THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1936 BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22583, 23 November 1936, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1936 BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE

Once again a voice entitled to a hearing has been raised to assert that a belief in the League of Nations is the foundation of British foreign policy. The voice is that of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor lof the Exchequer and a highly j responsible member of Cabinet. In i general terms it can be confidently i said that this utterance on behalf of the Government expresses the mind of the British people. As far as any such attempt can elicit the trend of public opinion, the peace ballot showed that trust in the League and loyalty to the principle of collective security for which it has stood were then unabated. Since then tho course of the League has not "run smooth." In Mr. Chamberlain's plain words, the League has suffered rude shocks. Yet there is no sign that public opinion in Britain has undergone any radical change. Certain things of importance have happened in proof of a doubt whether collective security can be achieved. Most noticeable among them has been an all-party acceptance of the need to look to national defence, and Mr. Chamberlain, as keeper of the public purse, is as sensitively aware as anybody else of what this means. He is aware also of the readiness of the nation to foot the bill. But his reiteration of adherence to the League can be made with equal assurance that it is in accordance with British thought. This thought has not been unaffected by the facts that give evidence of the serious weakening of the League. There has been a considerable loss of hope in its speedy and complete success as a means of establishing international peace. Nevertheless, while this is so, there is no settled inclination to turn away from the League in despair. There must be—so runs the consensus of public judgment—a return to heavy expenditure on defensive precautions ; but even while this is given serious practical attention the possibility of strengthening the League and enabling it to fulfil its original purpose must not be neglected. No doubt this refusal to abandon hope of eventual achievement by the League is prompted by a realisation that in the field of international politics no other recourse is promisingly open. National defence is not regarded as alien to the League's purpose; indeed, in the thought of very many it is in harmony with that, circumstances being as they are to-day. But just as national defence is not the last word in foreign policy, which cannot reasonably assume the eternal confronting of other peoples with lethal weapons, so there is a recognised desirability of some sort of international order. What form shall it take? That of alliances between one group of nations against another group —a revival of the old "balance of power" expedient? Although circumstances may seem to compel that revival, it is not viewed in Britain with complacence. Better situated than some Continental peoples to judge this expedient, the British remember it as more often the provoker of war than the harbinger of peace. It may have to be accepted as a compulsory second-best; the outcome of the conflict in Spain may make it inevitable; but no intelligent Briton conversant with history wants to give the notion house-room. What then, by way of international action? Nothing but the League. It may be—it is—no very satisfactory alternative. To credit it with more power, more brain, more heart, than it actually has, would be foolish. The "rude shocks" have bruised and bled ifc sorely. But they have not destroyed it. This is a truth to be mentally underlined as irrefutable. No light-hearted optimism can be indulged about this recovery, yet to try to bring it about is a duty, imposed by the necessity to seek some form of international amity and the certainty that in merely defensive and offensive alliances is no assurance of peace. Mr. Chamberlain, and the people whose mind he speaks, cannot turn away from even a weakened League, for no other means of general peace offers anything of practical value. His problem is how to strengthen this means. Some great nations —the United States, Germany and Japan—are outside ; Italy, nominally in membership, is indifferently aloof, as much consumed by selfish unconcern or sense of grievance as are those others. Two courses of action are open; to pursue the task without them or to induce them to come back. The first would be heroic but futile. Numbers are essential. The League as planned was worldwide ; experience has proved that the aloofness or withdrawal of great Powers can reduce it to impotence. How win their sincere and earnest allegiance? This is the pressing question. It centres in the nature of the national obligations expressed in the Covenant and in the treaty of which it is an integral part. Mr. Chamberlain rightly says nothing about the uninformed and inept suggestion of divorcing the Covenant from the treaty. To amend the obligations in a way making it easy for the malcontents to co-operate, or to persuade them to collaborate in an attempt to give the obligations a workable shape acceptable all round —this is the choice of effort. The effort must be begun by the nations loyal to the League. So far Mr. Chamberlain is on safe ground. But they ought not to do more than begin, lest in widening the gateway of entry they risk the egress of principles without which the League would be, in reality, weaker than ever..