THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 13, 1936 AUSTRO-GERMAN AGREEMENT

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22469, 13 July 1936, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 13, 1936 AUSTRO-GERMAN AGREEMENT

Austria has so long been,a centre of anxious thought in Europe that anything likely to affect its relationship with other countries must be given serious heed. The AustroGerman agreement, of which particulars are authoritatively given to-day, is much more than a mutual assurance of friendship. It definitely relates to matters that have, been a cause of bitter and sustained quarrel between the two parties, and therefore of deep concern to other nations whose welfare depends on tranquillity in Europe. To appreciate its importance there must be a realisation of the place Austria has occupied since the Great War. Its geographical situation puts it conspicuously in contact with many countries —Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Italy and Switzerland; and the mere recital of this list of neighbours is enough to indicate of peril in political relations. History attests the truth of this natural expectation. These neighbours have neither been friendly among themselves nor at one in their attitude to Austria. On

the other hand, by reason of happenings in the war and since, Austria has become a source of disquiet to most of them, and consequently to some not in geographical contact. The countries of the Danube have been especially fearful that national politics in Austria, and with reference to it, may involve them in trouble, as an inevitable outcome of German and Italian designs having Austria directly in mind. France, too, has been at times painfully uneasy about the interplay of others' interests in Austria. The effort to buttress Austria financially .since the peace treaty brought, by its severe reduction of the country's size, economic difficulties, has been largely inspired by the knowledge that Austria's bankruptcy would endanger a vast section of the economic fabric of Europe. Especially has the maintained political independence of Austria been a corner-stone of much foreign purpose. One exception to this consensus of desire exists. It is supplied by German policy, accentuated since Hitler came to power. The Austria of to-day, a feddral republic formed in 1918 from the predominantly German-speaking lands of the old Hapsburg Empire, is so considerably German in lineage as well as language that Nazi principles dictate its absorption into the Reich. Fully 97 per cent of its people speak German, the only apparent dilution being along the eastern border. Consequently, from the Nazi point of view, Austria's independence has been a virtual affront. However, this independence has been warranted by more than an ancient pride, for the religion of the people —about 94 per cent of them are Roiiian Catholics —has created a strong sense of unity that sets them apart from Germany. How vehement this policy of separation can be was manifested in the decisive days when Dr. Dollfuss was Chancellor. Operating against the Nazi propaganda has been the intense eagerness of Mussolini to keep the German dictatorship at a distance from his own. In actual mileage the distance is small, for between Italian and German territory is but a narrow strip of western Austria, only about 40 miles across; nevertheless, it is enough to prevent the frontiers from coinciding, and the Brenner Pass on Italy's northern edge can be the better held behind those Austrian miles. So Mussolini has regarded Austria's independence as essential —and he has been as eager as Hitler to exercise a neighbourly influence. No surprise need be felt at the ascription of this Austro-German agreement, with its recognition of the full sovereignty of Austria, to Mussolini's diplomacy. This recognition, of course, is calculated to assure other nations also of .Germany's intention to serve the peace of Europe, but its immediate foreign reference is to Italy's desire. When the text of the agreement is examined, its three undertakings are seen to be phrased in conformity with both German and Austrian policies, so far as these can be reconciled. Thus "Austria will maintain its policy in general and in particular toward Germany always on the fundamental idea that Austria recognises herself as a German State," notwithstanding Germany's acknowledgment of Austria's full sovereignty and the mutual promise that neither country will interfere, directly or indirectly, with the internal affairs—including the inner political developments—of the other. This may seem to be an attempt to combine opposites. Certainly a great deal will depend on the "series of individual measures" to be created by the two countries on the basis of this agreement. When these are undertaken it will become clear, perhaps, how far Austria is to comport herself as a German State. Will the Nazi Government then be content with merely an expression of Austria's close association with Germany in blood and language? Or will there bo an attempt to make this fundamental idea override the recognition of sovereign independence? Can Austria's Chancellor, now expressly viewing the agreement as leaving Dr. Dollfuss' conception unaltered, maintain a "Fatherland front" and yet relentlessly suppress Nazi extremists? These practical problems await solution. In the meantime tension in Europe may be usefully lessened.