THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1931. BRITAIN AND THE TRUCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20987, 25 September 1931, Page 8

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1931. BRITAIN AND THE TRUCE.

The attitude of the British Government to the Italian proposal for an immediate truce in armaments may seem to be unnecessarily hesitant, if not actually weak. In reality, it is wise and strong. It is more favourable than that of Japan and the United States, the former seeking a postponement of the operation of the truce and the latter a specific exemption in naval construction. The instructions to Lord Cecil," now leading the British delegation at the League Assembly, permit him to agree to the proposal in its naval aspect, subject to acceptance in this respect by all other parties. Concerning land and. air forces, he is directed to give an undertaking that Britain will not recruit for 1933 above their present low level, unless unforeseen circumstances arise. There is as much reason for both qualifications as for those pressed by Japan and the United States, and it is of better quality. Japan, in view of developments in Manchuria, is obviously fearful of being hampered by any precipitate 'undertaking of the kind; in the United States there is still a determination to pursue naval construction within the limits set advantageously to that country by the London Treaty. Compared with these half-hearted attitudes, the British proviso is magnanimous, when the naval facts are weighed. They are too well known to need repetition. Suffice it to say that, after nearly ten years of the operation of the initial agreement reached at Washington, the position of the Empire, owing to a heroic, not to say quixotic, example in naval disarmament, is perilously weak. It is more than time to call a halt. Mr. Mac Donald as Prime Minister and Mr. Henderson as Foreign Secretary both put on record a little while ago their Government's dissatisfaction with the failure of other Powers to follow Britain's eager lead and their despair of any good from "one-sided disarmament." Mr. "Baldwin, for the new Government, has rightly expressed the same view. Touching the proposal in its broad aspect, the British approval of its motive is warranted Nothing could be a better preparation for the forthcoming Disarmament Conference in February than an immediate agreement, by all the Powers, on such a truce as Italy has proposed—and an immediate implementing of the agreement by them all. Unfortunately, there is no general readiness to agree about it and no assurance that, if there were, the undertaking would be universally honoured. Japan may or may not be at the mercy of circumstances just now; her request for postponement, nevertheless, is fatal to the Italian proposal. Persisted in, it 'must wreck the idea. A truce for four months is barely long enough to be of value ; for a much shorter period it would be absurd, even as a friendly gesture. America's contracting out for the building of destroyers is little better. But there need be reference to neither when sincerity of motive is under discussion and it is understood that one disingenuous nation can spoil everything. There is such a nation—Soviet Russia. Its Government has been prodigal of words and niggardly of help concerning disarmament. For example, it strove to persuade the preparatory commission, at work on data for the coming conference, to lay down the principle that all armaments should be reduced by 25 per cent. ; and at the same time, alone among the Powers, it refused to give the commission requested particulars of its own armaments, thus preventing knowledge of what, in its case, that 25 per cent, would mean. Again, in May last, when besought by the League Council to supply particulars and unable to deny the Council what it had withheld throughout the work of the commission, the Soviet Government replied with some details—but stated that they were addressed to the coming conference and must not be earlier disclosed to other parties without its consent. This is chicanery, and the situation calls for chivalry, or at least candour.

When the conference meets, there will be submitted, as the basis of possible agreement, a draft convention already prepared by the commission. It is a framework merely, not a detailed convention for signature, as yet. Figures of armaments, personnel and budgets will be filled in before signature, and to these agreed limits the Powers will be restricted by solemn covenant. That is sound procedure. At all events, it grapples with the problem in a practical way. To deal with it in this fashion the conference is expressly called. The proposed truce, designed to be operative in the interval, would not necessarily be so precise or so equitable. Apparently, it treats all alike, imposing an immediate, temporary abstention from building, equipping, recruiting and all kindred activity, even in defensive measures. What has been found, however, in the course of the preparatory commission's

work is that existing armaments, examined in connection with the risks and requirements of the various nations, are of very unequal service. Some Powers are more strongly entrenched than others. An immediate cessation of all forms of activity would leave these relative inequalities unaffected. Only the conference can touch them with advantage. Observed by all, the truce would promote a welcome fraternal spirit but be no real contribution to the material problem, and the cautious attitude of Britain takes account of this fact.