THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1941 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23969, 20 May 1941, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS TUESDAY, MAY 20, 1941 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Russia's interest in the new theatre of war in the Middle Last is just as vital as her interest in the Balkans. Turkey is the bridge between the two regions and possession of the Straits a cardinal factor in either case. No definition of Soviet policy toward the impact of Nazi aggression into this vital sphere has been given or can be expected from the j sphinx of the Kremlin. Ihe world is • left to deduce what it can from the I trend of events, a trend that in i recent weeks seems to have turned I away from the democracies and toward the totalitarian States. Pointers have been given bv the recent stiffening of the American I attitude toward Russia. I ntil rei cently the United States had been i, making a patient effort to improve ; j relations with the Soviet, a task j undertaken by the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles. I The moral embargo on the export of ' essential war materials to Russia j was lifted, and conversations were opened at Washington with the ! Russian Ambassador. The end of this appeasement phase arrived a fortnight ago. when Washington halted all exports of war materials to the Soviet. Since then even sharper action has been taken by the seizure at San Francisco of a Uruguayan cargo of wool and leather en route in ! a Swedish steamer to Russia. Apparently Washington has given up hope of wooing Moscow, a decision that may be rejnforced by actual information on the present direction of Soviet policy. At one stage, however, it seemed as if Mr. Welles' wooing of M. Molotoff had made some impression. For several weeks in March and April the Kremlin took a verbal and paper stand in the Balkans which at the least must have proved embarrassing to Germany. First came the thorough scolding administered to Bulgaria for allowing the passage of German troops. Next Turkey was assured that Russia would remain neutral if Turkey entered the Balkan struggle. More hopeful still was the signing of the non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia at the moment when Belgrade was hardest pressed. A week later the Russian Government addressed a public and stern warning to Hungary through the latter s Ambassador to Moscow. Mr. Churchill chose this moment to attempt to increase Russian fears of Hitler's designs on the Ukraine and Caucasian oil, and perhaps he succeeded too well. At any rate the neutrality pact between Russia and Japan was signed in the Kremlin about 24 hours later. This may have been intended to give Russia a freer i hand in the West, but it also re- ! moved the threat to the Japanese i rear in the Far East, increasing ! Anglo-American cares in the Pacific. Just as ambiguous was the ban on April 29 on the transit" of war ; materials across Russian territory, j If it cut off German machine tools i from Japan, it also stopped Swedish munitions from reaching Turkey and American war materials from follow--1 ing the Vladivostok route to China. I These moves, being capable of two interpretations, preserved the Russia enigma. Yet a week later Washington, as already noted, acted in a sense indicating that America felt sure of the answer and that it was unfavourable to the democracies. The next day, May 7, M. Stalin took over the premiership from M. Molotoff. Since then any manifestations of Russian policy have favoured Germany. It seemed that, as has been suggested. Berlin and Moscow had reached an agreement on spheres of interest in Asia Minor and on measures of cooperation, diplomatically at least. This theory of a rapprochement finds confirmation in the reported cooling of General Franco toward the Axis, Falangist Spain's antipathy to the Soviet being consistent and violent. Japan also gave signs of suspicion and jealousy over the reported NaziCommunist deal, asserting her interest in all Asiatic affairs. This difficulty appears to have been overcome, to judge by the luncheon in Tokio on Saturday, when the Japanese Prime Minister entertained the Ambassadors of Germany, Italy and Russia and spoke of their common goodwill to Japan. Meanwhile Russia has been showing her sympathy with the rebel Government in Irak by according it recognition and signing a diplomatic and trade agreement with it. The simultaneous closing of the Caucasian region to travel, and the invitation to the Afghanistan Foreign Minister to visit Moscow, are suggestive of Russia's intention to pursue an active policy in Asia Minor. The fact, finally, that Turkey has not felt strong enough to close the Straits to Axis military shipments, or the Aleppo-Bagdad railway to consignments of munitions to Irak, indicates that, at the least, she is receiving no support from Russia. From all this the present direction of Soviet policy should be clear, although the cynical opportunism of Russia is such as not to rule out a new shift at any time. :