EARL JELLICOE OF SCAPA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22540, 3 October 1936, Page 17 (Supplement)

EARL JELLICOE OF SCAPA

Sir John, therefore, instead of following his original intention of steering so as to be some twelve miles off the Horns Reef at daylight, and thinking that his fleet was still interposed between the High Sea Fleet and their harbour, at 2.30 a.m. altered course to north and ran back along the course he had been steering in order to concentrate his fleet and correct his destroyers—still, as he imagined, keeping his fleet between the enemy and his harbour. At 4.15 ho was electrified by receiving a message from the Admiralty telling him that at 2.30 the High Sea Fleet was sixteen miles from the Horns l?eef, steering for the entrance. It was then too late to do anything except to search the water for possible derelicts. Sir David Beatty at four o'clock, still believing that the enemy were to westwards, asked permission to sweep in that direction to locate him —but, of course, it was useless to do so. 1 * • ♦ * • Admiral Scheer was equally in the dark with regard to the position of the Grand Fleet, for he stoutly maintained that it had never swept southward at all, but had steered to the northward for the whole of the night. t It is easv to see now how the two | fleets missed each other. At 8.30 p.m. I the two battle fleets were abreast of one another, only some twelve miles apart. From then until 11.30 p.m., the fleets steamed on slightly converging courses. To borrow an excellent simile from a book called "'The Riddlo of Jutland," the two fleets were steaming down the legs of a very acute angled V; the High Sea Fleet down the left leg and the Grand Fleet down the right. For a part of the night, from 9 p.m. to 1 a.m., the two fleets were within a few miles of each other, and gradually closing. * From 8.30 p.m. until 11.30 p.m. the speed of the High Sea Fleet was one knot slower than that of the Grand Fleet. It thus dropped three miles further behind. This just allowed the tail of our- line to pass the apex of the V before the van of the High Sea Fleet arrived there. The nearest ships were then only a little over a mile apart. After this critical moment the tracks of the two fleets formed the lower half of an X, the High Sea Fleet going down the right leg and the Grand Fleet down the left leg, and every minute drawing further apart. Next morning Sir John searched the whole of the area of the Horns Reef, and our fleet remained until 1 p.m., grim, disappointed, but undisputed possessors of the battlefield. After which, the enemy showing no disposition to leave their harbour, the ships of the Grand Fleet returned to their home ports. * • » ♦ » On June 6, 1916, Sir John wrote:— "Of course, I am not satisfied, as, given clear weather, the battle would have been final, and there would have been no German Fleet left, whatever happened to us. But that can't be helped. It is ludicrous for the Germans to claim a victory. Victory always rests with the force that occupies the scene of action, and we did this for the greater part of the next day, until it was quite clear that they had all gone home or as many as were left to go. If they had been so confident of victory they would have tried to go on fighting instead of legging it for home." The standard by which to judge a naval battle is not that of the tonnage sunk on each side nor the numbers of the various classes of ships destroyed or permanently disabled, but the effect the battle had on the outcome of the war. Judged by this standard Jutland was a substantial victory, since it practically destroyed all German hope of obtaining command of the sea. The result of the Battle of Jutland was that the High Sea Fleet (accounted by the Germans to bo the victor) remained in harbour for the remainder of the war and watched us transport without interruption millions of men and millions of tons of ammunition and stores to whatever part of the globe we wished to deliver them. The Germans, at all events, in June, 1916, knew that their fleet had been beaten, and that tho great torpedo offensive by which they had hoped to defeat our fleet in action had failed. We lost in the battle proper, not counting the preliminary cruiser action, which had nothing to do with the Battle of Jutland proper, 68,500 tons of ships to the Germans' 61,180. We

lost the battle cruiser Invincible, as against the Lutzow, the armoured cruisers Defence, Black Prince and Warrior to the old battleship Pominern; the Germans lost four light cruisers, Wiesbaden, Frauenlob, Elbing and Rostok, whereas \vc lost none; but we lost 6800 destroyer tonnage to the German 3686. There was little to choose between the losses, for the Invincible and Lutzow were the only large ships of capital value that were lost by either side. On the other hand, our supremacy on the surface of the sea was not only maintained, but emphasised. The German Admiral, after weeks spent in the preparation of a design to reduce thej,numbers of our battle fleet, found his labour frustrated, and he was defeated at all points. He discovered to what extent all plans were dependeut for success on the North Sea weather that no accurate forecast of the result of any operation could be made; and, above all, that he was opposed to an Admiral who was not going to play into his hands by being tempted, as he had hoped, inlo rash tactics. So much was this the case that, as a matter of fact, after Jutland, Sir John suggested the paying off into the reserve of ono division of the Grand Fleet, which offer, however, was not accepted by the Admiralty. He felt,

