MEDITERRANEAN STALEMATE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24747, 22 November 1943, Page 2

MEDITERRANEAN STALEMATE

I Politically South Europe has proved to be the "soft under-belly" of the enemy. Geographically it is ribbed from end to end by si iff mountain barriers, as was noted in this column when Mr. Churchill coined his vivid phrase. The hard facts of geography have been hammered home in the last few months. The Sicilian campaign was reasonably successful, although close observers noted how three German divisions, after being deserted by the more numerous .Italians, were able to exploit the terrain to impose delay on the Allies and make good their own escape in the end. Since then has occurred the prolonged and more serious hold-up on the Italian mainland. The excuses offered are valid enough—-bad weather increasing I he effect of enemy demolitions in hilly and mountainous country that increases the effects of enemy mines, and offers him an endless succession of natural defence lines. Furthermore, his front is short, about 80 miles long, and he can hold the whole of it in strength with a relatively jsmall expenditure of force. These factors

excuse the slow progress of the Fifth and Eighth Armies, but reflect very seriously on Allied strategy. In Italy, we are accepting battle conditions which best suit the enemy. Ways should be found of robbing him of these advantages and of stretching his power, already extended and strained. The Allies possess the means in sea power, air supremacy, and in the disposition of at least four armies based in the Mediterranean and at present unemployed. They should not be tied to the campaign in South Italy. It is true the thrust into the Aegean has met with failure. That was not due to the general conception, however, but to the omission of Rhodes from the first objectives. Anglo-Ameri-can prestige cannot afford to accept stalemate in the Mediterranean, a fact encouraging the hope that a more enterprising and mobile strategy will soon find decisive expression.