THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1932 WHEAT AND BREAD IN RUSSIA

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21251, 3 August 1932, Page 10

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1932 WHEAT AND BREAD IN RUSSIA

An . instructive sidelight on the Soviet Five-Year Plan has been provided by news from Moscow of Russia's wheat harvest. Only 32,000,000 acres have been harvested as yet this year, whereas 43,000,000 acres were harvested by the corresponding date in 1931; and the people expected to do the harvesting, especially in the Ukraine, are being exhorted to hurry with the harvest in order to prevent loss. The official exhortation not to dally indicates that the human factor, not the soil or the climate, is failing: without more energetic work the result will be disastrous. By this time, had the Five-Year Plan been sufficiently successful in the eyes of the agricultural workers, there would have been no need to goad them to toil; their enthusiasm would have made them unflagging reapers—unless, indeed, they have grown weary of toiling to increase exports while their own needs are inadequately met. This year was to see a revival of cereal export, so essential for the working of the plan, since to such a primary product, for which the Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Lower and Middle Volga arc excellently suited, Russia has largely to look for means to buy imported machinery. The harvest of 1930 was better than the most optimistic expected; it yielded 87.4 million tons, and furnished the first occasion, under Soviet rule, when the pre-war level of cereal production was reached. Thereupon the sowing area was intended to be increased by 12 per cent, but the aim was not realised; it was carried out under rigorous conditions of a definite schedule, yet the sowing was done on ill-prepared soil, too thinly and too late. Moreover, in many parts the harvesting was delayed and much of the crop was lost. To make matters worse, the weather in the south-east regions was that year unfavourable. As an outcome, the export of wheat had to be stopped, and bread became difficult to get at

home. That failure in 1931 was meant to be retrieved this year. Apparently, another failure is in prospect. The measure cf Russia's dependence on a successful wheat harvest is considerable, and incidentally there is an associated necessity for a good price. To export "dumped" wheat may serve for a while, with a view to entering a market, but sooner or later there must be a diminution of this method if trade is to be profitable. It happens that prices in primary products have suffered a heavier fall than those for manufactured goods, These goods, in accordance with the demands of the Five-Year Plan, Russia particularly needs, and the lower the price for her exported "consumption" goods the greater the quantity she is compelled to export in order to import the requisite "capital" goods, -such as machinery and factory equipment. Dumping or no dumping, this necessity exists under the Five-Year Plan, pursued at a time of falling prices for such primary products as cereals; and the Soviet aim has been, therefore, to increase wheat production for export. In any event, it was to be expected that Russia would endeavour to take again the spacious place she used to occupy in the wheat markets of the world. An exceptionally suitable soil, excellent qualities of climate, and a favourable geographical position have conferred on her cer-

tain notable advantages, with reference to her southern region. Under the Five-Year Plan there have been added much cheap labour and a greater degree of mechanisation in farm practice, associated with collective organisation. But the Soviet Government has not been content with these advantages. It has deliberately and unashamedly planned the privation of great masses of the Russian people as a means of increasing the volume of "consumption" exports. That this policy could succeed, up to a point, has never been seriously doubted. The only question has been how long the rural population, dragooned into a serfdom no whit less horrible than that known eCt any time in the Tsarist regime, would endure cruel exploitation for State purposes. It is undeniable that the peasants of Russia, whose main occupation is to produce food, are suffering an artificial food-shortage. They have been encouraged to endure this, by Government propaganda about the alleged menaces of foreign imperialism and anti-revolutionary sabotage. The ruse has worked; the new despotism has been accepted as inevitable—in a good cause. Yet there is a limit to success for such methods, and facts well authenticated suggest that the limit has been reached- Among the latest witnesses is one who, speaking Russian and escaping the watchful guidance of the Soviet "In-Tourist" Agency, has traversed 17,000 miles of Soviet territory. With only an English companion, who also speaks Russian, he has gained first-hand knowledge of conditions and does not hesitate to deny publicly the smooth stories of conducted travellers. "The shortage

of food and of other essentials of life, always serious in Russia," he writes, "has become in the last years acute. Moreover, the true cause of this state of affairs has become common knowledge. Even the most ignorant peasant is familiar with the fact that machinery for the Five-Year Plan is being bought abroad with the bread and butter of which he, with his wife and his children, stands in such sore need." When a few pieces of bread, as he avers, can only bo got with the greatest difficulty in the heart of a Russian grain-growing district, there will naturally be little enthusiasm there for harvest-work.