ON THE MOVE IN BURMA

New Zealand Herald, Volume 81, Issue 24851, 24 March 1944, Page 2

ON THE MOVE IN BURMA

For long periods at a time the wild and mountainous borderland between India and Burma seems to become the forgotten battlefront. something happens to bring it into the light again. About this time last year the Allied world learned with acute disappointment that the British and Indian troops which had been operating in the Arakan area, and had driven a considerable distance south toward Akyab, had been forced to withdraw. It was the one sector on which the Japanese hold on Burma was known to have been challenged. To find that gains, slowly and painfully made, had had to be largely relinquished was therefore the more disheartening. Those who felt it so had not then been told of Brigadier Wingate and his adventurous force operating deep in enemy-held territory further north, challenging the Japanese in the jungle where he was supposed to be supreme, raiding his bases and disrupting his communications. When these facts were known they brought a good measure of consolation for what had happened to the drive toward Akyab. To put into proper perspective the present Japanese attack on the frontier guards in the Chin Hills region, and his apparent penetration of Manipur State further north, it must be considered in relation to everything else that is happening on the frontier. It is not pleasant to have the enemy on the offensive in Burma when it was assumed that he was about to be made to fight for what he holds. But it should not be too hastily assumed that he has seized the initiative on a large scale. The sector involved is one of three on the long frontier where the opposing forces are face to face. In the Arakan coastal theatre the Japanese have already tried a counteroffensive designed to check the steady, if slow, penetration by forces in which British, Indian and West African troops are associated. It was firmly and decisively beaten off, and the pressure on the defences covering Akyab continues. Furthest north, American and Chinese troops are operating in the Hukawng Valley largely as a screen for the Ledo Road, designed ultimately to link up with the Burma Road and reopen direct communication with China. There have been other activities in the north, as far east as the frontier of Yunnan, but they are beyond the range of the Burma border theatre. The sector of which 'the Chin Hills form a part lies between these two foci of activity—some 100 miles north of Arakan and roughly 200 miles south of the Hukawng Valley. Its main significance is that it covers the Manipur Road, a highway running from the Assam railway—which goes as far north as Ledo—to the Burma frontier via Imphal, capital of Manipur State. Before it reaches the border it forks, a branch turning south to the Chin Hills. The importance of the area now in dispute to the Allied forces, and its value as a prize to the Japanese, thus become clear. Behind the road-head, inside Manipur State, the supply bases for the Allied forces, naturally, are located. Imphal is the main centre. Further back again, beyond the mountainous border region, the flying fields from which the enemy is continually harried are doubtless to be found. If, probing and infiltrating, the Japanese were able to break through effectively, they would neutralise the threat to their lines on the central Chindwin River front, which covers the railway from Mandalay to Myitkyina. The whole supply system for northern Burma depends on this railway and on the lirawaddy, which lies east of it. These facts would be sufficient motive for a defensive-offensive against the Allied spearhead stretching out from the Manipur Road. A large-scale drive into Assam would yield far richer fruit. The singletrack, narrow gauge railway traversing that province is the main, for practical purposes the only, link between India, the builders of the Ledo Road, and the troops which guard them and clear the way for them. Much is at stake in defence of this frontier section. From what General Auchinleck has said, the Japanese attack is not being taken lightly. There is no continuous front in any of these Burma areas. The nature of the countiy forbids it. The enemy may, therefore, achieve some degree of penetration. There is good ground for believing, however, that his infiltration tactics will be matched as they were at Arakan. He still has to counter the threat of the airborne force in his rear, on the Irrawaddy south of Myitkyina, and to meet the Chinese and American advance in the north. His turn to the offensive in the centre must not be dismissed as negligible, but its full importance cannot yet be judged.