HAIG'S WAR DIARIES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22206, 5 September 1935, Page 18

HAIG'S WAR DIARIES

EARLY USE OF NEW TANKS

SUMMING-UP ON THE SOMME

By A. Duff C'oopf.r—Copyright to the Nxw Zealand Herald,

ON this day—September 15, 1916—for the first time in history the tanks were seen i upon the field of battle. Haig, who was ever ready to welI come new inventions, had encour- | aged their construction and was eager to make use of them and did so to help this big push on the Sorame. Robertson referred to them dubiously in a letter a few days before. ! describing them as a "somewhat des- ! perate innovation." General Swinton, ito whose imagination, initiative and I perseverance the introduction of this | invention, destined to revolutionise the art of warfare, was largely due, has described the difficulties that he met with at every stage owing to the distrust and suspicion which new ideas invariably arouse in the official mind. Even after the first trial of the tanks the majority of the senior officers whom General Swinton encountered had no word of encouragement, still less of congratulation, to offer him. When he arrived at G.H.Q. an interview with the Commander-in-Chief was at first politely refused him by a member of the staff. Finally: "I insisted that the Commander-iu-Chief should at least know that I was there, and be given the chance to see me if he wished. He received me almost at once and very cordially. He i thanked me for what I had done, and said that though the tanks had not achieved all that had been hoped, they had saved many lives and had fully justified themselves; that he wanted five times as many; that he wished the existing arrangement to go on; and that I should go home and continue to command, raise and train the force. "These were the first words of appreciation given to the tanks —to my knowledge—since the King saw them at Elveden." ! If Tanks Had Been Withheld General Swinton believes, and many ■ share his opinion, that a grave error was committed in making use of the tanks at this early stage in their development and when so few of them were as yet available. He does not, however, appear to have expressed his view beforehand to the Commander-in-Chief, of whose intention to employ them he was well aware, and whom he saw more than once during the summer. It was without the benefit of General Swinton's advice that Haig took and adhered to his decision to use the tanks. Whether he was right or wrong must remain forever a subject of controversy. It may be readily admitted that if the use of the tanks had been delayed until a thousand or more of them could have been thrown into the field simultaneously, if it had been possible during that necessarily lengthy interval to perfect the machinery, train the crews, instruct the infantry how to co-operate and at the same time maintain the secrecy of the invention, the effect when it was finally produced would have been tremendous. But there are other considerations to to borne ,in mind. Had a man known that the war must continue until November 11, 1918, every decision would have been influenced by that knowledge. But there were many who hoped, and their hopes though doomed to disappointment were not conceived without ' some justification, that a decision might be reached in the autumn of 1916. The great battle that was being fought might prove decisive. The introduction of a new and terrible weapon J at the crisis of that battle might prove J the final factor —the little particle of I extra weight which would decide the | balance of the scales. Test of Battle Experience 1 Secondly, it is impossible ever to gauge the value of a weapon with any accuracy until it has been tried in j actual warfare. In vain does the inj ventor endeavour to foresee all possible contingencies. ! Haig continued to press forward to the attack and on September 25 a most successful advance was made into the enemy's territory. The enemy was now driven back to his fourth line of defence, and the position of the Allies had never appeared more hopeful. If the pressure against the enemy could be maintained at the same degree of intensity for another six weeks there seemed to be no reason why the ardently desired decision should not be reached before the winter set in. Everything depended upon the weather. Throughout the month of October the battle fitfully continued and the enemy was granted but little breathing space. On the 21st, during a very brief spell of frost and sunshine, the Germans attempted a counter-attack on the Sehwaben Redoubt and not only were repulsed with heavy losses, but a British attack timed for the same day was singularly successful, the Fifth Army capturing all objectives over a front of five thousand yards and taking over a thousand prisoners. On November 13 was launched the last attack, which brought the long Battle of the Somme to a close. It was the most successful of any that had hitherto been delivered. The Fifth Army attacked outside the River Ancre and swept all before them. The attack was continued on the four following clays with increasing success. Each day added to the distance of the advance and the number of prisoners and captured machine guns. But by November 18 the weather brought all to a standstill and the longest battle that had been fought in the world's history was over. There are still those who argue that the Battle of the Somme should never have been fought and that the gains were not commensurate with the sacrifice. There exists no yardstick for the 1

