IN NAZI GERMANY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVII, Issue 23661, 21 May 1940, Page 4

IN NAZI GERMANY

AMBASSADOR'S STORY ZERO HOUR IN BERLIN ATTACK WITHOUT WARNING BY SIR NEVILE HENDERSON No. XXXIII. During August 31 there had been much activity on the part of FieldMarshal Goering. I think that Goering himself would have preferred a peaceful solution, but in 'matters such as these it was Hitler's" decision alone which counted: and whatever Goering might feel he was merely the loyal and submissive servant of his master. Moreover, as I have already described, he had come down definitely on the side of peace a year before, and it may have been difficult for him to adopt this course a second time. He invited me, however, to come and see him that afternoon, and I did so at 5 p.m. "in company of Sir G. OgilvieForbes. As I had heard that the text of the proposals which Ribbentrop hnd refused to give me was to be broadcast on the radio that evening, my first remark was to point out to the fieldmarshal that this procedure would probably finally wreck the last prospect of peace. I him to do his utmost to prevent their publication. Proof ol "Good Faith" Goering's reply was that he could not intervene, and that the German • Government felt obliged to broadcast their proposals to the world in order to prove their "good faith." He talked for the best part of two hours of the iniquities of the Poles and of Hitler's and his own desire for friendship with England, and of the benefit to the world in general and the advantage to England in particular of such a friendship. It augured the. worst from the fact that he was' in a position at such a moment to give me so much of his -time. He had a few days before been made president of the new German Defence Council for the Reich (or War Cabinet), and he could scarcely have afforded at such a moment to spare time in conversation if it did not mean ~~ that everything, down to the last detail, was now ready for action. My general impression of this last talk with was that it constituted a final but forlorn effort on his . part to detach Britain from the Poles. Nevertheless, the field-marshal seemed sincere when, having been called to the telephone, he returned to tell us that M. Lipski was on his way to see Ribbentrop. He seemed relieved and to hope that, provided contact was only established, war might after all prove unnecessary. A Futile Meeting The meeting with the Polish Ambassador proved, however, quite futile. M. Lipski stated that he was acting solely in his capacity as an Ambassador without plenary powers to discuss or to negotiate. He handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a brief communication to the effect that the Polish Government was weighing favourablj* the proposal of His Majesty's Government for direct discussion, and that a formal answer in this matter would be communicated to the German Government in the immediate future. He did not ask for the German proposals, and Ribbentrop did not offer lie give them to him. Their meeting lasted but a few- minutes. When the Polish Ambassador, after his interview, attempted once more to telephone to his Government, he found that'it was no longer possible for him to do so. . Negotiations Spurned Hitler had, in fact, chosen this moment to precipitate the conflict. He did not want direct negotiations with the Poles. It was zero hour. In the early hours of September 1, without any declaration of war, the German army crossed the frontier, and the German air force proceeded to bomb - the Polish aerodromes and lines of communication. In accordance with Hitler's usual technique everything was then done by the German authorities to - prove to the German public that it ' was the Poles who had been the aggressors instead of the aggressed. Goering sent me a message to say that the Poles had begun the war by blowing up the bridge across the Vistula at Dirchau, while Hitler himself issued a proclamation to the German army declaring that the Polish State had refused the settlement which he offered and had appealed to arms. Every German newspaper repeated the lio that it was the Poles who had begun tho fighting* Travesty oi Facts Finally, at 10.30 a.m., Hitler met the Reichstag, which had been summoned for that hour, and similarly announced to the assembled delegates that he had been "forced to take up arms in defence of the Reich." It was a deliberate travesty of the facts, and never can there have been, or ever be, a case of more premeditated and carefully planned aggression. Late that same evening I was instructed by Lord Halifax to notify the German Government that the latter bv its action had created conditions which called' for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of their undertaking to come to Poland's assistance. Unless His Majesty's Government received satisfactory assurances that the German Government ,had suspended all aggressive action and would be prepared to withdraw its forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government would, without hesitation, fulfil their obliga- ■ tions to Poland. I was instructed at the same time to request an immediate reply, and was authorised, if asked, to explain that this communication was in the nature of a warning, and was not to be considered as an ultimatum. Ribbentrop's Reaction I handed'this communication in writing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 9.30 that evening. Ribbentrop received it without other comment than that the sole blame rested on the Poles. He made no inquiry as to the exact nature of the communication, _ but merely said that he must submit it to the Fuehrer'. I told him that I realised this would be necessary, and that I would be available at whatever hour ho might be in a position to give me the Reichschancellor's reply. Tho French Ambassador, who had been instructed to make a similar communication, did so immediately after me and received a reply on tho same lines. Final Preparations Early in the afternoon of that day, T had, in accordance with Lord Halifax's instructions, officially requested tho United States Charge d'Affaires to be good enough to take charge of British interests m the event of wai*. All ciphers ' and confidential documents were burned, and the whole of the staff left their normal residences and were concentrated in the Adlon Hotel next door or in the Embassy itself. September 2 was a clay of suspense. The Poles were, it was reported, putting up a brave resistance in the face of surprise and overwhelming numbers. No reply was received from the German Government throughout the day to the British and French warnings. (To be continued.) I