THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1933 NAVAL NECESSITIES

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21391, 16 January 1933, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1933 NAVAL NECESSITIES

To spend thought and money on naval manoeuvres at a time of elaborate parleys on disarmament may seem incongruous, but there is an easy answer to ridicule of the mimic British battle in the Bay of Biscay between raiders and merchantmen. The risk of war has neither been abolished nor made negligibly small by even the most sincere and painstaking efforts of our time. Whatever is remembered of the horrors of conflict, however clear the indictment of it as expensive folly, it remains a dread possibility. It is true that war is almost everywhere repudiated as an ordinary instrument of settling international differences. Yet there is no guarantee of its abandonment in practice. No pacts have been able to exorcise the spirit that prompts it. As yet, failure has followed every attempt to apply the alluring formula of peace with security. Mr. Kellogg, responsible in part for the Pact of Paris as the most venturesome verbal renunciation of war, annotated its text with the comment that "the right of self-defence is inherent in every sovereign State and is implicit in the treaty." None of the Powers represented in the Disarmament Conference has committed itself to more than the determination of doing its utmost to put a limit—not an end—to the means of strife. The League Covenant calls for the reduction of armaments only "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common, action of international obligations." Thus the renewal of war is still to be seriously feared, and it behoves every State to be watchful against assault, while combining with others to lessen its likelihood. And each State, having regard to its own needs of defence, can without apology adopt measures of self-protection. There has been more in these manoeuvres of British naval forces than any theoretical test of the risks run by outlying British territories. These territories, by reason of the long sea-roads that link them, are dependent on maritime safeguards, but most of all this trade-route consideration is vital to the United Kingdom, both for its own security arid for the associated if not entirely dependent welfare of the distant Dominions. At this juncture, signalised by a deliberate policy of all-Empire trade, care for the safety of ocean-borne freight, to say nothing of passenger traffic, is more than logical; it is imperative. Were there any reasonable prospect of an all-round abolition of submarines, the onus of naval precaution would be considerably lightened, but the chastening fact is that British proposals for their absolute prohibition have scarcely any better prospect of adoption than they had at the Washington Conference. An adequate provision of cruisers and destroyers is essential, first, for keeping open the home waters of the United Kingdom. By effective blockade its supplies of required foodstuffs and raw materials would be disastrously cut off. It would lose also its oversea markets for manufactured products, and with the collapse of its industries would be faced with an imminent destruction of ability to continue self-defence. Although conditions have altered since the House of Lords presented a memorial to Queen Anne including the statement that "it is a most undoubted maxim that the honour and wealth of this kingdom d e P en d on the protection and encouragement of trade and the improving and right managing of our naval strength," the principle is still sound. Second, and' as vital in the new circumstances, is the need for cruisers and destroyers to police the outlying sea-roads, in order to maintain the unity of the Empire, as vulnerable in its branching arterial system as it is at the heart. American spokesmen have been making much of the economic peril of the United States, should enemy ships hamper, . even at a distance, the national system of sea transport. With thousandfold force their contention expresses the kindred plight of the British Empire. Less than eight years ago, under what was known as the Birkenhead scheme, because of its adoption after an exhaustive inquiry by a Cabinet committee of which Lord Birkenhead was chairman, a five-year building programme was begun. It did not exceed the limits set out in existing international understandings, and could not bo held to imply hostility to any foreign Power. All that was projected was a reasonable degree of maritime safety. This scheme however, modest as it was, has been , whittled away, year by year, construction being slowed down, postponed and cancelled until by 1020 it ceased altogether. Little has been done since then to overtake requirements. The 1025 schedule was based on needs of replacement —to supply deficiencies occasioned by vessels becoming obsolete or reaching their age-limits—and its progressive nullifying has meant a steady decline of strength. Absolutely and relatively, the Fleet is utterly below requirements, and functions with difficulty. The Admiralty, according to a recent statement of the First Lord, has been sorely pressed to satisfy requests for cruisers in cases of dire necessity in the course of the last eighteen months i of the 3G in commission, 20 were abroad at the time he laid these facts before the House of Commons. The British Navy, long the bulwark of peace and safety for many peoples besides those under the national flag, has dwindled to a shadow of its former self, a mere skeleton of its old robustness, and the process of reduction has been so gradual that little attention has been attracted. It will be well if the manoeuvres now reported strengthen a national resolve to be done with unilateral disarmament and to pursue less recklessly a policy that hitherto merely increased risk of disaster,,