The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1943 NEW PACIFIC INITIATIVE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24748, 23 November 1943, Page 2

The New Zealand Herald AUCKLAND, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1943 NEW PACIFIC INITIATIVE

By their attack on the Gilbert Islands, the Americans have brought the war back into the Central Pacific, where it started for them almost two years ago with the treacherous Japanese swoop on Pearl Harbour. Since then, apart from the thunders of the Battle of Midway and raiding operations, this vast region has been relatively deserted. The chief zones of activity were in the south against the Solomons and New Guinea, and in the north in tbe Aleutians. Now attention has been dramatically switched from the enemy's right and left flanks to his centre. The rumbling of the approaching storm had been heard for a week past in the bombing by Liberator and carrier-based planes of the enemy's strongpoints in the Gilberts and on the neighbouring Nauru and Marshall Islands. Now 7 United States Marines have gone in for the kill. Their action fulfils the recent promise of Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States-. Pacific Fleet, who is directing the operations, that the Japanese would be blasted from their island strongholds in the most direct manner. The immediate objectives are the capture of Makin and Tarawa Islands, the former (the most northerly of the Gilberts) for its seaplane base and radio station, and the latter (100 miles to the south) for its large air base. Tarawa is the key to the whole group. The other islands would almost certainly be involved in its fall, which would also lay open the southern flank of the Marshalls. There the Japanese have for long been building up a strong forward base at Jaluit. As Tarawa covers Jaluit, so Jaluit covers Truk, the Malta of Micronesia and supply base for New Guinea and the Solomons.

A more immediate consequence, presuming the Americans clear the Gilberts, will be the shortening of the Pacific supply line by thousands of miles. Owing to the vast distances involved, the Pacific commanders are much occupied with problems of logistics—of transporting, quartering, and supplying the forces employed and to be employed. Admiral Nimitz by his initiative in the Gilberts aims to provide an easier solution to the logistic problem. In their vast defensive perimeter enclosing the north-west Pacific, the Japanese had included a deep salient at the south-east extremity by seizing the Gilbert and Ell ice groups. This move established them across the direct line between the North American Pacific coast and the South Pacific zone including New Zealand and East Australia. It also brought the enemy close to Samoa and Fiji. Allied convoys were therefore forced to make a long detour to avoid the danger zone. Instead of cutting across they had to go round. The clearing of the Ellice group early in September blunted the enemy salient. Success in the Gilberts would pinch it off. Allied convoys would be enabled to take a much more direct route to the fighting zones in the Solomons and New Guinea. From San Francisco to the Solomons direct the distance is 6000 miles : via New Caledonia it is 8400 miles, and via Auckland 9000 miles The saving on the round trip would be 4800 to 6000 miles. On the naval side, there is the improvement in communications between the South Pacific and Central Pacific commands. The enemy loses some of the advantages of working on interior lines by the increased opportunities for mutual support. And with shorter lines of supply to protect, their task forces can be reinforced by the escort vessels and aircraft freed from convoy duty. These are most practical considerations and there i- still another. The fate of Nauru and Ocean Islands hangs on the outcome of the struggle for the near by Gilberts. This is no small and local matter when it is remembered how Australian and New Zealand farm production depends on phosphates, and how hungry the world is for the milk products, fats and meats the Dominions can supply, given ample fertiliser. Returning to strategic considerations, the thrust in the Central Pacific is bound to affect the Japanese defence of Rabaul, 1600 miles to the south-west. The enemy is hard-pressed by General Mac Arthur's converging drive from New Guinea and the Solomons. Admiral Nimitz's initiative in the Gilberts may well cause a dangerous diversion of enemy supplies and reinforcements from his right flank to the centre. Even if both demands can be met by the enemy, the provision for the Pacific must subtract from the Japanese force available to meet Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's moves in the Indian Ocean, or a thrust at the Japanese homeland itself based on the Aleutians in the North Pacific. In fact, Japan should before long learn that Tojo's warnings of the Allies' growing power were not idly spoken, while those who have been complaining of the neglect of the Pacific by Allied strategy may have cause to revise their judgments.