THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MAY 15, 1942 GAS IN WARFARE

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24274, 15 May 1942, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MAY 15, 1942 GAS IN WARFARE

Hard on the heels of Mr. Churchill's warning to the Germans of the consequences if gas should be used against Russia come reports of its employment in the Crimean offensive. Stories are beginning to circulate about a new chemical agent which cannot properly be classed as a poison gas because it merely makes its victims unconscious, permitting them to be taken prisoner. All these reports should be accepted with reserve at present. The Germans may or may not have begun to use gas. They may or may not be preparing to do so. Whatever the actual position, there is no doubt that to spread stories, especially concerning new and extremely effective forms of gas, and the tremendous results to be expected from them, is consistent with that war of nerves which the Germans have carried on persistently ever since hostilities began. Actually, suggestions that the enemy is about to resort to gas warfare, especially if they seem to have been circulated with his consent, are a very good indication that he is not contemplating anything of the kind. Surprise is one of the most necessary conditions if a gas attack is to bring the maximum results possible. To resign all chance of catching the enemy unawares would not be like the usual German method. It is while denying any intention of using gas, or accusing the Allies of doing it, that the Germans are most likely to be preparing to launch attacks with its aid. There is no mystery about the way gas can be used or the results that it can produce. The records of the last war are available. They must be read with a realisation that all the belligerents are known to have done a good deal of research in this field since 1918. If gas were to be used again on a large scale new methods and even new materials might easily be produced. Before deciding too hastily that this is likely, it is well to recall the circumstances in which chemical warfare was embarked upon in 1915. The armies on both sides had gone to ground. Frunts had been stabilised, and it Lad become apparent that, with the fire power of modern weapons, the break-through about

which the High Commands dreamed could be achieved only with enormous superiority of manpower and a colossal expenditure of human lif©. It wa3 in these circumstances that the Germans discharged clouds of chlorine gas against the Allied lines at Ypres in April, 1915. They nearly succeeded in breaking the line. If they had followed up the initial advantage more vigorously they might have succeeded com- - pletely. They never again enjoyed the advantage of utter surprise, for gas was very soon adopted by all the belligerents as one of the accepted weapons of trench warfare. It was tactically valuable, but never again looked like being a decisive factor. The point to be emphasised is that the use of gas was a feature of static warfare, the parties lying heavily entrenched in a condition of prolonged stalemate. It had a nuisance value all the time, was employed in concentrated form to hamper artillery, to produce fatigue and lower the morale of trench garrisons, and to interfere with movement and communications. Lite application in this way to the 2000mile Russian front, where the war hitherto has been largely mobile, would be a very different proposition. The position on the Kerch Peninsula, in the Crimea, seems to make gas attack feasible. It is a narrow front, and there are reported to be powerful entrenchments of the permanent type. But Kerch is only a small sector and even if some form of gas has proved effective there it does not follow it [ will be equally so elsewhere. Such an agent as the notorious mustard gas, which persists for a long time in any area thoroughly drenched with it, might in the end be as great , a menace to the side using it as to those attacked. Any ground captured would have to be thoroughly decontaminated before it could safely be occupied. All told, while the possibilities of chemical war- ' fare reappearing cannot be dis- j missed lightly, it is not safe to assume that the same materials and methods as those employed in the last war would prove equally use- ' ful now when conditions and tactics 1 are very different. '