THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 3, 1933 END OF THE VICKERS EPISODE

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21533, 3 July 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JULY 3, 1933 END OF THE VICKERS EPISODE

The release of the Vickcrs engineers imprisoned in Moscow and the lifting of the British embargo on llussian importations bring to an end a memorable episode in AngloRussian relations. There may yet be a sequel to the painful story, for precautions may have to bo taken against a repetition of the experience. It is understood, indeed, that an agreement precluding staged trials of the kind is being arranged between the two countries. Negotiations with this purpose are desirable. The moral code of the Soviet Government is not so lofty that it can be left to its unfettered discretion to say what it will do when next it need,. l ! scapegoats for its damaged reputation as a promoter of economic "plans." True, its undertakings in this may be no better honoured than other promises have been, but an agreement of some sort will give clearer ground for action should a similar occasion arise. When tho Russian Embargo Bill was introduced in the House of Commons there were objections on the ground that it violated accepted principles of international practice. Argument on this basis claimed that to use a commercial weapon, even ito flourish it, in order to induce another country to surrender its right to bring aliens to judgment, was an infring?mcnt of those principles. To interfere in the exercise of thiis right is customarily held to bo justifiable only when the process adopted by tho offending country is clearly unjust and illegal. The first British White Paper on tho subject shows that at the beginning of tho episode any taking of drastic action was expected to arouse criticism. Within a few hours of the first arrests, it narrated, the Ambassador at Moscow was urging tho Government to threaten a breach in Anglo-Russian relations even "at the risk of incurring an accusation of participation in pre-judging an issue of which legal remedies have not been exhausted." Sir Esmond Ovey's evident anxiety that unusual steps should be taken quickly was explicable as an outcome of the strain produced by threo years of difficulty in Moscow. However, there was soon abundant reason for such steps.

As a matter of fact, the criticism was wrong in its assumption that the Soviet Government was entitled to the usn 11 immunity from interference enjoyed, by civilised nations. The Russian Foreign Minister, of course, made much play with the theoretical right. "No strong terms, no threats of any kind," he said, "will have the slightest effect on the Soviet Government, except perhaps to confirm its resistance." Time and again, at every turn of events, he declaimed thus, and at th<j trial the official prosecutor heaped sneers upon the British Foreign Office, adding the remarkable assertion —no doubt anticipating the obvious indictment of the proceedings as brutally primitive—that Soviet justice was the finest in the world. If it is, there is a poor prospect of finding legal decency anywhere. From the contents of the British White Papers, tho reports of the trial and the statements made by those earlier escaping from Soviet "justice," it is now easily possible to judge that assertion; and it stands declared as either absurdly foolish or cunningly framed as part of the melodramatic proceedings. The treatment of the accused reduced them, as far as was possible, to physical and mental wrecks before the trial began, in a dastardly endeavour to extract incriminating admissions, and throughout the trial there was a scarcely veiled effort lio stifle the truth. When the threat of commercial reprisals was known, some critics of the British Government bemoaned the decision as Hkely to add to the peril of the accused, and others complained that tho threat merely argued the Government's wish to avert a judgment reflecting on British honour. Both bodies of critics have been silenced by the knowledge that nothing could add to the peril of the prisoners and that no judgment of such a court could have any ethical status. Drastic measures were the only ones of any value. So it came about that the Am-

bassador in Moscow was instructed to tell the Soviet Government that "if British subjects arc used for spectacular treason trials staged for reasons of internal politics," AngloRussian relations must be gravely affected. Judging by what it then knew from the. detailed communications of the Ambassador, to say nothing of earlier proofs of the lengths to which the Soviet Government would go in a political extremity, the British Government had ample justification. Doubtless, in deciding on the embargo, it carefully weighed all risks and reactions. On one hand were certain advantages of trade to be sacrificed, at least temporarily, in relation to imported timber and oil, and £9,000,000 worth of annual exports, as well as millions of money owed by Russia in Britain. On the other hand, Russia could not easily find a substitute for the British market, and any sudden check on her exports would am suddenly prejudice her dependence on credit abroad. At the time of the engineers' arrest negotiations for a new trade agreement with Russia were proceeding, according to official announcement, "in a perfectly satisfactory manner," and the Government, for many reasons, was not wishful to disturb the friendly intercourse of the two countries. But the balancing of commercial and political considerations, whatever their importance, was not allowed to delay the taking of the only stop dictated by moral principles, and in any inevitable sequel these ought to count most. They may mean little to the perverted mind of Muscovite Communism, but happily they mean much elsewhere iu the world,.