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WAR IN SPAIN

SITUATION OUTLINED

THE „ CONTENDING FORCES

pRITAIN.'S SOUND POLICY

DANGERS OF INTERVENTION

instructive summary .of the present confused situation in Spain was given by Mr. L. K. Munro at a luncheon of tho Auckland Creditmen's C'lub yesterday. The president, Mr. G. Mdridgp. presided over a large attendance. After drawing attention to leading 'characteristics of the two contending parties, 31 r. Munro reached the conclusion that the British policy of non-intervention in the struggle was thoroughly justified. " On July IS tho so-called Spanish war wilj have lasted precisely a year, and-no doubt, to a great many European diplomats ifc must appear to have lasted a great deal longer," said Mr. Munro. In July of last year there was a "moderate" Government in power; and the' "Reds" on the one side and the Fascists on the other were each aiming nt taking control of the situation. It was largely a question of which side, would act first. The armies led by Franco, the Fascist general, anticipated a speedy success, and .the absence of that success was unquestionably a surprise to them. At the present time tlioy controlled roughly three-quarters of Spain, but on the other hand Catalonia, Madrid and Valencia were controlled by tho lleds, who had under them a considerable portion of the more wealthy part of Spain. Ideals of the' Parties ' In the -area controlled by Franco's forces, there seemed io be comparative content, but in tho part controlled by the Reds there had undoubtedly been subversive movements because of tho I incompatibility of the ideals of certain sections of tho forces supporting tho Government. "It is impossible, I think," said Mr. Mimro, "for any Englishman to have BD yVgreat degree of sympathy with j Fascism, but 1 am doubtful whether it j

is possible* to have any great degree of sympathy with the loyalist Government, > the ideals of which are in many respects very remote from that form of democracy ' which we support." Mr. Munro replied to the criticism that English', foreign-policy. bad consistently re- ' suited in support of Franco, and said that Germany and Italy would never •'have agreed to international control. There had been further criticism of the Anglo-Italian naval agreement made in January' of this year, and it was said - that shortly after it the number of Italian troops in Spain had risen from 10,000 to, 50,000; but- it was in the "'highest- degree unlikely that Britain would favour that because the presence of Italian troops there obviously struck i at our lines of communication through the Mediterranean. ,British Impartiality .

V "The fact that we are impartial may be verified," said the speaker, "because we have come in for a certain amount of criticism, from both sides." It was " possible,' however, that if a Bolshevist -power took control' 1u Spain Britain ' ffmight tufcei action. £ It could be said with a fair , degree of confidence that whichever side £ triumphed in Spain jits foreign: helpers V f; would - not remain there - permanently. Touching on the question of whether the '.-present Spanish loyalists did actually represent- democracy, he said the propaganda of the loyalist Government was .immensely superior to . that ; v - of the Fascists,- Catalonia was . un-.

doubtedly' tht most important part of loyalist Spain. -and one of the strongest parties in,that area was the anarchosyndicalists, whose ideals could not attract much support, among , English peoples. It seemed that a triumph ot the loyalist Government could only result in a dictatorship of the proletariat in one form or other. ' Dangers of Intervention

"However much one may. support either party, is it worth while," Mr. Munro asked, "for the British nation to intervene on . behalf of either and possibly embroil us in an international war? That-result could only be worth while if our interests were so vitally concerned that intervention was neces-

ssry. intervention is necessary only if the success of the Germans and Italians in Spain is such as to menace our safety. There is not sufficient evidence that the Spanish people would put up with them there for any great length of> time. If that is the case, then the policy of the present British Government of letting the Spanish fight it out is the best safeguard of the world's peace."

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19370701.2.174

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22769, 1 July 1937, Page 15

Word Count
705

WAR IN SPAIN New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22769, 1 July 1937, Page 15

WAR IN SPAIN New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22769, 1 July 1937, Page 15

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