JAPAN'S MORAL DECLINE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 25021, 11 October 1944, Page 3

JAPAN'S MORAL DECLINE

HOW CAREER OF AGGRESSION BEGAN AMERICA'S VAIN PEACE EFFORTS By SUMNER WELLES, formerly United States Under-Secretary of State. From his book, " The Time for Decision " —World Copyright Reserved.

No. XXI. On that autumn day in 1915 whon I first arrived in Japan the control of governmental policy was still largely in the hands of those who had turned Japan to the West. They believed that Japan could best achieve pre-eminence in the Pacific and in the Far East by utilising the position as a world Power which she had achieved by her alliance with Great Britain and by her defeat of the Russian Empire in 1905. They advocated co-operating with the other great Powers and working toward their own future greatness by concentrating upon a liberal parliamentary system of government. The leaders of thought believed it wise to encourage the incipient trend toward liberalism and constitutional government because they were confident that the rapid industrialisation r.f the country would inevitably act as a counterbalance to the rapacious ambitions of the military classes and to the blind reaction of the ignorant peasant population. The Elder Statesmen ' In those days the real guiding force I in Japanese governmental life was exercised behind the scenes by that unique I body known as the Genro. or Elder Statesmen. Together with Emperor Mutsuhito, they had been responsible for the transformation of Japan within the miraculously short snace of 60 years. When the Genro disappeared the. Japanese people reverted to the "vicious and uncivilised customs oi antiquity." In 1915 the American Embassy undertook to represent the German interests in Japan, consequently I had the opportunity of seeing for myself not only the decency and consideration with which the Japanese authorities treated the prisoners whom they had captured in the German outposts in China, but likewise the real friendliness which tho Japanese people showed a foreigner even in the remote districts. The degenerate barbarity with which the prc-sent-dav military authorities of Japan have treated prisoners of war could not have been conceived of by anyone who, like myself, had visited their prison camps .30 years ago. Nevertheless, even at that period it would have been a very close observer indeed who did not realise that behind all the veneer lay a primeval military instinct. Events were already creating the Frankenstein monster which would soon cause the ruin of the _ Japanese people, and would crumble into ashes those more worthy ideals of the generation which first made Japan a Power. Schemes of Conquest Western Foreign Offices have known for a long time that as far back as the closing decades of the past century several projects, such as the Tanaka Memorial, were drawn up with the approval of the Japanese military and naval general staffs. The original plans envisaged not only the seizure of Korea and Manchuria, the islands in the Pacific, including the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, but the ejection of all European influence from the Pacific regions, the subjection of China, the elimination of Russia as a Pacific Power and the relegation of the Western Hemisphere to a subordinate position. The Tanaka Memorial may not actually have been the bible for Japanese official policy, but succeeding Japanese Governments have unquestionably taken every opportunity offered by the temporary embarrassments of' the other great Powers to realise, piece by piece, the achievement of this total plan. The Assault on Manchuria The agreement of the Japanese Government to enter the Nine-Power Treaty, and the other engagements undertaken at the Washington Conference of 1922, which laid equitable foundations for an adjustment of Pacific problems in a manner which should have been satisfactory to Japan, brought about the first open and violent opposition by the Japanese military and naval leaders to the continued control of policv by civilian Cabinets. From that time on, notwithstanding the granting of full manhood suffrage to the people in 1928, plots to assassinate the more liberal and Western-minded members of the Japanese Governments rapidlv increased. Assassination became the rule rather than the exception in Japanese public life By the autumn of 19.51 the purely militaristic elements in Japan hail gained control. The Japanese Government once again shrewdly selected tot its next move toward Asiatic domination a moment when the nations oi Europe were deeply preoccupied with other questions. World-wide economic depression had reached a culminating point when Japan launched her longplanned assault upon Manchuria m September, 19:51. The time could not have been better. The Government the United States, fully occupied with other problems, like all the major Powers, was caught by surprise. Britain's Attitude China immediately set the machinery of the League of Nations in operation, [•'or three weary months the optimists still hoped that a miracle would occur: that a League which had no force of it« own, whose members were unable or unwilling to take any practical action whatever, would be able to dictate to one of the largest standing armies in the world. By January of 1932 Japan had completely succeeded in her agression upon Manchuria. The Japanese Army and Navy continued their attack upon China through assaults at Shanghai and through the valley of the Yangtze. Secretary of State fetimson was the one figure in the Hoover Cabinet who saw clearly what effect the Japanese invasion would inevitably have upon the peace of the rest of the world, in M>ruarv, 1932. he urged the British Government to join with the United States, in view of the failure of the League to rope with the situation, in invoking the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. As is well known. the British Government, through Sir John Simon, tacitly made it. clear that it was not disposed to take the action suggested. American Aloofness This attitude did much to create in U.S.A. hostility toward British policy, and many otherwise objective persons placed the blame for the almost unlimited evils arising out, of Japan's successful aggression in Manchuria squarely upon the doorstep of the British Government. It has always seemed to me that this effort to place the burden of blame exclusively upon the British Government is not only unfair but unrealistic. The whole course of American policy from 1920 until 1932 had made it more and more evident that the American people were determined to evade any responsibility for the use of force in maintaining peace in the rest of the world. The fact that the action taken by Secretary Stinison was bitterly criticised throughout the country and was assailed in many quarters as being "warmongering' 1 was a case in point. The Japanese Government itself was fully aware of the position. The courageous attitude taken by both President Hoover and Secretary

