THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1933 STORMFUL SKY IN THE EAST

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21399, 25 January 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1933 STORMFUL SKY IN THE EAST

The expectation that China will speedily offer desperate resistance to Japan is increasing ominously. Both parties to the Manchurian dispute have lately taken an implacable attitude. Japan threatens summary reprisals for any Chinese advance into Jehol, the Manchukuo province abutting on China proper, while China resents Japanese encroachment into that region. Jehol, consequently, is dangerously likely to become the scene of a serious and sanguinary clash, precipitating war on a colossal scale. Approximately 200,000 Chinese troops, it is reportedj are concentrated along the Great Wall—apparently at the point of junction between China proper and Jehol—and their leaders have informed tho Chinese Government that they are ready "to fight to the last man." To judge by happenings in recent weeks, this express determination will not deter Japan, whose methods in Manchuria accord with the military dictum that the best defence is attack. The latest Japanese move has been a violation of the Great Wall itself, and thus a direct challenge to China. This carries the cause of quarrel into an area of agelong sanctity to the Chinese. Had there been only an entrenching of Japanese influence within the province, a purely defensive purpose might have been pleaded in explanation—on behalf of Manchukuo and yet in the legitimate interests of Japan. Eor it has always been understood that Japanese rights in southern Manchuria have specifically included the eastern portion of Mongolia—to use a name that covers a tract of ill-defined frontiers—of which Jehol has been the most easterly. Japanese resentment at the building of Chinese railways into Manchuria through this region, with the obvious intention of competing against the covenanted privileges of Japan in relation to the South Manchuria Railway running down through Mukden to the Liaotung Peninsula at Port Arthur, has been justified. But to extend military influence beyond the Great Wall is excusable only on military maxims, not legal or moral rights. Japan will probably assert that no actual violation of China's ancient frontier has been committed. Shanhaikwan, where the local Chinese post office has been superseded by a Japanese telegraph centre, is a city said to be south of the Great Wall, but on detailed maps it is depicted as-touching this substantial line of demarcation on the north-eastern side, where the line turns to its adjacent termination on a gulf of the Yellow Sea. Yet, even if this topographical fact be fully established in theoretical vindication of Japan, the anger of the Chinese at the occupation of Shanhaikwan can be understood, for Japan has thus gained a base for military operations south of the boundary. It matters little, under conditions of modern warfare, whether this city has its centre within or beyond the Great Wall, so strategically is it placed for dominating the north-eastern area of China proper. Contiguous to the sea, and therefore under the protecting gunfire of Japanese warships, it can be well used for mobilising and deploying forces coming in from the north or landed by transports. It is within striking distance of old Peking, aforetime the Chinese capital, and Tientsin, a considerable city on the coast, important not only as an educational and industrial centre but also as a commercial port. To occupy Shanhaikwan is to threaten China with an incursion endangering much that is vital to the republic, although the administrative headquarters are now' far to the south. Added to the offence of abusing advantage in Manchuria is this further menace, in the eyes of China, not to be tolerated without a national onslaught on the invader, if other nations will not intervene to preserve, as they have promised, the territorial sovereignty and administrative independence of the republic. The Chinese thus, like the Japanese, fall back on breach of treaties as the justification of their actual and intended doings. Hope from solemn covenants has turned to despair of help from them. What Geneva has done —or not done—adds to the probability that the arbitrament of war cannot much longer be avoided. The League's efforts at conciliation have so far been fruitless, in spite of much earnestness and toil. They have been belated and timid, doubtless with reason if not adequate excuse, and neither disputant puts much, if any, trust in Geneva now. A few days ago there was brave talk of # "sanctions" and "further steps," but Japan is seemingly unafraid of pressure and China hopeless of support. The Japanese know only too well that, as M. Herriot bluntly puts the fact, America's absence from the League prevents that body from playing its proper joart. Washington has promised "moral suppol't" to the League's efforts to impose peace—and Japan appears to regard the threats of Geneva as pop-guns and the diplomatic speech of Washington as empty air. Perhaps Japan is right. China has come to practical agreement with her on that one thing. It may be early to predict futility for these vague plans of intervention. Of course, as soon as Tientsin is actually touched, or actually menaced, foreign gunboats will speak in the way that is theirs, because of the commercial concessions their Powers possess in the city ; but when that happens the war will be on. And China will then be as resentful as Japan, and the confused issues in the East will be worse confounded. It is not a pleasant outlook. What M. Herriot has said about yellow supremacy over the white races may be far-fetched, but the risk of ugly complications is not to be dismissed as fanciful.