THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 1936 BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22447, 17 June 1936, Page 12

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 1936 BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE

The debate in the House of Commons to-morrow on British foreign policy, with special reference to the League of Nations, will be followed throughout the world with the closest interest. Nine months ago Britain took the leadership at Geneva in inspiring collective action against the Italian aggressor. The course of events since then has given a valuable, if painful, demonstration of the League machinery in motion. Britain set out in September with high hopes of making an impression on Signor Mussolini and, on wider ground, of enthroning right over might, t»f asserting the rule of international law over the single will of a dictator. The result has certainly disappointed expectation and it would be folly to refuse to learn by experience. The great question is, therefore, how does the British Government interpret that result and what will be its future policy 1 An answer to that question could not in any case be long delayed as I Britain must play her part at the meeting of the League Council on June 26 and at the special session of the Assembly convened for the following Monday. Meanwhile the recent statement of Mr. Neville Chamberlain on sanctions has aroused renewed controversy in Britain. So much so, that Mr. Baldwin has agreed to set aside tomorrow for a debate in the Commons. Intense interest will attach to the definition of British policy to be given by the Foreign Secretary. Mr. Eden has already informed the Commons that he " will be prepared to state the views of the Government regarding the action that should be taken collectively at the meeting of the League Council and Assembly." Apart from Germany's breach of the Locarno Treaty, the main issue is the .attitude to be taken toward Italy. She has been named an aggressor and put under penalties. These still operate although Signor Mussolini outfaces the League with an accomplished fact. How is the League to meet this situation ? Its prestige and its very existence depend on the decisions, or indecisions, at Geneva at the end of the month. Britain must again play a leading part and her influence is likely to be decisive. A 'section of British opinion is already asserting that sanctions have failed and should be withdrawn. To assert the failure of the sanctions policy is unfair in a sense, because it was applied to Italy weakly, and incompletely. If certain sanctions, such as an embargo on oil or closing the Suez Canal, had been used, they would probably have proved decisive. Just as probably they would have led to hostilities, starting another war to end war. As Mr. Baldwin said long ago, and has repeated recently, effective economic sanctions involve military sanctions. The nations would be faced with the paradox of waging war through the League for the sake of peace. And although it would be a collective war, that would not make it any the less terrible. It seems that sanctions can only succeed in disciplining a major aggressor by aggravating the very condition they were designed to cure. Recent experience has proved that the threat of 'sanctions will not turn a determined nation from its purpose, nor will their incomplete application stop a war in progress. The only remaining .question is whether their continuation will bring the aggressor to terms and that, in the light of events, (scarcely calls for an answer. If sanctions can serve no purpose, except to heighten animosities and increase the privations suffered by the Italian people, their withdrawal must be considered. The objections to that course are many and grave. Principle will be sacrificed to expediency, force will triumph over justice, the criminal escape with the plunder. These and other melancholy reflections cannot be escaped because they are true. But it is also true that the nations are not yet prepared to act collectively in upholding the League principle. Nor would single-handed action by Britain or any other nation, even if it were contemplated, save the League position because the collective idea would still lack its application. The British Government has to face the logic of the position and, unlike its critics, must make responsible decisions. Apart from the Abyssinian question, it has to consider the situation in Europe. Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland has changed the whole outlook there, and the change is the more marked because of Italy's abstentions. France and other nations are anxious that the active collaboration of Italy should be again secured as a counterpoise to Nazi expansion. Many may doubt whether, after her recent exhibition of bad faith, Italy's collaboration for security can be relied on. More than that, some may ask whether it is a wise choice to set up as a guard against one nation another which claims hegemony on the Danube and dreams of empire in the Eastern Mediterranean. At this distance it is not easy to 'see a clear way through a most complicated and distracting situation. For that reason the British Government's policy, as defined by Mr. Eden, is of the first importance. One thing is certain and that is Mr. Eden's attachment to the League principle. Any proposals he may make as to its future will therefore have special value, being inspired by sympathy even if, wisely, tempered by experience.