THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1933 JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21493, 17 May 1933, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1933 JAPAN IN THE PACIFIC

Attention is called, by an authoritative writer, to the scale and venue of certain Japanese naval manoeuvres in tho Pacific. These arc not necessarily to be viewed as a portent. Japan may not be anticipating immediately either an offensive or a defensive war. In the present state of her national finances, a major conflict would entail a severe drain 011 her resources, and in spito of her notice of withdrawal from the League she manifests no desire to disregard international duty entirely. There is thus no necessity to look* upon these manoeuvres as a threatening gesture. They are to be noted seriously, however, as a Japanese reaction to current possibilities. Events in the Ear East point to trouble that may extend. Europe is disturbed by national politics in Germany. Geneva sees as yet 110 clearway to established peace. Nations that have made sacrifices in the interests of international concord arc hesitating to go further. It would be idle for Japan to ignore a situation full of uncertainty if not menace. Even a repentance of her own contribution to the uncertainty would not make t the prospect secure. To keep her fleet in efficiency and readiness is an obligation, therefore, of the times. More than most, she is dependent 011 her naval resources. She was willing at Washington to accept a place in the battleship ratio lower than that shared by Britain and the United States, a willingness all the more notable because of the consensus of Japanese expert opinion that capital ships were still an,essential nucleus of organised seapower. Since then she has given proof of a sincere readiness to cooperate in a general movement toward reduction and limitation of J naval armaments. But she is increasingly dependent on oversea transport of food and raw materials for her manufacturing industries and for entry into as wide a market for her products as she can enjoy. The British argument for adequate protection of trade routes applies with considerable force to her also, and if no security be provided by allround disarmament she must look to her own capabilities for their defence.

The venue of these manoeuvres is, I perhaps, to be explained as natural; too much weight can be attached to the choice of it in an equatorial region of the western Pacific. To carry them out in the vicinity of island groups where she has large interests cannot be condemned out of hand as a bellicose demonstration. Yet the relation of these groups to naval strategy in the Pacific gives them a particular interest. These groups—the Mariana, (Caroline, Pelew and Marshall Islands—are held by Japan under mandate, and they mean much to her as an outlet for necessary migration and a sphere of development. She holds them by virtue of allotment by the Allied Supreme Council after the war, and it is by no means certain that her withdrawal from the League means forfeiture of the mandate. That point, at all events, may remain in abeyance until the expiry of the period of notice of withdrawal from League membership, of which nearly two years have to run. In the meantime, she has expressly declared her intention of retaining possession, and the reasons for this determination are clear. These groups have already become the home of 12,000 of her people, and development has proceeded. Held as a C mandate, they are virtually an integral part of Japanese territory, subject only to safeguards imposed in the interests of their indigenous population. Remote from centres of civilisation, yet relatively contiguous to Japan, they are expected to be administered in this intimate way. But there is a further reason for Japanese determination to use to the full the authority conferred by the mandate : they occupy a strategic position in that part of the Pacific with which the mandatory is vitally concerned. The terms of the mandate preclude use of the islands as a naval base, but in the event of a breach of the peace so serious that the whole arrangement may be endangered 'there would at once arise, from Japan's point of view, a desirability of ignoring that restriction and chancing the international consequences. Preparation for that contingency would be blameworthy but not easily preventable. In viewing the outlook, Japan cannot have been unaffected by the fact that the United States' naval plans have achieved an effective advantage in the region. There are American stepping-stones across the Pacific, from the continental littoral to the Philippines. Hawaii and Guam are on a practically direct route from San Francisco to these American islands, and Tutuila, in Samoa, provides an alternative southern route from Panama to Guam. These points are all naval bases for the American fleet, and Guam, which is situated in a key position of the equatorial western Pacific, is in the Mariana group, 1510 miles from the Philippines, 3330 from Hawaii and 3120 from Tutuila. Guam, thus in close touch with Japanese interests, is a potential menace to ; them. It has been in American possession since 1898, when it was seized from Spain in the course of the Spanish-Ameri-can war, and is equipped as a firstclass naval station. Continued friction between Japan and the United States must have contributed to Japanese anxiety about the proximity of this American base and strengthened tho determination to yield nothing of the countervailing opportunity presented by a hold on the Mariana and adjacent groups, which offer a "foremost rampart against aggression." The manoeuvres probably have no immediate significance, but to become familiar with the naval conditions of the region is doubtless regarded by the Japanese high command as a duty made urgent by the international uncertainties of the present and contingencies of tho future,, ,