WORLD SECURITY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 22389, 8 April 1936, Page 13

WORLD SECURITY

NATIONS' DISPUTES. SETTLEMENT METHODS COVENANT AS BASIS By Telegraph—Press Association—Copyright (Received April 7, 6.5 p.m.) British Wireless RUGBY, April 6 In the course of his speech in the House of Commons to-day the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, said he disagreed that the Powers ought not even to have attempted to arrest the Abyssinian war. They could not establish international law by abetting its breach. The position of the British Government remained exactly the fame as it had been throughout the dispute. The Government was prepared to take part in economic and financial measures in so far as others accepted them and carried them out in the same spirit. Mr. Eden said he had thought it wise to make clear that the British Government could not agree that conciliation was at an end. He uttered a warning against the idea of setting aside the task which confronted them as the result of the violation of the Locarno Treaty by Germany and trying to negotiate some wide scheme of general settlement for Europe. By unduly widening their aim they might lose their immediate objective. In spite of the difficulties of the present time the League had grown in strength through all these years since its inception and its roots had struck deep. That was why it was imperative that everything they did should be founded on the Covenant. He hoped 'they would not lightly seek to amend it until they were sure, everybody in Europe was ready and willing to fulfil their existing obligations under it.

PURSUIT OF PEACE POWER BEHIND LEAGUE BRITAIN'S NEED TO ARM In. a speech in the House of Commons on February 25, Mr. Eden dealt with the question of collective security through the League and Britain's part therein. ' —" "It would be idle to deny," he said, "that there is in all parts of the House anxiety as to the future, and it would be equally idle to deny that that is an anxiety which vre must all share on the Government Bench —an anxiety which is not minimised, though it is mitigated, by the reflection that the course which this country pursues in the next year or two may well be a decisive factor in events.

"It is no great tribute to the collective •wisdom of the world that now, 18 years after the close of the war—a war which those ,of us who were of an age to fight in it were assured was a war to end war —we find ourselves confronted with the same problems, dreadfully similar in character and import with those of the years before 1914. It seems that in addition to the ordeal of the war itself the war generation has thrust upon it the task of finding sufficient wisdom to prevent a recurrence on an even greater scale of the suffering which it endured. Indeed, this is clearly statesmanship's most urgent task; how is it to be accomplished ? Not, I am convinced, without the full and active co-operatioi? of this country—a co-operation which can best be exercised and probably only be effectively established thrpugh the machinery of the League and of collective security.

A Strong Britain Essential "This country is firmly attached to that policy because it believes it to be the policy most likely to ensure the maintenance of peace. Nor is thera anything in that conviction incompatible with our own national interest, for the League is an attempt to establish an international order, and an international order is a national interest. (Cheers.) "Yet —and this is the consideration ' which the House has to bear in mind —if this country is to play its full part in a system of collective security, two conditions are indispensable. First, that the system should be truly collective and so powerful as to deter any would-be aggressor whether from without or from without; and secondly, that this country should be strong and determined enough in policy and in arms to play its full part therein. (Cheers.) ''When I view the future of foreign policy I can see several different lines along which events may develop, but whichever course events may take the one element which appears as essential for every course is that Great Britain must be strong. (Cheers.) I regard this as an essential for any foreign policy which we can pursue with any hope of success in the near future. What is more, it is only by this method, I am convinced, that we shall ever obtain an arms agreement at all. If the House will recall, the most successful example of arms negotiation known to history was the Washington Treaty, negotiated at the time when Britain was not weak, but strong. "It is clear that if you want to get, as we all do, disarmament, you will only get it through the increased power and authority of the League. That power and that authority must depend in a considerable measure, if we have any regard at all to the events of the last few months, upon the armed strength of our own country.

Causes of Rearmament "Personally, I do not disguise from the House that I deeply regret that increased expenditure upon armaments by this country should have become inevitable. It is an unproductive form of expenditure. There is this measure of comfort: rearmament to strengthen collective security is the cheapest form of rearmament. It is cheaper than rearmament within the pre-war system of alliances, and it' is infinitely cheaper than rearmament in isolation. "But whilo collective security is cheaper than either of the other two methods it is still expensive. There has still to be rearmament. Why? This is the fact that we have to face. Because of lack of confidence in the goodwill of nations and because of the obsession of fear. Here then lies the political task of the League, and of the Government of our country. Fear of unprovoked aggression can only be eliminated, and it must be eliminated, by a gradual strengthening of collective security until every nation is convinced that in no circumstances can aggression be made to pay. "it is essential, however, in reaffirming our attachment to the League and to collective security, that we should distinguish clearly between that policy and encirclement. The British Government would take their full share in collective, security; they will have neither ot nor part in encirclement. The di*- • 1 » If - ; .-l tmction is surely ciear.