THE NEW Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941 JAPAN AT THE CROSSROADS

New Zealand Herald, Volume 78, Issue 24127, 20 November 1941, Page 8

THE NEW Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1941 JAPAN AT THE CROSSROADS

Questions of peace or war in the Pacific will be answered by the outcome of the current negotiations in Washington between America and Japan. While both parties want peace, their respective views on the terms seem to be completely irreconcilable. Each asks of the other concessions that neither could conceivably grant. American public opinion would not tolerate the desertion of China and the economic appeasement of Japan, any more than the Japanese would agree to a retreat from East Asia. The deadlock is complete, but deadlocks do not necessarily end in war. The parties could agree to differ and still live in unamicable peace. At least that is true for America, and also for the British Empire and the Dutch East Indies, whom Washington can be considered to represent in the present parleys. But it is probably not true for Japan. Past aggressions have brought on her the economic and financial sanctions imposed by the A-B-D Powers, affecting 85 per cent of her foreign trade. Much of the trade is vital to her, particularly exports of silk and imports of cotton, wool, oil, iron and fertilisers. This virtual blockade is weakening, and Japan's economy could not survive it for long. Either Tokio must surrender or she must attempt to break the stranglehold while she is strong enough to try. That is what the Japanese Foreign Minister had in mind when he told the Diet that the time for negotiations was drawing to a close. Japan cannot delay indefinitely while her economic lifeblood drains away. Failing a settlement, therefore, Japan will be forced to take the initiative—and soon. The question then turns to the direction she will take. Anxiety for her home front might suggest an attack on Vladivostok, the one point from which Japan proper is vulnerable. Against such a plan rise up several objections—the Arctic weather would impede the hardiest campaigners, the United States is particularly sensitive in this area where Asia approaches America, and the Russian bear is strong and still sleeping in the Far East. In his speech on Monday the Japanese Foreign Minister seemed to count on the neutrality pact with the S6viet holding good. In any case an attack on Siberia does not promise quick returns to reduce the shortages caused by the A-B-D blockade. The same objection applies to a campaign based on Indo-China and aimed at cutting the Burma Road. First on Tokio's policy list and dearest to the Japanese heart is the settlement of the China incident, but democratic, sanctions have posed more immediate problems. Unless Japan can command certain commodities she lacks —oil and iron are the prime examples—her war machine will slow down and finally stop, and her hopes in China and elsewhere be disappointed. The effect of sanctions may therefore be to direct her eyes toward the nearest sources of the needed commodities, that is, toward the East Indies and Malaya. There she would have to accept the risk of fighting at the end of long sea lines of communication and incurring the hostility of the two greatest naval Powers. Thus past aggressions and subsequent sanctions have brought Japan to the brink of the abyss. Proceedings in the Diet do not' suggest that she Tvill be able to draw back. How then might she be expected to proceed in her perilous leap after quick returns? The oil of Borneo might be attacked from Camranh Bay, but Japan requires more than oil. The Dutch East Indies could supply most of her needs if Singapore did not deny the approach to the rich storehouses of Java and Sumatra. It would not be surprising, therefore, if Japan recognised in Thailand the solution of her strategic problem. Thailand has been called the Belgium of the Far East. Its occupation would serve several Japanese purposes. To the west, Burma and its oil would be threatened, as well as the Burma Road, while a footing would be won on the Indian Ocean at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca. To the south, a land frontier would be obtained with Malaya and its iron ore, and a long step taken on the road to Singapore. The rainy season is ended, and Japan is already established in the useful land base of Indo-China, on Thailand's frontier. And Thailand is no match for Japan. Such would appear to be the hard logic of further aggression, although the Japanese and logic often seem to be strangers.