THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1935 THE BATTLE AT GENEVA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22211, 11 September 1935, Page 12

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1935 THE BATTLE AT GENEVA

Geneva is still the centre of action in the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. How long wilt it remain so 1 That depends. The search there for a basis of settlement acceptable to both parties and in harmony with League principles may be abruptly abandoned. This, ifc is clear, will not be occasioned by ajiy mood of despair on the part of the more or less disinterested members of the Council or the Assembly. Patience is a virtue that the League needs, and is expected ifco have, in plenty; and the present session of the Council has been by no means devoid of it. But either or both of the disputants themselves may wreck the peaceful endeavour, by a sudden and final decision to do what is right in their own ey'JS. So far, Abyssinia, conspicuously responsible for bringing the dispute to the arbitrament of the League, has behaved well, making temperate statements and pledging ready acquiescence in any finding that does not violate practicable rights of sovereign independence. Abyssinia, indeed, in the sphere of international discussion, has proved to be the more civilised of the two parties to the quarrel. Italy has obstructed the process of inquiry and conciliation, adopting an attitude alien to the League. It is this hectoring tone, even more than the substance of the Italian demands, that bodes ill for Geneva and the world, and the almost unswerving maintenance of it suggests that at any moment Italy, in a fit of uncontrollable temper, may break with the League, launch a mass attack on Abyssinia, and defy the world to interfere. The reported mention of a "zero hour" on September 24 is certainly ominous, but the fact that little care for effective secrecy has been observed about it suggests that it was meant to be ominous—in the hope of impressing both Addis Ababa and Geneva with the desirability of making great concessions quickly. Quite possibly, also, the display of Fascist fervour by a crowd outside Signor Mussolini's official residence, and his dramatic declaration "We shall go ahead!" had a similar intention. Without doubt the hurried exchange of Italian and German assurances of friendship was arranged as a demonstration to the Powers.

Nevertheless, although characteristic Italian skill in stagecraft has assuredly been exercised, it would not do to count overmuch on its eventual ending in a quick return to prosaic, matter-of-fact sobriety of reason. Actors less naturally vehement than Italians have been known to carry histrionic enthusiasm to insane extremes, confusing the semblance with reality; and a war on Abyssitiia is probably viewed already by countless Italians, of high degree and low, as the only appropriate climax of their present impulse. They would be disappointed, believe themselves robbed of a legitimate enjoyment, if a sudden collapse of opposition at Geneva gave all that Italy demands. How then could they have any proper revenge for Adowa 1 Such are the perilous absurdities risked by inflaming a people to martial frenzy. However, there is no likelihood of an agreement at Geneva that will satisfy all Italy's demands. Signor Mussolini evidently knows that, and fumes; the Emperor of Abyssinia knows it, and hopes. Yet there is still a possibility of a compromise entitling both disputants to accept it with relief. They both know that war may be ruinously costly, and some Italians have the added knowledge that a terrible loss of international reputation would follow '{such a flouting of the League. Ira spite, then, of Italy's gaming of a "zero hour," the issue remains with Gleneva—unless a swift and sanguinary clash between the gathering forces in East Africa takes it irrecoverably away, or a pronouncement by the League gives sharp offence. The report from Rome that Italy will not launch an unprovoked attack while Geneva is examining the dispute, although this assurance is qualified by a reminder that Italy has not given any formal undertaking of the kind as well as by the use of the word "unprovoked," strengthens the opinion that the battle at Geneva is still of importance to both disputants. How that battle fares is difficult to judge. Some indications emerge, however, from to-day's news. The Italian proposal of a mandate over all Abyssinia has apparently been rejected ; M. Laval was inclined to favour it, but opposition from M. Herriot and other members of the French Cabinet, also from M. Litvinoff in the name of Russia, has told heavily against the proposal. In its place is reported to be a British scheme, to be submitted at an opportune moment, of a collective mandate to be exercised by the League either through a High Commissioner or by Britain, France and Italy; Britain's insistence that any such scheme must be conditioned by Abyssinia's free acceptance of it is obviously intended to preserve that country's sovereignty, at least in sus-

pension. Most interesting of all is the list of concessions Abyssinia is prepared to make, according to new instructions received by the Abyssinian delegates. The list is incomplete but the three concessions named go some way toward Italy's demands: to yield part of Ogaden would extend the present Italian boundary although it would not necessarily provide a junction between Eritrea and Italian Somaliland ; to allow Italy to construct a road from Eritrea to Gondar would give Italy access to the attractive Abyssinian upland ; and to permit the League to nominate advisers for Abyssinia would assist in obviating Italian complaints of prejudicial discrimination. A qualification of the last-nanfed concession Abyssinian right of veto of the League nominations—has in view an acknowledgment of sovereignty. This acknowledgment is the crux of the conciliation problem, and Abyssinia, all things considered, cannot be blamed for insisting on it. On international grounds there is palpable reason for the maintenance of sovereignty; to take it away would be an unprecedented proceeding and one difficult to justify in practice even if it were theoretically unexceptionable. Its recognition is basic in League principles, and to deprive Abyssinia of it, supposing that practicable, would be to remove all responsibility for implementing the counsels of advisers. The concessions will probably not satisfy Italy, but should they be formally offered they will be a further token of Abyssinia's wish for a peaceful place in the comity of nations.