STALIN'S SPIES IN THE RED ARMY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVIII, Issue 23861, 11 January 1941, Page 5 (Supplement)

STALIN'S SPIES IN THE RED ARMY

could bring more influence to bear upon the peasantry to keep it under the thumb el the proletarian dielatorship." By the conscription act ol l-'iJs only workers can enlist and it was up to the Government to decide who should be included as "workers." The result was a rapid increase in the proportion of industrial workers in the army. The army in ]9"Jo was about. SI per cent peasants and only II per cent industrial workers, liv iO.'i.i these figures had changed to 44 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. 'I his small proportion of peasants to workers bears no relation to the respective numbers ot these two groups in the population. Once in the army, the party leaders concentrated all their efforts upon making the men good Communists. I lie result has been that something like half of all the men in the army are party members. Officers' Sympathy Nevertheless, up to the present, Joseph Stalin lias not been quite sure of the army's loyalty to himself and his policy. There has been some reason to suppose that many members ot the armv, while outwardly lo\al, were seeretlv opposed to the Communists. At any rale, the system w-as adopted, priorto the Finnish campaign, of having each Red Army commander advised by a partv commissar, who had equal rights with him on military questions. This measure was not originated bv the Communists. Alter the tall ot Isarism in 11)17, the provisional government under Alexander Kerensky decided that it would be necessary to enforce some form of control over the

SOY I KT RUSSIA, by a new decision, has abolished the system of political commissars attached to llie army. The difficulty of the Soviet leaders has always been that the army refused to become a Red Army, li refused to become a trusty Bolshevik instrument. It has always remained a purely Russian Army with all the old traditions, good and bad, ready to serve the nation as a whole rather than the Communist Partv leaders.

Lenin liad had no intention of building ft permanent army. Ho looked to the formation of a militia. Rut Renin, in this respect, was a pure theorist. A Soviet historian ot the Rod Artnv comments: "I'he setting up ot militia units at a time when workers and peasantry were in opposite camps, when cities and villages were starving and banditry was rite, weakening the whole position of the proletarian dictatorship, would simply have meant arming the anti-proletarian elements. I hose element;?. it is true, could penetrate into the Red Army. But in a permanent Red Artnv the party and the workers

Russian Leader Is Not Sure That His

By Professor WASSILY LEONTIEF, in The Christian Science Monifor

officers of the army, who were suspected of being more or less sympathetic to the monarchy. Political advisers were therefore appointed to establish some supervision over the officers and to propagate the ideals of the new regime. Soon after the civil war broke out, however, it became clear that the adviser system was not satis!actor", and i it was abolished. Hut later, when Mr. Stalin's policy was giving rise to much dissatisfaction, reaching its peak with the execution of Marshal Michael Tukhachevsky and other army commanders in 19.17, it was found necessary to restore the system of advisorships. This was done by virtue of a decree published May 17, 19.17. The supreme leader of these advisers was Rev Mekblis, now Vice-Premier, who was then an influential figure in the secret police- the G.P.I". Recently Mr. ek hi is became head of the newlycreated commissariat for the control of all economic State boards. Political Education This favourite of Mr. Stalin became intensely unpopular with tho.se officers who had survived the officers' "purge" which brought the elimination of Marshal Tukliachevsky. Me knew little of military matters and was far more interested in testing the political education of the Red Army. The result was the infusion of considerable discontent in the Army—a bad preparation for an actual campaign, as the Finnish war proved. The army was continually at cross-purposes. The Communist, advisers were liable to be thinking far less about victory in

the field than of the liberation of the lower classes in the world at large. They assumed that the peasants and workers making up the majority of the army in most countries would welcome the Red Army as their deliverers. This attitude proved not unsatisfactory in connection with the occupation of the White Russian provinces of Poland, where the peasants had been actually oppressed by the .Polish landlords. War in Finland But during the war in Finland the Red "liberators'' found that their campaign had missed tire. As a result Moscow acknowledged that the Red Armv had learned a great deal during the Finnish campaign. Its commander, Marshal Clement Voroshiloff. was removed from his post. There are to he no more "comrade commanders." The old Tsarist titles of general, colonel and captain have been restored. The party paper Pravda explains that "the political commissars were necessary earlier. But. now their task has been done and the new law of the Red Army is complete obedience to the military commander." No vert he!e -, the dropped political commissars did not return to their headquarters on J.jubjanke Street in M os-eow —the central G.P.I'. offices. Marshal Timoshenko appointed them all to new posts as assistant commanders for political affairs at salaries equal to those they received under the old system. Anti-Red sympathisers say that while the officers have lost their political advisers, each regiment has received a Stalin spy instead.