measurement of such events, there are no returns to prove whether life has been sold at its market value. There are some who from their manner of reasoning would appear to believe that no battle is worth fighting unless it produces an immediately decisive result, which is as foolish as it would be to argue that in a prize fight no blow is worth delivering save the one that knocks the opponent out. As to whether it were wise or foolish to give battle on the Somme on July 1, 1916, there can surely be only one opinion. To have refused to fight then and there would have meant the abandonment of Verdun to its fate and the breakdown of co-operation with the French. When Falkenhayn struck at Verdun he believed that he was striking at the heart of France, and that if he could win Verdun the beating of that heart would cease. Who shall say that he was wrong? There lived no shrewder judge of his fellow countrymen than Clemenceau and he believed that even a small disaster might produce a peace party who would bring the war to an inglorious conclusion. If the proud boast " lis ne passeront pas " had once been falsified, where would those who had made it have found the spirit which would have enabled them to continue the fight? The Somme Saved Verdun And if Verdun had fallen, if the sacrifice of 200,000 lives had been made in vain, what would France have thought of her Ally, who had stood by unmoved, never raising a fiuger, deaf to those passionate appeals for help ? AIJ military writers are agreed that the Battle of the Somme saved Verdun and if no further justification were forthcoming that alone would suffice. But the Somme did more than this. The British Army that advanced so confidently on July 1 was a citizen army, only half-trained to war. The survivors in mid-November were veterans who could have discussed the military profession as equals with their ancestors who had passed through all the South African, the Crimean or the Peninsular campaigns. As a final test of a new weapon must be the battlefield, so also is the battlefield the only furnace wherein are forged the armies of victory. It was the survivors of the Somme who two years later formed the backbone of the force that smashed the Hindenburg line and drove the invaders off the soil of France. The German Army, on the other hand, came into battle not with ,the courage of ignorance, hut with confidence of knowledge. The world has never seen a more highly trained and perfectly disciplined machine. From birth every German had been taught to think himself a soldier, he had been fed from childhood on the glorious traditions of Sadowa and Sedan, he had been trained from youth in the exercise of arms, and the military supremacy of Germany had been with him the first article of faith. End of German Military Tradition On the they were not taken by surprise; they had had full time to prepare the fortifications behind which they awaited the coming onslaught, and the elaboration, ingenuity and intricacy of those earthworks marked a new epoch in trench warfare. Even Germany could produce no finer soldiers than the men who manned them. Falkenhayn had given orders that " not a foot's breadth of ground must be abandoned." Von Bulow had laid down that "only over our dead bodies may the enemy advance." And for the German soldier the result of the Somme was not the loss of a few lines of trenches nor the bitterness of temporary defeat; it was the end of u great tradition, it was the bankruptcy of a religious faith. Two instances were brought to Haig's notice of German officers who, being prisoners, had attempted to commit suicidt —a fact of profound significance. German writers have frankly admitted the psychological effect produced. The historian of the 27 (Wurtemburg) . Division writes, "In the Somme fighting there was a spirit of heroism which was never again found in the Division, however conspicuous its fighting power remained until the end of the war." " Muddy Grave ol Field Army " Captain Von Hentig of the General Staff tells us that "the Somme was the muddy grave of the German field army and of the faith in the infallibility of German leadership. . . The most precious thing lost on the Somme was the good relationship between the leaders and the led." Another German writer asserts that " the tragedy of the Somme battle was that the best soldiers, the stoutesthearted men were lost; their numbers were replaceable, their spiritual worth never could be." But the most conclusive of all evidence is the testimony of General Ludendorf. As the result of the Somme fighting he admits that "we were completely exhausted on the western front. ... If the war lasted our defeat seemed inevitable ... I cannot see as I look hack how the German G.H.Q. could have mastered the situation if the Allies had continued their blows as they did in 1016." When certain British politicians, alarmed by the number of the casualties, rallied to the crv of "No more Sommes," they little knew that their latest slogan was also the muttered and heart-felt prayer of the whole of the German Army, from the men in the trenches to the Commander-in-Chief. These then were the results of the first, great battle fought under the supreme command of Haig. Verdun was saved, the maintenance of AngloFrench co-operation was assured, the British Army was taught to fight and the heart of the German Army was broken.

This concludes the extracts from the first volume of Mr. A. Duff Cooper's biography, " Haig." The series will be resumed on the appearance of the second volume early next year.