"LIKE A SECOND BELGIUM"

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 23109, 6 August 1938, Page 18 (Supplement)

"LIKE A SECOND BELGIUM"

By H. P. S. MATTHEWS—(Copyright)

no'c bo indifferent to the fate of France if that country were compelled to come to tho assistance of Czechoslovakia. The Franco-Polish allianco plays an important part in giving Poland Becurity against Germany; tho defeat of France would mean a very serious weakening of Poland's position. Suporficially, at any rate, there would appear to be a marked community of interest between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Both States are allied with France; both havo reason to fear the Irredentism of their German minorities. Czechoslovakia would free herself from an important source of friction with Germany if she could find her security in adherence to the PolishRumanian " neutral bloc " rather than through alliance with the Soviet Union, but, though each country protests its desire for closer relations with the other and blames the other for the continued coolness of their relations, CzechI'olish tension continues.

An Old Quarrel The quarrel dates from pre-war times. In the old Austria-Hungary the aristocratic Polish nationalist leaders looked down upon the bourgeois Czechs; while the Czechs looked to Russia for deliverance from the Habsburgs, tho Poles hated the oppressive Russian rulers of "Congress Poland," preferring the milder sway of the Habsburgs. Tho post-war controversy over Teschen and tho Polish minority in Czechoslovakia perpetuated the pre-war enmity between the two peoples. Numerically, the minority is small; the Czechs estimate it at 80,000 and tho Polos between 120,000 and 150,000. As minorities go, it is relatively well governed —certainly better than is tho Ukrainian minority in Poland. It has grievances, however, comparable to those advanced by the Sudeten Germans. It complains of acts of discrimination by minor Czech officials; it complains of the activities of tho Czech "national association," whose policy is the " Czcchisation " of the national minorities.

AT the beginning of June, when the tension resulting from - the first batch. of municipal elections in Czechoslovakia had already eased somewhat, statements appeared in the press which suggested that the' attitude of Poland had decided the.issue between peace and war. Germany, it was reported, had been deterred from attacking Czechoslovakia by the ' firm line taken by Colonel Beck, the Polish Minister, in an interview with the German Ambassador, Herr von Moltke.

loser, and, in consequence, the principal object of her policy is to avoid the danger of being drawn into such a conflict. Hence her refusal to enter the " Eastern Locarno " proposed by M. Barthou, for, under the proposed pact, it would have been necessary for her to allow the right of passage through her territory to the troops of the Soviet Union. Like Great Britain, Poland is opposed to the creation of " ideological blocs," for the natural protagonists in these blocs would bo Germany and Russia, and the battlefield between them would be Poland. The Polish attitude to the present German-Czech differences is determined largely by the desire not to become involved in a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union and to prevent the troops of either Power from violating Polish territory. Russia has announced her intention of implementing her treaty with Czechoslovakia, and M. Litvinoff has explained that tho attitude of Poland and Rumania separate will not deter tho Soviet Union from coming to the aid of the Czechs. The Polish-Rumanian staff talks in Warsaw are the reply to this Russian threat to the territories of the two neutral Powers. France as Ally ' It' would not, however, be correct to infer from Poland's fear of Russia that she sees, eye to eye with Germany' over the question of Czechoslovakia. Indeed she is, in a sense, in a position analogous to that of Great Britain. Although in no sense directly committed to the defence of the Czechs, Poland is the ally of France, and could

Though the reports were emphatically denied in Warsaw, where it was declared that no interview had taken place between Colonel Beck and the German Ambassador, they served as a reminder of the important part which Poland plays in determining the courso of events in Xorth-Eastern Europe. Passage of Troops With a population of little less than 30,000,000 and with a standing army of 270,000, Poland constitutes a powerful harrier' between Germany and the Soviet Union. Even more important, perhaps, at the present time, Poland furnishes, with her ally Rumania, a harrier against the sending of Soviet troops to the assistance of Russia's ally, Czechoslovakia. Geographically, Poland occupies the position of a second Belgium, and the Pole 3 cannot easily forget that the struggle between Germany and Russia during the Great War was fought out largely on Polish soil. In a. war between her two great neighbours Poland could only be "the

There is no such thing as a minority which regarded itself as fairly treated, and the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia is no exception. In addition, the Poles complain of the activities in

Poland Has Many Concerning

CAUTIOUS ROLE OF "NATURAL BATTLEFIELD"

Poland of Communists, whose headquarters are in Czechoslovakia, while the Czechs reply with complaints at the encouragement given in Poland to elements among the Slovaks who are hostile to tho Prague Government. Sympathy With Henlein The fact that the Polish., minority in Teschen feels many of tho same grievances as tho Sudeten Germans causes Poland to feel a certain sympathy for Herr Henlein. Both the Polish and tho Hungarian minorities have profited by tho discussion of the grievances of the German minority' in order to air their own grievances. But it would be a mistake to suppose that Poland is unperturbed by the. possibility of Gorman expansion at the expense of the Czech republic. Quito apart from any possible annexation of territory, fears are expressed that the object of German diplomacy is to detach Czechoslovakia from her present allies and to mako of her a German vassal State. This policy, if implemented, besides increasing the relative strength of Germany, would havo tho effect of outflanking tho Polish province of Upper Silesia, which was formerly German territory and contains a large German minority.

lyse the centres of lier heavy industry in Polish Upper Silesia.

Something liko 65 per cent of Poland's foreign trade passes through tho two ports of Gdynia and Danzig; since a considerable amount of Poland's trade with Germany—which represents 14 per cent of her total trade —passes across the land frontier, it follows that Germany, by closing the Corridor route, could cut off about three-quarters of Poland's foreign trade. While it would ultimately be possible to divert some of this trade to_ the Black Sea route, tho initial effect would be disastrous for Poland.

Although the Polish arms industry is largely sit.uated at a distance from the frontiers, Upper Silesia, the centre of the heavy industry, and consequently of Poland's "war potential," is exceedingly vulnerable. It is the opinion of competent military experts that the industries of Upper Silesia could be prevented from functioning without tho movement of a single man over the German frontier. Germany Greater Danger The general lines of Polish foreign policy are tolerably clear. If she is to I preserve her neutrality, she must maintain good relations with both her great neighbours, showing, perhaps, a particular deference to Germany, since she is potentially more dangerous to her. Her interests run parallel with those of Rumania, and might, if outstanding differences could be cleared up, run parallel with those of Czechoslovakia. Her alliance with France is in accordance with the well-established diplomatic principle of cultivating good relations with one's next-door neighbour but one.

Such a development would be all the more unwelcome to Poland, since it became apparent that Germany is working for the creation of a single Nazi political group embracing all the Germans of Poland. A group of this type would be all too reminiscent of the Irredentist Sudeten German party in Czechoslovakia. 6,500,000 Ukrainians The million Germans living in Poland would represent most important asset for Germany in the event of trouble developing between the two countries; so would the discontent of tbo six and a-half million Ukrainians, who represent little less than a fifth of the total population of Poland, and with whom the Germans are known to have established contact.

Poland, a country without natural frontiers, is faced on the west by a neighbour which refuses to regard the frontiers of Versailles a;| final, and on tho east by a country which she suspects of desiring to propagate the Communist doctrine among her land-hungry peasantry. Her policy is dictated by her suspicion of her two neighbours and by the desire to prevent her country from becoming the battlefield upon which is fought out the conflict of the "ideologies."

Even more important is the fact that Germany would bo able, in the event of conflict, to cut off the greater part of Poland's export trade and to para-