BY-LAW ATTACKED

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21982, 13 December 1934, Page 16

BY-LAW ATTACKED

CONTROL OF MEETINGS SPEECH IN THE DOMAIN DISMISSAL OF APPEAL The decision of Mr. W. R. McKean. P.M., to fine Boy Stanley, carpenter, of Morningside, £1 and costs, 13s, for holding a public meeting in the Domain without authority, was challenged on Stanley's behalf by Mr. Slipper, before Mr. Justice Reed in the Supreme Court yesterday. The meeting took place on August 19, and the charge against Stanley, who addressed the gathering, was, that as he had no written permit from the City Council he broke by-law 14, clause 2. Stanley brought forward no evidence at tho Police Court hearing. The by-law, against the validity of which Mr. Slipper appealed, makes it an offence for any persons to hold, organise or direct a procession or any public meeting, gathering or demonstration in a street or public place except in compliance with the terms of a written permit, and every person who takes part in such procession or meeting is also guilty of an offence. It was shown at the hearing that the defendant did not make any application for a permits The magistrate held that there was Fiifßcient statutory authority for the City Council to make a by-law regulating the gathering of persons. If the defendant's intention was to test the validity of the by-law his method had not been commendable. The by-law did not make any restrictions on the freedom of .speech, but merely purported to regulate gatherings of persons. Mr. Stanton appeared for the informant, Donald Scott, sub-inspector of police. Objections to By-law Mr. Slipper attacked the by-law on four grounds—that it was manifestly repugnant to the laws of New Zealand, that it was ultra vires of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1920, and other Acts, that it was bad and invalid on account of its uncertainty, and that if. was unreasonable because it was particular and partial in form and made restrictions upon the liberties of the subject for which there was no justification either in fact or in law. His Honor said the question was really whether there was any power to make this by-law. The Domain was v#«;ted in the City Council and did not the regulations give it power to con trol ? Mr. , Slipper said the question was the extent of the pouer possessed. His Honor said the by-law did not purport. to take away the right of free speech. It purported to regulate •where that free speech should take piano. Mr. Slipper: 1 submit it goes further than that. It makes a flat prohibition, with some concessions or iillowances that we are not intended to know anything about. His Honor said the council surely must have power to regulate meetings. He supposed it was the administration that Mr. Slipper objected to. City Council's Case

Mr. Slipper said that was not so. There was a latent defect in the bylaw itself. It was framed to conceal its author's intention, and was based upon arbitrariness as opposed to the rule of law. Mr. Stanton said the effect of most by-la,ws was. to take away rights that previously existed, and it could not be contended that that was repugnant to the common law of New Zealand. A by-law necessarily involved restrictions on the liberty of action of persons who came under its scope. Unless there was some nerson who was holding organising or directing such a meeting the persons attending were not guilty of an offence. The onus of proof of unreasonableness lay upon the person who alleged it. The power to make the by-law was clear and the regulation of persons in the Domain would be one of the very first objects of regulation. In answer to His Honor Mr. Stanton said he thought the court had no power,to amend a by-law on an appea}. The By-law Upheld

"I must congratulate you on your very able argument, Mr. Slipper," sftid His Honor, "but I must point out to you that the general observation you make as to the inherent rights of the public to hold meetings in public places has really no bearing on the present case; for common law rights can be taken away by statute, as tbey have been in the present case, by granting power of regulation to the City Council."

His Honor said it was admitted that the appellant deliberately refrained from applying for permission in order to test the validity of the by-law. Under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1933, the council was authorised to make by-laws regulating the use of any recreation grounds, and that, of course, included the Domain. There could be no doubt that power to regulate its use included power to regulate meetings. Section 13 of the By-laws Act, 1910, gave all the powers that could be exercised under this by-law, and covered the various matters which the by-law dealt with. Applying these statutory provisions to the by-law, he was of opinion that it was not invalid. He was quite unable to accept the contention that the discretion left in the present case was unreasonable. It must be assumed that the City Countil would act reasonably, and would give due consideration to every application for permission to hold a meeting. The appeal was dismissed, with costs £7 7s and disbursements.