OUR EMPIRE'S AIR POWER

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23850, 28 December 1940, Page 8 (Supplement)

OUR EMPIRE'S AIR POWER

CCtj-iHE picture wliicli British i; air power presents to us —is, instinctively, one of a vast flotilla of air squadrons sufficient, when all the needs of defence and co-operation on land and sea have been met, to undertake the larger strategical ventures that may well shape the immediate destinies of Western Europe." That is the prospect to which Mr. J. M. Spaight's book, "The Sky's the Limit," climbs honestly and conscientiously. It is essentially a wartime book. Tt is written for times in which events follow each other too "quickly to permit final conclusions to be drawn from the experience gained in them. Mr. Spaight is not a propagandist. Nor is he given to incautious generalisations. His present book therefore is largely descriptive. Its main purpose is to show the structure of British air power and the resources on which it may expect to draw for continuous expansion while the war proceeds; expansion which will enable it to semi forth against the enemy "an aerial mass of manoeuvre, a mass extra to all normal requirements, a mass that can be thrown in anywhere, a mass that will bo overwhelming, irresistible, an avalanche that renews itself." Help from Dominions To that end the nation will need huge numbers ot aeroplanes. Mr. Spaight explains not only how the aircraft industry at home has been reinforced by "shadow"' factories and by the reserves of engineering capacity represented by other industries, but how still more productive capacity lias been created in Canada and Australia; and how large output in the United States is at Croat Britain's disposal. Machines there will be in great numbers. Men in much greater numbers —20 times as many — will be needed, and here again the author shows how the overseas Dominions and Colonies are going to help. So line is the prospect that Mr. Spaight indulges in no regrets at the slowness with which Great Britain turned herself to rearmament. Rather does he count it good fortune that she began to expand her Air Force no earlier than 19:11. By that time the modern types of fighter and bomber were corning forward and the new squadrons were filled with them, whereas, if we had begun rearming earlier, they would have been filled with the old biplanes that now have only a small part in the war in the air. lie is of opinion too that Great liritain's air strength in September, 1939, "had become so formidable that the bombing of this country could be seen to be a very dubious proposition for any enemy, however strong in the air." In succeeding pages lie tells tales of air fighting which support that view, allowing that there had been valuable opportunity to increase our strength during the nine months of war which preceded the principal trials. "Grey Geese" Those tales of the exploits of a Gladiator squadron in the Norwegian campaign; of how two Hurricane squadrons met the German onslaught in Mav ami on one day brought down ■l!) enemy aircraft without loss to themselves; of how the first squadron of Deliauts - on their

Achievements

first day of battle, come «•/> freshly to the eye as to remind the render how much more lias happened in the last two months to justity our faith in the vision oi those extra ilotillas which will add their own quota to the blows that bombers and fighters, operating with the Army, will strike. For Mr. Spaight supports the popular belief that air power will determine tho war. He thinks of Urit-ish aeroplanes as tlie "grey geese" of the fourteenth century brought up to date. What the bowmen and their "grey geese achieved for the F.nglish cause at ( recy and Poictiers in those days, tlie; airmen and their aeroplanes will accomplish for the British Kmpire in these days. Naturally, with such an end in view, .Mr. Spaight thinks of the bomber as

the vital weapon, mid in that lie is right. The defence of Great Britain has thrown the fighter into almost undue prominence. Here it takes its propel place as the defensive power, whether it is employed to keep enemy bombers away from our bases or to keep enemy fighters away from our bombers as they sail along to raid the enemy's sources of strength. Essential to Victory The bomber is seen by the author as the offensive weapon essential to victory. It must blast a path for the tanks which will lead the Army's onslaught. It must weaken the offensive preparations of the enemy. It must strike at the enemy's power to make war and it must, when necessary, help to protect British sea ways against interference. Yet no part of'the air machine is seen out of proportion.

, One example of this well-balanced view is contained in the quite brief reference to the situation of British air power in the Middle Hast. "Cairo" says Mr. Spaight. "has been called the 'Clapham Junction of the air.' It mi<*ht also be regarded as the_ pivot- upon which the. lonn; mechanical arm of British air power can turn and swing in wide circles over Europe, Asia and Africa." That aphorism has gained greater force since it was written; and nothing except the author's failure to deal more explicitly with night bombing than to point out that making contact is the vital point in 'fighter operations, has happened since this book was written to impugn the good judgment of ati author who had already won a hit>h reputation for soundness. "The Sky's the Limit. A. Study of British Air Power," by J. M. Spai?ht. (Hodder and Stoughton.)