ROOSEVELT'S TASK

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25048, 11 November 1944, Page 8

ROOSEVELT'S TASK

CRUCIAL FOUR YEAfes FORECAST OF PROGRAMME REPUBLICAN CO-OPERATION BY A. D. ttOTHMAN - 1 (Special to the New Zc/imkd Hirald) WASHINGTON, N OV The Presidential election produced many surprises. President Roosevelt? popular majority is below that of 19in but his Electoral College majority •' again more or less of landslide pro Po l! tions. There is warrant for current e- " pectations that the President Jj" during his coming difficult term 0 f office, invite Republican leaders to shar the task of shaping America's responsibilities in and toward the out. si;V world. The Democrat Party's represents, tion in Congress has been substantially increased, and its majority in the Senate will probably be unchanged. On th other hand, the Republicans lost a con! siderable number of State Administra" tions, just when it had been expected this was the field where a Republican resurgence would be most evident. It is significant that many leading isolationists in Congress, like Mr Hamilton Fish (Republican—New York) and Senator G. S. Nye (Republican—North Dakota), were defeated. All this easily lends itself to a variety of interpretations. Dealings With Congress The diminution of President Roo se . velt's popular majority can be interpreted as a not unqualified endorsement On the other hand, the increase in Democrat representation seems to be an endorsement of the vital elements of his policy, mainly in the foreign field. The Republican losses i n the State Administrations, however, seek difficult to reconcile in any way ivi'th the foregoing, since in 1940 one of the chief aspects of the Republican gains was the party's great increase in governorships. The change of the pictures in Congress is definitely favourable to Mr Roosevelt, but is c!°arly insufficient to give him a free hand in a legislative progtamme. If he should persist in his course of dealing with the new Congress in the manner with which he dealt with the last Congress he will undoubtedly run up against the same opposition; a recalcitrant Democrat-Republican bloc and Congressional resentment at being driven. The Republican minoritv in Congress remains a vigilant and coherent entity, and from the experience of the pist two years there is reason to believe that the President has realised it as such. It must not only be consulted; it must also be given a greater share in the actual determination of policy. Such are the qualities of statesman-. ship characterising the President as a : politician that it is_ felt lie will fully grasp the opportunity which an election of such mixed results presents to him. Posts Given to Republicans It will be recalled that when the war crisis loomed he reached out toward national unity and a bi-partisan operation of government by entrusting two important Cabinet posts to the Republicans, Colonel Knox (Navy) and Mr Stimson (War). Consultations, which Mr Hull held with the Republican leaders of Congress, and more recently with Mr Dewey's representative, offered further evidence of this. It is well known that President Roose. velt sees the next four years as the most difficult of his career at the White House —a career marked by a succession of ever-mounting crises. His next term can cap the reputation which has been built for history out of many elements of genuine greatness. If there is any conclusion to draff from the. known method of the President's thinking, it is safe to say that he can read the potentials and dangers of the present, situation better than any other man. The dangers lie wholly in antagonising those of the other party with which he has to work to such an extent that a complex postwar programme which, *in many respects, will require Congressional approval even more than the conduct of the war, may be defeated. The potential lies in inviting the participation of the Republican leaders to share the responsibility for America s and the world's future. Dewey Willing to Collaborate It is no secret that President Roosevelt sought the late Mr Wendell Willkie's participation after 1940, but failed because of Mr Willkie's suspicion that he would be the moon deriving light from the sun. On the other hand. Mr Dewey has shown an unparalleled willingness actively to share responsibility with President Roosevelt m making the peace as, for example, during the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations. Mr Dewey, by his large popular vote, and his obvious status in the Republican Party, cau be expected to aspirt to the Republican Presidential candidacy in 1948. It can also, therefore, be expected that he will continue w:tn his determination to participate in tOB present Administration's foreign policy negotiations. _ ... n The defeat of so many Republic 3 isolationists in Congress, _ moreover, frees Mr Dewey of a restraining influence, and heightens the likelihood tha as in his campaign there will be litti difference between his and Preside Roosevelt's ideas on foreign policy.. This is an excellent opportunity I President Roosevelt, and he is®... likely to 1 ake advantage of it. W not mean less credit for mm; it mean greater credit for him if ne M a united people behind him and cessfullv-achieved foreign programst show at the conclusion of his foun and final term, Three Points What, then, can be expected from the President's programme? , . . One. the retention of the ® oCia !JL. lation gains to which the R®P U °|' . have repeatedly agreed, with con sions to business to alleviate the bit i even if frequently unreasoning,, onism toward the President. He . maintain regulatory procedures OB? where they can be ngred upon J! . partisan accord as necessary i post-war period of adjustment Two. international co-operation ® the lines followed both Presid«nt Roosevelt and Mr Dewey paigu pronouncements, ints « ample room for a bi-partisan national programme. , n „ Three, lend-lease was a bold awJ orthodox conception. It compelled Pj port even from the must recant . unthinking elements opposed ™ r dent Roosevelt. The period gj require the same kind of rO . amelioration in America s economic lations with a world in crisis, P even more than in the war year . . It is therefore not inconceivable the President may advocate something like a 25 per cent general tariff Jr . tion for America as the single K j stimulant needed for an Internationa economic revival and an assurai the stability of the peace. ,