THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941 ROSTOV AND TOBRUK

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24136, 1 December 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1941 ROSTOV AND TOBRUK

Both points of Hitler's two-pronged thrust into the Middle East have been broken off by Allied offensives, in the north at Rostov and in the south at Tobj'uk. Whether the moves were concerted or not, they are serving to drive the enemy from the approaches to the landbridge that connects Europe, Asia and Africa, from the Suez Canal, and from three of the world's richest oilfields. Those who had been demanding that Britain open up a second front should now be able to recognise that the Libyan offensive represents the extension of the main battle to the south, so that it is stretched from Murmansk to Tobruk. To fight on a common front is better than opening a second front. Empire and Soviet are to-day engaged on one vast operation—active resistance to the German drive to the East, the old "Drang nach Osten." Russians are not lacking in imagination and can scarcely fail to recognise the complementary nature of the operations at R-ostov and at Tobruk and to be heartened at the active British support on the southernmost flank. Just as heartening to the watching world is to observe that the two great Allies, in spite of repeated and dire setbacks on land, are each capable of wresting the initiative from the enemy and pressing it vigorously. It is a strong omen —a "bull point" for the Allies—that will not go unnoted in Tokio or Ankara, Vichy or Madrid. Marshal Timoshenko's recapture of Rostov is of the greatest significance. First and foremost it means that the Marshal has not only been successful in re-forming the southern group of Russian armies shattered west and east of Kiev, but he has also been able to fashion a striking force out of them. When Marshal Budenny was relieved of the command, the situation was disquieting, with the enemy driving across the Ukraine toward North Caucasia and the Caspian Sea. By the skilful use of rearguards to slow up the enemy while he reorganised his main forces well to the rear, Marshal Timoshenko went far to stabilising the position while he prepared a counter-stroke. This was launched south-westward from Voroshilovgrad several days ago and, by the threat to Rundstedt's right wing on the Sea of Azov, opened the way to the key centre of Rostov. The Russian success may be partly due to the diversion of enemy forces to the Moscow battle, partly to the unreliability of the Italian, Hungarian and Slovakian levies incorporated in Rundstedt's army group, and partly to his lengthening line of communications. In any case these factors do not subtract from the credit due to Marshal Timoshenko. He had provided against such a chance and was able ,to take it when it came, thanks to his own foresight and the stoutness of the Red soldiers. The key to the whole southern front is thus restored to Russian hands, for Rostov is the northern gateway to Caucasia, the advance guard of the Caspian region and Astrakhan, and the connecting link between Moscow and Baku. The success at Rostov dispels for the time being any anxiety about committing forces in the Western Desert, while the immediate risk remained of the enemy thrusting down through the Caucasus to threaten the right flank of the Empire's position in the Middle East. Gains in Libya would be dearly bought at the cost of an enemy stroke toward the Persian Gulf. Against this contingency and as a buttress to Turkey, Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn recently suggested that "it may be considered wiser to keep our Middle East forces in reserve." Mr. Churchill and General Auchinleck took the bold course, however, in committing an important part of those forces to the offensive in the Western Desert. Thus they sought to reassure Moscow by engaging in active operations on the one land front open to them and now they have received reassurance in turn from Moscow. The success at Rostov must postpone any enemy thrust into Caucasia and Iran. It is true that the enemy possesses in the Crimea another starting point against Caucasia, but its value is discounted while Rostov remains in Russian hands. Thus is brought out the interdependence of operations in South Russia and Libya, and the fact thatEmpire and Soviet are fighting on a common front toward a common objective and with important success.