THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941 PACIFIC NAVAL STRATEGY

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24132, 26 November 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1941 PACIFIC NAVAL STRATEGY

The American-Japanese negotiations at Washington continue wrapped in mystery. Great Britain, China and Holland are content to leave their conduct in the hands of Mr. Cordell Hull, who occasionally takes Mr. Kurusu and Mr. Nomura to the White House. The Japanese, in spite of sabre-rattling in Tokio, are obviously marking time pending the development of the campaigns in Russia and Libya. Hitler tricked them over- both his original pact with Russia and his sudden drive to Moscow. In consequence no considerations of honour bind the Japanese to the Axis, which they would promptly desert if the inducement were great enough or if the Germans were to become bogged down in Russia. America's determination to maintain China's territorial integrity prevents a bribe to Japan at China's expense and the steady progress of the Germans in Russia does not hold out much hope of the Nazi armies stopping until they have occupied the most valuable of the Soviet's European territories. Further Japanese aggression has therefore to be studied as the most likely development, accompanied by the entry of the United States into the war for the purpose of preserving the status quo in the Pacific. It is therefore not surprising to read in yesterday's cablegrams Rear-Admiral Stirling's advice that the American Pacific Fleet should be transferred forthwith from Hawaii to Singapore. He is not the only retired American naval officer who holds this view. Captain Frederick L. Oliver, naval correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, urged even last year that the Pacific Fleet should be stationed at Singapore. Such a move might deter the Japanese from going further south. If it failed in this object, it would at least prevent the American Navy glaring at the enemy across 4000 miles of ocean from Hawaii. Certain lines of development are clear if America and Japan go to war. In the first place the Japanese would be anxious to avoid a major naval engagement. True, as RearAdmiral Stirling points out, the Japanese Fleet, with its 12 battleships, nine aircraft carriers and numerous fast cruisers and destroyers, is a formidable force. But if she lost any of these ships her capacity to replace them quickly is very limited. On the other hand, America's launching of great battleships ahead of schedule proves the speed of her production, the vast resources at her command and her ability to make losses good. Only if the American Fleet were based on Singapore and in a position to obstruct in time a movement of troops by sea to Thailand or Malaya might a great naval battle be forced on the' Japanese. A war with Japan would certainly develop into a blockade, to which the Japanese are so peculiarly vulnerable. The activities of the blockading fleet have to extend from the Aleutian Islands in the north to the mandated islands in the south. Through this long line of ■blockade Japanese cruisers and merchant raiders would undoubtedly from time to time escape and inflict damage on Allied shipping. In such a war bases would be of the first importance. Most vulnerable of the American bases is the island of Guam, whose real fortification has only barely begun. In spite of urgent naval advice, a niggardly and shortsighted Congress refused for years the necessary defence votes, as a result of which, hemmed in by the Japanese mandated islands, Guam would probably fall an easy prey. In the Far East itself America would then be left with Cavite, in Manila Bay, but would, of course, have the use of Hongkong—of doubtful value, and of Singapore and the important Dutch base at Sourabaya. Cainranh Bay, in Indo-China, is unfortunately in Japanese hands. At Pearl Harbour, in Hawaii, the American Pacific Fleet would be almost invulnerable. In its long journeys across the Pacific the Fleet has at least three routes, in which it would be exposed to swift attacks from Japan's fast cruisers. The direct route to the Far East lies through the Japanese Marshall, Caroline and Mariana groups and is far too dangerous. The northern, by way of the Aleutian Islands, has weather difficulties and, apart from a link-up with Russia and a way of attack on Japanese fishing grounds, is not likely to be used so much as the southern approach by Samoa and through the Torres Straits up to the Dutch East Indies and Singapore. All these are warlike considerations. Japan has not yet thrown caution to the winds and Lord Halifax is still optimistic. Naval men, however, must plan ahead of the optimism of diplomacy.