RECAPTURE OF KHARKOV

New Zealand Herald, Volume 80, Issue 24534, 17 March 1943, Page 2

RECAPTURE OF KHARKOV

Although the enemy has won successes of first-rate importance in the Ukraine, it would be a mistake to draw pessimistic conclusions as to the prospects on the Eastern front. An obvious corrective is offered by the continued progress of the Red Armies west and north-west of Moscow. It will probably be found that: the root cause of the set-back in the Ukraine was that the Russians outran their supply. It should be remembered that in less than three months the Red Armies advanced 350 miles from Stalingrad to Kharkov, and thence pushed on another 100 miles westward to Lebedin and 120 miles southward to Pavlograd. If they have had to give up the miles beyond Kharkov, they still hold the leagues west of Stalingrad—the whole vast territories of the Don basin and the North Can casus. The distances they travelled tell the story. It is the story of the campaigns in the Western Desert once again—the over-stretching of long supply lines followed by defeat and retreat until the other protagonist was hoppled. On the steppes the handicap of distance was increased by the early thaw, a disadvantage

that bore far more heavily on the Russians, fighting much farther in advance of their bases and using twice devastated lines of communication. The set-back does not, therefore, reflect on the fighting spirit of the Red Armies. When supply catches up with them, they should be found ready to resume the offensive. Meanwhile, by the capture of Kharkov, the enemy has shored up his front in South Russia, confirmed his hold on most of the Donetz Basin, and secured the communications of the large forces collected there. He has also obtained a position from which he can attempt to mend his broken fences north from Kharkov to Orel. His drive toward Bielgorod suggests that he intends to make the attempt.