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THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1942 THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Out of the many reports of operations on the long Russian front a picture of the general situation is now beginning to develop. According to the latest information, the tenacious German defence of various key points, mostly the larger towns, has created a front running in a series of loops. The Russians, thrusting with cavalry and ski troops between these enemy bastions, have penetrated far beyond . them, and thus created bays corresponding to the loops the Germans hold. In some instances the Russian by-passing process on both sides has led to complete encirclement. This has been the fate of a whole army based on Staraya Russa, where a veritable state of siege has been created. It has been the most dramatic as well as the most extensive example of the enveloping tactics. • The fate of this army still hangs in the balance. Much depends on the question whether it can be relieved, is forced to surrender, or fights to the stage of annihilation. It now appears that the town of Orel, on the main railway line south of Moscow, is in a similar plight. The Russians have been sufficiently certain of their grip on it to send a formal demand for surrender. This has been rejected and the fight goes on. A third example of the encirclement method was Mojaisk. When the Germans called off their offensive three months ago and began to give ground, they spoke of retiring to a more favourable line to await the spring. That may have been their motive and their intention. It is evident their plans have been badly disrupted. Whatever line they meant to establish, it was not the one on which they now stand. No general staff would deliberately choose to dispose its forces over such a series of loops and bays, with transport and communications seriously complicated, and the chance of threats to flank or rear developing in a dozen different places. It is true the thrusting Russians face the same risk, but their forces are obviously more mobile than the German, and have a chance, if cut off, of sinking into the countryside, among their fellow Russians. It cannot be imagined that the Germans have welcomed the penetration as providing tactical opportunities. Encirclement on the grand scale has long been a cardinal feature of German plans, but this succession of salients and counter-salients has obviously been forced on them, and their risks are greater than the Russian. In addition, the line created offers a thorny problem to be solved before the much-heralded spring offensive can be launched. It must be straightened somehow. To retire from the present bastions would not be a good prelude to an offensive. To drive back or destroy the advanced Russian forces would involve a long series of virtually local offensives distracting to the mounting of a grand attack. It is premature, however, to talk of a spring offensive yet, for the Russian winter has not lost its sting. Meanwhile it has to be shown that the Germans can hold even the present awkward line. The position at Staraya Russa is the most interesting in its possibilities. If the Russians can seal the fate of the 16th German Army, beleaguered there, it will be a notable triumph, and for Hitler a disastrous defeat. Moreover, as suggested in to-day's cable messages, a German retirement in this sector would probably force evacuation of the Leningrad area. Should the Russians make reasonable progress toward Pskov, the Germans besieging Leningrad would be left with no exit except the narrow gateway between the northern end of Lake Peipus and the coast. A retirement by this route into Estonia might have results affecting the whole front down to the Sea of Azov. This latter section is the most vital for Hitler if, as is generally assumed, he hopes to resume his drive toward the Caucasus—and oil. Orel, Kursk and Kharkov are three bastions required to cover this sector. The envelopment of Orel and the recently reported advance toward the Dneiper bend menace the springboard for another thrust to the Caucasus. The situation along the whole front is full of great possibilities. The Germans have already lost much, and are threatened with the loss of more, that must be retrieved to set their offensive against Russia on its feet again. Failure to do it might develop into a disaster from which there could be no recovery. That is why every scrap of assistance that can be given to Russia ii?, vital also to the whole Allied cause.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19420306.2.37

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24216, 6 March 1942, Page 4

Word Count
769

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1942 THE RUSSIAN FRONT New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24216, 6 March 1942, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. FRIDAY, MARCH 6, 1942 THE RUSSIAN FRONT New Zealand Herald, Volume 79, Issue 24216, 6 March 1942, Page 4

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