AT about the same time, three further messages were inter--1 cepted 'oy the Admiralty •which indicated that the German tattle fleet-was on a S.S.E. course at a speed of sixteen knots, and •that the German battle cruisers were taking a position astern of the battle fleet. These signals were paraphrased by the Admiralty, and reduced to a single signal stating: .."German battle fleet ordered home at 9.14 p.m., Battle cruisers in rear. Course g.S.E. | E. Speed 16 knots." This was handed to the Commander-in-Chief about 1!..30 p.rq. At that same time, 11.30, Captain Duff reported from the Birmingham that the enemy's battle cruisers w*re steering south. This was on a course practically parallel to that of the Grand Fleet. A few minutes later a signal fi:oin Commodore Goodenough that hud been jammed and greatly delayed, sent off at 10.45 via the Nottingham, received by Sir John at 11.38, placed the 4th Scouting Sqaadron to the westward of the line of advance of the Grand Fleet. • * • * • Which of the reports was correct? That from Captain Duff and the one from Commodgje Goodenough or that from the Admiralty? The latter msde the High Sea Fleet at 9.14 p.m. steering for the Horns Reef; the former showed that the High Sea Fleet, at 10.45 was steering for the Heligoland or Jims route. The 9.58 signal had made Sir John doubtful of the intercepted messages, wad.so he accepted the ocular report from Captain Duff and the Commodore in preference tc the Admiralty interespecially ;is over two hours had elapsed between 9.14, the time of origin of the Admiralty intercepted message, and 11.30, the time at which it had been deciphered and handed to him.Had the Admiralty repeated the three messages instead of making a pot-pourri of them, the reiteration would have convinced Sir John that the High Sea' Fleet was in reality making for tho Horns Reef. It was a piece of bad luck that Captain Duff had sighted tho German cruisers just after they had hauled from S..S.E. 3 E. to a south course to avoid an attack by oir destroyers. Had he sighted them a short time earlier or even later he would have been able to report the true course on which the Sigh Sea Fleet was steering. After/.this 9.14 signal up to 12.44 a.m. five messages were intercepted by the Admiralty, all dealing with the course a:iid position of the High Sea Fleet; none of these was forwarded'to the Iron Duke. Had any one of these been sent on, Sir John would have had distinct eridence that thij High Sea Fleet was dropping behind, and therefore crossing astern of tho Grand Fleet. » • « » • As it was, Sir John was firmly convinced _4hat for the whole of the night the High Sea Fleet was to the westward of the Grand Fleet. Sir David Ileatty was also strongly of the same •minionf.

in view of the event of the Jutland battle, that our command of the North Sea was absolutely secure, even with a reduced battle fleet. Before the Grand Fleet had even entered Scapa after the battle, the German communique claiming a victory at Jutland was released by the Admiralty censor. This production created doubts and anxiety, while the subsequent statement issued by th«f Admiralty, coupled with the handling of the situation for the next few days in London, caused the British public to believe that we had suffered a defeat at the hands of the German Fleet. These communiques were responsible for the letting loose of a flood of irresponsible criticism. • # # * • Lord Jellicoe has left on record his view of these strictures. He wrote: "Before it is possible for anyone to realise the difficulties which confronted me as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland, it is essential for the clear idea to be formed and continually kept in view of the two main factors to which these difficulties were entirely due. "These two factors were:— "1. The absence of even approximately correct information from the

No. 111. Germany's Failure At Jutland

From " The Life of Admiral Jellicoe, " by ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD H. S. BACON, K.C.B.

Last Saturday's instalment, " Tactics at Jutland," continued the deicription of the great sea battle and told how, in the darkness, Sir John Jellicoe was endeavouring to cut off the enemy from his home ports. It was difficult to know which haven of safety the Germans would make for. At 9.53 p.m. a German signal of the utmost importance was intercepted by the Admiralty, asking for early air reconnaissance at Horns Reef. For some inconceivable reason this was not passed o ; n to the Commander-in« Chief of the Grand Fleet. Had it been received by Sir John it would have told him conclusively that the High Sea Fleet was making for Horns Reef. '

battle cruisers and their attendant light cruisers regarding the position, formation and strength of the High Sea Fleet. "2. The lack of visibility when the fleet came in sight of a portion of the High Sea Fleet, due largely to mist, and partly to the unavoidable smoke of our own battle cruisers. "None of my critics nor those responsible for the compilation of the Admiralty narrative of the battle, nor those attempting to reply to iny observations in that narrative, appear to have realised in the least degree the extent to which the factors mentioned above affected my handling of the fleet during the two hours that followed the meeting of the Grand Fleet with the High Sea Fleet. "I find it quite an easy matter to point to movements which I Bhould have ordered had even a fraction of the information at (1) been before me, but, on the other hand, I find it exceedingly difficult to state that without further information, I should have acted differently." • • • » • Five points were seized on and used as evidence that Sir John had failed as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. These were: — 1. That Sir John should have raced down south with the fastest portion of

