THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 1941 THE NEW SITUATION

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23999, 24 June 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 1941 THE NEW SITUATION

Mr. Churchill's declaration of the line to be followed by the British Empire in the Russo-German conflict is commonsense and completely satisfactory. He starts with the incontrovertible proposition that "any man or State who fights against Nazism will have our aid." Russia has just graduated into this belligerent class and, therefore, "we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and to the Russian people." Nothing could be clearer and fairer than this undertaking, although it depends upon what is possible, in the sense of both the means and ways of delivering them. So far as the technical and other assistance mentioned by Sir. Churchill goes, aircraft could solve the problem of access. And such a contribution would probably meet Russia's need better than any other. She possesses the manpower and materials in immense profusion, but lacks the organisers, the skill and the direction that expert personnel could supply. Mr. Churchill also promises to interest Britain's Allies and friends on Russia's behalf. The undertaking has great potential value in the case of the United States, if the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act were made to apply to Russia. No official declaration of the attitude of the American Government has yet been made, and that is not surprising in view of the Soviet's record, but Mr. Churchill ventures the prediction that Hitler's attempt, by the attack on Russia, to confuse the aim of the democracies will prove woefully mistaken.

At the same time, and Mr. George Bernard Shaw to the contrary, the new Russian factor in the war situation should not, be overestimated. Mr. Churchill would not have us cherish any illusions. Perhaps he remembers the misplaced hopes of the last war in the Russian steamroller. The Soviet notwithstanding, he concludes with a clarion call to redouble our efforts and strike with united strength. Indeed, it would seem that Mr. Churchill, who forecast the German attack two months ago, holds no sure opinion of the Russian power of resistance. In one passage he speaks of the Nazi aggression as no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of Britain, a prelude to be played out before winter comes, according to Hitler's hopes. He even pictures the German Army using Russia as a stepping stone to India and China. His references are carefully guarded, but the moral is plain. The diversion of Hitler's drive into the East and the expenditure of his forces on the Russian colossus are clear gains in the short run. If Russia should develop her traditional talent for fighting a stubborn defensive war, then Hitler's strength may be seriously sapped. But the British Empire cannot afford to count on that, cannot afford to sit back with Mr. Shaw and smile while Russia smashes Germany. Instead, the opportunity presented by Hitler's turning away into the East must be used to increase and intensify the onslaught on Germany in the West and to fortify the Allied position at all points. Mr. Churchill proclaims this intention in every line of his speech. So can we best bring aid to Russia, defend ourselves, and prepare the final overthrow of Nazism.

It is the more necessary to use the opening presented by Hitler —to go while the going is good—because of the chance that Germany's gamble in Russia may succeed. The most ordinary prudence demands that this possibility be taken into account. Hitler has not taken the heavy risk without the most careful calculations. His attack plainly indicates the opinion, based on the painstaking estimates of the German General Staff, that the Russian venture can be made to pay. The hope is that the expenditure of men and material will be more than recouped by the receipts of wheat and oil, labour force and strategic gains. Hitler counts on quick victory at a cost he can afford to pay in return for virtual immunity from the blockade weapon, and for the capture of positions from which he can pursue his drive toward Suez, or thrust down upon India, or reach across to join hands and forces with Japan. Mr. Churchill envisages these possibilities, and also the facingabout of Hitler for a final reckoning in the West, reinforced and provisioned by the vast loot of Russia. He does not raise these contingencies as bogeys to affright us, but as risks reasonably to be reckoned, and as spurs to activate and energise us iri a mighty effort to exploit the Russian diversion and so defeat Hitler's cold-blooded calculation.