THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1938 HITLER'S SPEECH

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23154, 28 September 1938, Page 14

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1938 HITLER'S SPEECH

Whether Herr Hitler's speech is, in any sense, a last word, cannot yet be said. His intention seems to have been that it should be the last he would speak on the subject, and also that, except for another to be spoken by Dr. Benes, President of Czechoslovakia, it should be the last before Dr. Benes, by intimating his acceptance or rejection of a last chance to save his country from war, took full responsibility for events. This intention, there is reason to hope, may miscarry. The personal communication Mr. Chamberlain has sent to Herr Hitler" should elicit a definite reply. If Mr. Chamberlain expressed, as is thought, definite opposition by both Britain and France to Herr Hitler's memorandum, presented at the end of the Godesberg conversations, it calls for comment by him. Throughout the negotiations he has been manifestly loth to believe that Britain and France, particularly Britain, would stand by Czechoslovakia should he carry out his threat of attack. In his speech he has since said "We want peace with Britain; we want nothing from France, only peace." This can be taken as a sincere utterance, for obviously he has much to lose and nothing to gain by antagonising these two Powers. He will therefore grant the courtesy of a reply ; neglect to do this would be tantamount to a diplomatic affront, for the communicated decision introduced a new fact for his consideration. Mr. Roosevelt's appeal stands on a different footing. Although earnestly phrased, it is too weakly general, too remote from crucial points, and too late, to be impressive. "It can but encourage," says Mr. Chamberlain, "all those who sincerely desire to co-operate in this endeavour." Its implication —that compelling Mr. Roosevelt to intervene is a strong popular repugnance in the United States to the course Herr Hitler declares he will take—may lead him to think a little more cautiously. But Mr. Chamberlain's letter, while not a Note despatched with State formality, goes right to the heart of the matter with practical touch. There is, then, a possibility of further negotiation. Herr Hitler, in the opinion of one British commentator, has in his speech slammed the door but not bolted and barred it. Of Mr. Chamberlain's communication it can be said that its merit is to push the door a little ajar. Nevertheless, there should be no mistaking the main tone and substance of Herr Hitler's speech. It is bitterly and uncompromisingly vindictive, especially in its references to Dr. Benes, whose record and worth are known too well throughout and beyond Europe to permit general belief in the truth of this evil portrait of him. To compare his aims and influence to those o? Dr. Schuschnigg, and to proclaim that the Nazi vengeance wreaked on the one must be inflicted on the other, are indicative of an insane hatred, comporting strangely with professions of a love of peace. The guilt of Dr. Benes is to have made a brave stand against Herr Hitler's threats and to have rallied his countrymen in a cheerful devotion to the national cause. It would be better for Germany were Herr Hitler able to claim so good and selfless a service as his own title to honour. Further, there is revealed in the speech what has been suspected in Herr Hitler's planning all along—a resolve to weaken Czechoslovakia to the point of virtual extinction as an influential State in Europe. It is democratic in constitution; it has taken a prominent place, especially by reason of Dr. Benes' ability, in the League; it has been the dominant unit in the Little Entente and consequently a powerful support to France; it has held the interest of Russia: therefore it must be rendered incapable of opposing Nazi purposes! Plainly Herr Hitler sought to incite in others, German and non-German, an animosity equal to his own.

Judged by its avowal of policy, the speech was a sinister contribution to the "pacification" of Europe. It was characteristically Nazi, not in outlook. It must have j disappointed equally those expecting a declaration of war and those hoping for a declaration of peace. Elements of both objects are present in its thought and language, but in the main it is a declaration of the right of might. Its texture is shot through with power politics of the worst type. Democracy is scorned ; dictatorship is lauded; and egoism is in every proclamation of what has been accomplished for Germany and against Powers held despicable. "I am right," and "succeeded," and "can confess openly that we are rearmed as no country ever was before" —the emphasis cannot be missed. In all this is no guidance to peace. This is the flinging of a challenge rather than the proffer of guidance to a better international achievement. And the effect of it all is to put other nations, holding different ideals, on their guard. There should be no slackening in preparedness against conflict. At the most there is a breathing-space of a few days, and they are none too surely possessed, for all that has to be done. The duty for statesmanship is twofold—to use every possible means to turn any opportunity for further negotiation into promising charwtels and to lose no time in organising defensive resistance to a peril that may quickly take baleful shape. These tasks can. be undert.tkeu together.,