FOCH AND THE WAR.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20819, 11 March 1931, Page 8

FOCH AND THE WAR.

'AMERICANS' USEFUL WORK

SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE. j ' LAST DAYS OF HOSTILITIES., Copyright, 1931J by Doubleday, Dorsn and Co., Ino. (All Eights Reserved.) No. XXIX. In order to augment the effort demanded of the American Army I did not hesitate to increase the scope of its command. The autonomy of this force had been fully established and now, in order to effect a concordance between operations in the Argonne and those in Champagne, as well as a close union of efforts, General Maistre, who in this region commanded the central group of French armies, was charged with assuring co ordination between the operations of the French troops on the right of his group and those of the American First Army. The slowing up of the Argonne operations had beei} otherwise interpreted in certain quarters less acquainted with the difficulties encountered by commanders iii handling tho masses of modern armies ....

But there is no denying the magnitude of the effort made by the American Army. After attacking at Saint Mityiel on September 12, it attacked in the Argonne On the 26th. From September 26 to October 20 its losses in battle were 54,158 men—in exchange for small gains on a narrow front, it is true, but over particularly difficult terrain and in the face of resistance by the enemy. At the same time, with a view to hastening as much as possible the resumption of the combined offensive of the French Fourth Army and the American * First Army, and in order to render their progress easier, I drew up, on October 21, a general instruction, setting forth th« objectives to be attained and the methods to be employed in reaching them. Principal Factors of Success. On November 1 General Petain sent out to his troops a general instruction. "The designation of successive lines of objectives," General Petain wrote, "must never be allowed to hamper the dash of attacking troops or diminish the chance# of pushing forward as far as possible. . . . It follows that to make such designation /is' justified as a general procedure only during the phase when the rupture of a fortified line is boing effected. "As soon as pursuit begins, speed becomes the principal factor of success, and the idea of the direction must take precedence over anything else in the mind of a commander. Once tho enemy has been seized the hold on him must not be relaxed When this moment arrives the only thing which need concern any unit is the direction of exploitation assigned to it, and along which it must boldly push forward, without stopping to regulate its advance on its neighbours. . . Thus, complete identity of views existed between the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies smd the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies. It was now important to pass from theory to action. For that reason General Persuing was urged to hasten the launching of his offensive west of the Meuse. Brilliant American Success. "It is of the highest importance,"• I wrote him on October 27, "that the American First. Army be ready to begin operations on tho date decided upon, viz., November 1, and that it be able to continue them unt l important and certain results have bee:a attained." I therefore prescribed that the attacks to be undertaken by the American First Army on November 1 should be pushed forward and continued without any pause until this army was in possession of Boult-aux-Bois, Buzancy and further to the east, and hsid assured the occupation of this region, a,s a first result to be obtained. These attacks were facilitated by successive actions which the French Fourth Army had been developing since October 13 east of Vouziers. These, having as-' sured a bridgehead on the right bank of the Aisne'between Vandy and Falaise, now enabled ; it to draw upon itself a con« siderable part of the German troops in the Argonne, thus relieving the pressure on the America,n Army. It was under these conditions that the American offensive was carried out on November 1. From the beginning it achieved brilliant success, capturing the first day the enemy positions as far as the Busaney-Stenay Road, while, on the left, the French Foarth Array extended its foothold east of the Aisno. Orders were now given to develop without delay the advantages obtained, by continuing the combined Franco-American operations in the direction of Sedan and Mezieres.

Retreat of the Germans. Severely shaken, the enemy, between the Aisne and the Meuse, was not long in beginning a retreat. On November 2 Croix-aux-Bois, Buzancy, Villers-devant-Dun and Doylcon fell into our hands. On the 3rd the entire nothern part of the Argonne was cleared, the heights of Belval wera occupied and our troops lined the left bank of the Meuse as far as Dun. On the 4th the Franco-American advance was continued beyond Stenay and Le Chesne, penetrating into the wooded region south o!r Beaumont and progressing along the Meuse almost to Stenay. I warmly congratulated General Pershing on the very important results obtained, "thanks to the ability shown by commanders and the energy and bravery of the troops." I urged him to continue his operations "in the direction of the Meuse around Bazeilles and upstream from there" and to extend them as much as possible on the right hank of that river.

General Penihing had already been asked a few/ days before, in view of the withdrawal of Ihe Austrian divisions from France, in consequence of the armistice concluded with Austria, to have the American Second Army execute, with the means at its disposal, "local operations sufficiently vigorous to reconnoitre the enemy and develop whatever partial success may be obtained." Proposed Lorraine Attack. [Marshal Foch then gives details of the preparations for the projected attack in Lorraine, which was fixed to start on November 14. The Armistice intervened on November 11.] This attack was to be commenced with "28 divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry, supported by a considerable mass of artillery and by about 600 tanks." It was to cover a width of 20 miles, which would be added to a battle already being victoriously pursued along a 200-mile front. It was to be launched in a new direction, where there was no •possibility of its encountering strong enemy forces. For this reason it was permissible to expect from the "attack a brilliant start and a rapid conquest of a dozen or so miles; after.this it, would undoubtedly encounter devastations such as were already retarding elsewhere the progress of our other armies. It would add its efforts to theirs, augment them, reinforce their effect, without changing their nature.

It was the march toward the Rhine, in the direction of Berlin, once more confumed for the ensemble of the Allied forces-by a convergence of repeated efforts growing greater every day. Such a march along such a 'route could not fail to bring fcbout: the definite decision of the war. ('Co be continued.).