HITLER'S GERMANY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 22126, 4 June 1935, Page 11

HITLER'S GERMANY

UNPREPARED FOR WAR LACK OF EQUIPMENT GOERING'S AIR FORCE . COMING CONSCRIPT ARMY The following: article, wri.tten in London on May 4 by Mr. Aubrey L. Williams, special European correspondent to the New Zealand Herald, is the third instalment of a series of articles regarding presnnt-day conditions in Germany. He deals in to-day's contribution with the etate of the German air and military forces. His conclusion, based on his recent inquiries ill Berlin, is that " Germany is not yet ready for war." In spito of reassurance from Signor Mussolini and Mr. Lloyd George that there would be no European war in the immediate future, millions of Europeans have remained in dread of such an outbreak, 'sad experience has made them more suspicious of German intentions than the occasion, soberly judged, demanded. Not a few British people have seen in Sir John Simon's Berlin mission a resemblance to Mr. Hater Lord) Haldane's pre-war mission to Germany, and they have felt that privately, if not publicly, Sir John has reported an intransigeance prevailing in Berlin, with which the nation would soon have to cope, which was the counterpart of that reported to the Asquith Government.

As to the "unofficial" missions to Germany of the Marquis of Lothian as a Liberal, and of Lord Allen of Hurtwood, a National-Labourite in politics, and their assurances on their return of the peaceable intentions of tho Nazi leaders, coupled with an urging of a reorientation of our policy, there has been a tendency to assume, as happened to similar visitors in 1913-14, that wool had been pulled over their eyes. Early War Not Probable Bearing this quite general impression of an almost imminent war in mind, the relief I experienced may be imagined when inquiry m quarters in Berlin likely to be informed on such matters convinced me that an early war was a most improbable event. There was more than mere relief; there was t that positive deflation experienced following the lilting of a grave and prolonged menace. It need not be that Nazi Germany will never make war. Its leaders do not broadcast their intentions in that regard. In any case, they will be judged by deeds rather than by words. If armament is piled up seemingly out of all proportion to Germany's legitimate requirements, then the worst may be assumed. The plain fact is that Germany is not yet ready for war, that she has not yet acquired the necessary material, or trained the men in sufficient numbers to wage war successfully on a large scale. And, as it was put to me, Germany has had experience of largescale war, and she now is aware of the magnitude of the preparations required for such a conflict, and would be unlikely to move until a certain standard was achieved. Assumedly, the next war, should one unhappily come, will be predominantly aerial in character, but not so entirely. The air arm will require the support of the naval and military arms, no less than that of the economic one. Germany's Efficient Air Force It is admitted by critics that General Goering has accomplished a consummate piece of organisation in bringing the so-recently revealed German Air Force to its high efficiency. His feat is the more remarkable, because it has been accomplished in secret, a condition necessarily imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, which denied Germany a military air force.

Goering's boasts of absolute preparedness may be discounted. More than aeroplances and aerodromes — even underground aerodromes —should such exist elsewhere than in the imagination of foreign secret service agents —are required to make an air force. Perfection cannot have been achieved in sectional training under the hole-and-corner conditions hitherto adopted, in secret defiance of the Treaty v It is a force potentially menacing, but not yet first-class. What most disturbs foreign experts is the revealed capacity of German industry to turn out aeroplanes at such high speed, a speed that the British aircraft industry cannot yet approach, since even British civil aviation is much smaller than the German. High Standard of Soldiers The German Army, also, is far from ready to take the field. By the Treaty of Versailles Germany was permitted to maintain an army of 100,000 men. Thoroughness of German concentration tipon such a comparatively small force has resulted in the creation of what is probably the most efficient army in the world. Physically, intellectually and morally the men enrolled are of a very high standard. The Reichswehr soldier impresses at sight. Many are obviously of officer standard, and one assumes that such will figure as leaders in the conscript army, whose enrolment and training will commence next October. Like the Air Force, the Reichswehr, participating in the national plot to defeat the provisions of the treaty, has indulged in hole and corner training in order to bring its numbers up to a figure said to be 300,000 —a number, I believe, contemplated by the MaoDonald Plan —which the Reichswehr chiefs, under the non-political General Blomberg, had selected as its limit, for the present. The Reichswehr leaders, so I was authoritatively informed,, were utterly unprepared for Herr Hitler's announcement, made in calculated riposte to Allied diplomacy, of the throwing off of Versailles bondage, and the re-adoption of conscription, with the immediate enrolment of an army of 550,000 men. End of Surreptitious Training

Being honourable men. the Reichswehr generals are not altogether displeased to come out into the open, to have done with surreptitious training, which, of course, could not be carried out with the desired efficiency. The Fuehrer's pronunciamento forced General Blomberg to consider wider horizons, and to-<lay he probably has a force of 400,000 men, but this army lacks many essentials. M.v former comrades-in-arms will understand the primary importance of initial equipment. That is not yet available in any' great quantity. I heard of an infantry brigade which went into camp for spring training with. 4 * two regiments only, instead of the normal three, because the necessary initial equipment—uniforms, small arms, accoutrements, etc., was not available. If that be the case it appears unlikely that art adequate provision of heavy artillery has yet been made, and masses of heavy artillery cannot be manufactured overnight, even by the allegedly super-efficient German heavy industry. Similarly, a navy cannot be produced by sleight of hand, and naval training is necessarily more technical than is that for the military l ' arm. Taking all factors into consideration sheer foolishness alone would cause Germany to precipitate war for some little time, even supposing that she really contemplates hostilities. In one contingency only, as will later be touched upon, does the danger of German aggression seem possible.