THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1932 DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21319, 21 October 1932, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1932 DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

The two influential deputations waiting on Mr. Mac Donald and Sir John Simon to express British public opinion on disarmament have a case to which both Ministers are sure to give very sympathetic attention. A day or two ago the Prime Minister said that, while he was not sure that Britain had not played the part of peacemaker too long, he would rather be blamed for that than for precipitating a situation that would make agreement impossible. Referring to Germany's refusal to continue in membership of the Disarmament Conference, he said that she knew well that Britain did not oppose her claim to equality in all negotiations there, and added that the keynote of Britain's policy was not rearmament but disarmament. At Geneva the Foreign Minister has consistently taken the same stand. In giving assurances of national support for all measures employed by the British Government to end the deadlock ! created by Germany, the deputations speak, therefore, with welcome emphasis. The matter in hand, however, resolves itself into a question of ways to overcome the obstructing difficulty. An attempt has been made by Britain to prepare the way for Germany's resumption of her place when the conference reassembles in February: the proposal for a fourPower discussion of the present obstacles to agreement, this discussion to be shared by Britain, France, Germany and Italy, was thus made. It has been welcomed by Italy; France has consented to participate with a view to putting before Germany the French objections to the German claim to equality; there is still a possibility that the circle will be completed by Germany's agreement to such an attempt to resolve the difficulties. But the proposal has not had the immediate and ardent welcome all round that the situation demands, and it is problematical whether the suggested conference. will result in a final removal of obstacles: to agreement at Geneva. Meanwhile, there remains the awkward fact that Germany, for the time being at least, stands determinedly apart, declining further association with the commissions now handling the uncompleted business of the conference This attitude of Germany has been frankly based on disappointment with the methods adopted by the conference, and for this disappointment there is ground all too good. It is known that the early stages of discussion were hampered by two things in particular Germany's reiterated demand for equality in armaments and the reluctance of the French delegation to admit the claim. No open breach occurred until lately, but all the elements of a quarrel were present beneath the surface. Other things have contri-; buted to what Germany has regarded as inexcusable hesitation to achieve practical results. Even an agreement to devote special attention to means of attack—in order to curtail opportunities for'aggressive war—was negatived by disagreement ■when an attempt was made to classify armaments as either offensive or defensive. Almost every type of weapon was declared, by some delegation or other, to be merely defensive. Capital ships, according to Admiral. Pound, a British spokesman, had a definitely defensive character. Admiral Hepburn, of the United States, agreed that it was not possible to set aside capital ships and aircraft-carriers and designate them as strictly offensive. M. Dumont, the French Minister of Marine, said that France regarded the submarine as the arm least menacing to civilians ; it was the poor man's weapon safeguarding him against superior navies. A German delegate contended that there was no aggressive purpose in the construction of his country's "pocket battleships." But it is tolerably plain that every weapon for -which a good vord was thus spoken is equally liable to be made an instrument of aggression. The commission seemed to get nowhere, save to add fuel to the resentment of Germany at the whole tedious process. For this delay Germany, of course, had .1 measure of responsibility, but it gave force none the less to the German contention that the conference was unduly slow in giving effect to the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. There has since been pressed, even more strongly, Germany's demand that either the other nations shall reduce their arms, in terms of the treaty, until they are on a level comparable with hers or else she shall be freed from the restriction preventing her rearming up to their ! strength. For the former alternative j she has logical warrant in the under- | takings at the peace, and to its j achievement the conference is i morally committed. But a further j difficulty has arisen, to which M. j Ilcrriot, speaking particularly for France, now makes reference. He asserts that Germany has already rearmed beyond the stipulations of the peace treaty, and speaks of recourse to certain tribunals in order to sheet home the charge. His threat to carry the matter further implies application to the League Council for the exercise of the powers of surveillance of Germany it took over from the Allied Commission of Military Control when the Locarno agreement was effected. These powers have been dormant ; at all events, little or nothing has been heard of their exercise. Now, however, they may be revived, with a possibility of report to (he Assembly and subsequent submission of a case to the World Court. An acrimonious discussion may be made inevitable by this French move, and I it can be obviated only by early pursuit of the four-Power conference plan, so that an agreement may be reached before the Disarmament Conference reopens. Advantageous use of the interval offers the only way out of the deadlock.