of State Stimson, in announcing that the United States would refuse to recognise the acquisition ol territory gained tas a result of aggression likewise served some useful purpose at a moment when the standards of world morality had reached a desperately low point. In recent years it became a matter of actual knowledge to the United States that Japan, in flagrant violation of her treaty obligations and ol her obligations as a member of the League, had undertaken on a vast scale the fortification of the most strategic islands in the mandated areas. Several factors made it extremely difficult for the executive branch of the Government at Washington to take any course which would have given Japan pause. Congress was reluctant to approve naval appropriations' for the fortification of United States Pacific outposts. The American public were reluctant to bo persuaded that for the sake of their own security any policy other than one of isolation was necessary. I'"or American diplomacy or foreign policy to have been effective during the five years preceding Pearl Harbour, public opinion would have had to express its readiness to support positive acts on the part of the Government. Hut no such popular support for a positive policy existed. Moreover, Washington's ability to manoeuvre was almost ended by the Neutrality Act. Oil and Scrap Iron It has lately been said that the United States Government should have shown greater vigour when the Japanese sank the Panay on the Yangtze River in December, 19.'37. I have always felt that the President, who handled the entire incident personally, could, under the conditions which then existed, have shown neither greater wisdom nor greater determination. The prestige and dignity of this country were fully tipheld. Short of bellicose action, to which the American people would not have been receptive, the President could have taken no more positive step than that of addressing the Emperor direct. In the last months prior to Pearl Harbour, when Congress had finally removed many of the obstacles to executive action, the adoption of a more positive policy was made extremely difficult by the increasing probability that the policies of the European Axis would eventually force the United States into war. The insistent demands of our highest military and naval authorities that diplomacy prevent any hostilities with Japan until the last possible moment, in order that the United States might not find herself confronted with a war in both oceans, were regarded—and I think rightly—as the paramount consideration. "That was the compelling reason why the Administration continued to permit until only three months prior to Pearl Harbour the exportation of certain grades of oil And scrap iron to Japan. In my judgment our policy did delay the Japanese attack for at least a brief period A Sincere Ambassador The last stages of the history of -the relations between .Japan and the United States prior to Pearl Harbour are of fascinating interest. The appointment in January, 1941, of Admiral Nomura as Ambassador was the first step. In my first conversations with the Ambassador after his arrival in Washington I obtained the definite impression that he, at least as an individual, was sincerely seeking an adjustment. T bav<* always had reason to believe, and I have I not changed my opinion, that the selection of Admiral Nomura as Ambassador was a blind—made more effective because for some time Admiral Nomura himself was not aware that ho was being used for that purpose. But it is unquestionable that he must have known in the final days of his mission that an attack by his country upon the United States was inevitable. Konoye Seeks a Meeting In Tokyo, Ambassador Grew had done his utmost, in conditions of extreme delicacy—and, at times, of appalling difficulty—to make clear to the .Japanese Government and people how grave the situation was becoming. The reports of Ambassador Grew from the outset of his mission to the last days—seen in the light of the present —reflected with amazing accuracy the true trend of events. Upon two occasions during those final months the President received urgent detailed requests from Prince Konoye, then still Prime Minister, to meet him at some point in the Pacific in order to try to solve through personal conference a situation becoming more and more insoluble as the weeks passed. Prince Konoye was a highlycivilised Japanese statesman, weak and vacillating in character, but imbued with some moderate tendencies. 1 myself am not certain to this day of the purpose behind those requests: whether he hoped to utilise the solemn significance which would attach to any official agreement into which he entered with the President as a means of overriding his fanatical military and naval war lords; or whether this again was a deliberate ruse upon the part of the .Japanese Government to secure for itself a better striking position. It must be admitted that it is conceivable, in view of the treacherous nature of the attack upon Pearl Harbour, that the Japanese may have had some even more sinister purpose in seeking this conference with the President. A Despicable Job The President determined not to venture upon what seemed to be a forlorn hope. With the removal of Prince Konoye as Prime Minister in October, 1941, and the appointment of General Tojo as his successor anv possibility of negotiations vanished. For that reason the notorious Kiirusy mission became even more fantastic in retrospect. No responsible official in the Administration was ingenuous enough to believe for an instant that any practical benefit could be gained from Mr Kurusu's mission, nor did his oily manner, his inability to present any convincing reasons for his sudden mission, add any conviction to the official conversations in which he attempted to engage. His last call at the Department of State, at the very moment that word was received of the attack on Pearl Harbour, was thoroughlv in keeping with the despicable nature of the job he had begn sent to perform. Further extracts from ''The Time for Decision" will appear on this PJIR6-