THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1934 THE ROOSEVELT PROGRAMME

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21791, 4 May 1934, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1934 THE ROOSEVELT PROGRAMME

How fares it with the Roosevelt programme? The report of the United States Chamber of Commerce annual convention supplies part of the answer—a very important part. Ultimate and complete success cannot be attained without a maximum of cooperation by great industrial and commercial enterprises. This has never been questioned, in spite of the large powers entrusted to the Administration. Mr. Roosevelt has done more than ask for this: he has pleaded for it. In addition, he has used the services of General Johnson, as executive head of the scheme, to whip up the laggards in all parts of the United States. This chief agent and director has gone here, there and everywhere endeavouring to counter opposition, inspire confidence and guide local action. All this is proof that the President and his colleagues, including the advisers known as his "brain trust," realise that the President is powerless, even with the endorsement of his methods by Congress, if business magnates ' will not respond. In the convention 'they are sufficiently represented to enable their mind to be discovered. It is a divided mind. General Johnson, ba-cked by the president of the convention, has been unable to win unanimous approval. On so crucial a point as the value of economic planning the best that can be said for the acceptability of the recovery programme is that it commands a hesitating and limited welcome after a considerable acquaintance with it. and that business judgment in the United States is positively averse to the establishing of Government control through imposed legislation. This cannot be regarded in White House as a satisfactory state of affairs. Criticism, of course, has been expected. It was inevitable from the beginning. However, after so long an experimental period, marked by much adaptation of the to meet difficulties as they arose, on the confessedly "trial and error" method, something better / than this confusion of opinion must have been anticipated by the authorities in Washington. They find themselves still without universal favour, and the programme to which they are commitfed more than ever is still running the gauntlet x

It must be said that Mr. Roosevelt himself oontinues to be popular. Even where opposition to vital parts of the scheme is general there is admiration for the man. The President has been the-'greatest argument for the programme, an asset of highest value. He has got things done, and if some of them are neither appreciated nor approved his lifting the nation out of its Slough of Despond has won much respect. And this sort of testimonial is not to be lightly esteemed. It is better to go wrong sometimes than not to go at all. The United States as a great nation was, not so long ago, so craven-heartfed in the face of economic trouble, that fear threatened to pass into utter despair. This was the alarmed and alarming diagnosis made by leading, expert and trustworthy Americans at the time. Mr. Roosevelt's courage brought a new spirit of hope, a new lease of life, and for this he deserves the nation's thanks. But gratitude for this psychological boon, while thf» boon is itself of untold economic value, is one thing, and full endorsement of his measures is quite another. A doctor may aid greatly a patient's recovery by speaking and acting with encouraging assurance, but the remedies he applies may nevertheless hasten the patients death. So personal admiration of the President has not stifled criticism of his programme. The criticism, indeed, has become sharper and more open. "The honeymoon is over," say the critics, who proceed to oppose his measures with obviously less fear of being torn to pieces by the tinthoughMiil admirers of his plan. For example, they are now, as in the Chamber of Commerce convention, condemning various parts of the programme reiterating, no doubt, the general charges that it has raised the cost of living faster than it has raised wages, and that it has been more a "share-the-work" achievement than one of increased aggregate pay-rolls. But these reiterated general charges are not so important, from the point of view of this convention, as the reactions on industrial and commercial enterprises, considered in relation to their future stability and service to the country.

"Big business" in the United States is far from convinced that the RooseveL programme is working in the interests of that stability and service. It has welcomed the relaxing of the anti-trust laws and the reducing of cut-throat competition under Government control, but it has opposed, and from the attitude of the convention is still determined to oppose, any serious extension of that control. The president of the convention has praised certain achievements of the scheme, but it is significant that his optimishi abqut business conditions is frankly shared by opponents of the scheme, who are saying em-, phatically that the improvement, actual and prospective, is not due to it in any great measure, if at all, but to other factors. B Two particular achievements are named by him — abolition of child labour and elimination of unfair competition. The first reform need not have waited for the

Roosevelt programme ; it came in the wake of the scheme, not as an integral part, and might just as well have been the outcome of direct social legislation. As for the elimination of unfair competition a very different opinion, probably not represented in the convention, has been expressed by small manufacturers and small retailers. They have complained that the programme spells their ruin, and charge it with benefiting one section of business—incidentally best able to take care of itself—at the expense of another. Agricultural discontent, also outsicle the convention, has been by no means allayed, despite the efforts of the Administration to placate the farmers. Labour has been divided in its opinions. In the division among opponents is the strength of the programme, but they are becoming more openly dubious about permanent benefit and may combine to hamper it.