THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1939 RECOGNITION OF FRANCO

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXVI, Issue 23284, 1 March 1939, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1939 RECOGNITION OF FRANCO

Spain has a new Government, in the eyes of Britain and France. If General Franco's ecstatic word, in the hour of his elation, be fulfilled as he expects, all the world will speedily follow in granting recognition. Lithuania has so decided; Latvia and Estonia are reported to be of like mind. Franco's "beloved Italy, friendly Germany and those South American nations encouraging us" have already shown which way their feelings take them. The number of irecognising States will grow. Britain, Mr. Chamberlain declares, is moved,by facts, not by feeliiings: tho insurgent cause, as a result of th« fall of Barcelona and the overrunning of Catalonia, is in established control of the greater pari; of Spanish territory, both on and beyond the mainland. To refuse to apply this criterion, because of a political antipathy or an incurable bias toward a particular ideology, would be fit odds with the basic realities of sovereignty. These, and not wishes, should dictate action. The war in Spain has been a civil war; intervention, whether overt or veiled, has not altered this fact. In the stand taken by the Nonintervention Committee, at the resolute arid sustained urging of Britain and. France, this fact has been fundamental. Now, in the face of a, conclusive if not concluded triumph by one party to the struggle, tliey have no option.. To withhold recognition would be inconsistent ; it would amount to the very intervention to which they, no matter whait others have done, have been strenuously opposed. After all, sovereignty depends upon ability to enforce obedience, and that ability has passed lErom the old Government to the new,, In an ideal world—the world in which visionaries aloofly dwell—this way of looking at things might be all wrong, but practical considerations, in accordance with the root principles of international law and practice at the present point of their evolution, prove it to be inescapably right. The censure motion tabled by Mr. Attlee as Leader of the Labour Opposition is in key with the catcalls of some of his noisy followers and the Communist cry that Mr. Chamberlain should be impeached. To say that recognition of General Franco's Government "constitutes a deliberate affront to the legitimate Government of a friendly Power" and "a gross breach of international traditions" is as false as it is unfortunate. It is utterly at variance with international traditions. Its use of the word "legitimate" is a crafty effort to lead discussion away from those traditions. Even if the word were applicable—a point upon which facts have something to say—Mr. Attlee's employment of it is illogical: this being his way of deciding the rights and wrongs of the civil war, he should have proceeded to demand Mr. Chamberlain's head on a charger for not having sent the British Army and Navy and Air Force to the help of the imperilled Government. It has been his way to press, move or less vehemently, for such intervention, but now, instead of sticking to his guns, he runs away in a self-manufactured fog of phrases about international traditions and a policy destroying democratic confidence in the good faith of Britain. A more grotesque non sequitur is difficult to imagine. No doubt the'prevailing good sense of the House of Commons will assert itself in the debate on his motion. Supremely desirable at this juncture is a sober facing of facts, chief among them the emergence of a new regime in Spain. Whether that is liked or not, and there are reasons for not liking it, it must be accepted. The more it is disliked the more alert and levelheaded should be the approach to international questions raised by it, and non-party collaboration, after the usually sensible fashion of Britain's parliamentary handling of foreign policy in critical times, ought to be served on all sides. Discussion is in order, but a frantic bid for party advantage is certainly not.

For Spain, of course, pressing problems arise. General Franco's success is by no means the achievement of internal peace and order. Knowledge of Spanish history precludes easy hope of that. Disunity has dogged every effort to work a democratic system. Stability has depended, at every turn, upon the personal strength of the ruler for the time being, and that time has seldom been long. "The curg e of the pendulum" has been suffered in political affairs, to a degree not matched elsewhere, yet there has been no jfhythm in the swing. Spain is not one, but many. Regional loyalties have played an obstructive and weakening part, and recent experience shows that composite Governments, the prey of faction, have done little well. Animosities of various kinds have hampered the development of a fully national spirit; b is present, but in the absence of a high level of average education the disruptive elements have wrecked many a laudable scheme. General Franco, or whomsoever he may select to take control or assist in it, will inherit great and grievous difficulties. That is Spain's concern, and it will not be lightened by others' meddling. The risk still to be faced is that such meddling, for selfish reasons, may banefully continue; and it is at this point that the possible international implications of General Franco's success have to be considered by other nations. Neither Britain nor France can afford to be indifferent to them. Certain direct legacies of the war call for foreign watchfulness. Of more dangerous significance, however, are such questions as the security of France and the peace of the Mediterranean. Whether these are to have pleasant answer will spon appear*