his battle fleet when at 4.33 he received information that the German battle fleet was at sea. 2. That the Grand Fleet should have been deployed on the Western instead of the Eastern Division. 3. That on seeing the enemy turn away at 6.33 p.m., he should have turned toward them and chased them. 4. That the turn away to avoid torpedo attack at 7i20 was condemned in no measured terms. 5. That the Grand Fleet should have been off the Horns Reef at dawn. Sir John's business as Commander-in-Chief was to fight an action maintaining the command of the sea, but not to gamble. The interval of time between 4.40 p.m. and 6 p.m. is one hour and twenty minutes. The difference in speed between his fast and his slow ships may bo taken as being one and a-half knots. If Sir John had rushed on with his faster ships they woidd have gained only two miles over the slow ones, and his fleet would have been disorganised and in a higgedly-piggedly formation due to the general chase. * * * » • The second criticism has been dealt with in the description of the battle. Sir John's masterly and unexpected

deployment on the Eastern Division at once raised him to the first rank as a naval tactician, and in all probability prevented a serious reverse in the early part of the action. As regards the third criticism, that of not closing nnd chasing the German Fleet when it disappeared at 6.42 p.m. after their turn away, it is sufficient to quote Sir John's own words: — "I imagined this disappearance of the enemy to be due merely to the thickening of the mist, but after a. few minutes had elapsed it became clear that there must be some other reason, and at (3.44 1 hauled up one point to the S.E., and at 6.55 four more points to the south, signalling at the same time to Sir Cecil liurney (Marlborough, 6th Division) to ask if he could see any of the enemy's battleships, and receiving the reply in the negative. At this time the visibility, as stated in my official despatch, was about 12,000 yards, but the light was extremely baffling. These conditions were ideal for an attack by enemy destroyers, and it was also quite possible that mines might be dropped by the enemy's light cruisers in the rear of the retiring fleet. "The danger from submarines under the special circumstances of our meeting with the High Sea Fleet was not considered to be great. Lastly, the direction in which the enemy had retired was not known. For these reasons it was advisable to move further to the south-eastward before attempting a large closing movement." As regards the fourth criticism, we have already shown that by the turn away he saved several of his ships from being hit by some of the thirtytwo torpedoes fired at the fleet, a number which he had every reason to expect would have been, greatly exceeded. The Marlborough, already hit by one torpedo, and listed over, eluded three torpedoes, the .Revenge swerved vigorously and saw one torpedo pass only ten yards from her bow, while ayother passed equally close under her stern; the Hercules and Agincourt'put their helms over sharply and sheered six degrees out of the line. , A torpedo was seen to pass between the Iron Duke and the Thunderer. The Colossus dodged another; the Revenge swerved again. These torpedoes were actually seen, all of which must have hit and incapacitated six of the battle ships if their beams and not their sterns had been exposed to the attack; but there were certainly other torpedoes that passed and were not noticed. Further, the second, fifth and seventh German divisions were unable to sight our fleet owing to the turn away, and therefore were prevented from delivering their attack. * # • • • As regards the fifth criticism, we have shown the position of doubt regarding the intentions of the enemy in which Admiral Jellicoe was placed owing to the information of his own shifts being diametrically opposed to that received from the Admiralty; and owing also to the failure of the Admiralty to pass on to him in full a large part of the information that had been received by from the deciphered signals of the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet. A Commander-in-Chief in these days often has to be, certainly he should be, a great dam to public opinion, a check on the overflowing zeal of those under him, and a wet nlanket on that gallantry which heedlessly runs unjustifiable risks. The individual fighter does not appreciate how very small is the part that his ships and those near him play in a great naval battle. His range of vision is very limited. The Commander-in-Chief has to take into account not only the tactics of the whole fleet, but also the whole strategy of the war, and still further tho psychology of his officers and men, his fellow countrymen and their allies. Moreover, the position of the Comman-der-in-Chief holding the command of the sea is infinitely more difficult, and his policy liable to be much more unpopular than that of the Commander-in-Chief of the weaker ("fleet in being"), who can undertake heroic risks and is able legitimately to play a bolder and more popular role in a great war. These are points which should be appreciated and kept in view when discussing the tactics of a modern Armageddon on the sea; and judged by them the conduct of Admiral Jellicoe, our Commander-in-Chief at the Battle of Jutland, must not only find completo justification, but be awarded the highest commendation and praise. (To bo Continned)