THE TOWER IN SILOAM.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20792, 7 February 1931, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE TOWER IN SILOAM.

AN EARTHQUAKE PROBLEM.

BY MATANGA.

It is a far cry, as years and miles are counted, f vom the falling of an ancient tower in Siloarn to the tottering, l crushing walls that have killed scores in towns of Hawke's Bay this tragic week. Yet are they linked by a swift train of thought. " Those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them " —it is the wisest, calmest voice of all history that speaks—" think ye that were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem ? I tell you, nay." Those eighteen were workmen employed in making an aqueduct to the famous Pool of Siloam. Suddenly, in the midst of their toil, they were overwhelmed in an avalanche of stone. "Ah!" said the wiseacres, complacent in their little creed, " they perished for their sin in profaning a sacred place; there is the proof of their guilt." And the word got currency and was widely believed—an easy-going word, but it was met in the way by this notable question and answer, and given the lie to its face. The question and its emphatic answer echo on. They ring in ears listening now, as eagerly as then, to tales of calamity. An earthquake is ranked as " an act of God " in sundry business documents and in common speech. It is the human way of dealing with happenings beyond mortal power to start or stay. There is 110 quarrel with that description. It holds, though it may hide, a truth undeniable. But the quick, confident conclusion that evil marches on the heels of wrong-doing, that the calamity coming swiftly out of earth and sea and sky is the wreaking of supernatural vengeance on human waywardness, is still a prevalent interpretation of these overwhelming events. It will nob do. It falters in the presence of hard facts. The terrible story of Hawke's Bay shows it to be untenable. Those scores on whom the tottering ruins fell in 1 Napier' and Hastings, -think ye that they were sinners above all men dwelling in New Zealand ? What of tho priests who met swift death —of the do.vout worshippers in the pro-cathedral—-of the nurses at the hospital—of the good, known and unknown (though " known unto God "), who were overwhelmed as tragically as tho rest? To put these questions is to destroy tho slim fabric of much easy thinking, and to set anew the age-old problem of pain. Development oi Character. There will be tales of providential escape. They havo a value. Even Jn tho current phrase " special providence " there is a truth. But the deductions often drawn from th;it aro crude in the extreme. The ill suffered by the morally guiltless, even the best of men, has for ages exercised devout and undevout thought. Tho problem presses still. It is presented by the sorrowful happening that has caused many to stand still and wonder. It will not be put aside by any easy theory. One thing can be held with certitude by all who have much acquaintance with human life. It is that hardship and grief may minister to the highest development of efficiency and character, and none will be ready to deny that this development counts for most in any rational scheme of things. Starting there—no other beginning is worth, a thought—the problem of tho incidence of suffering is not so insoluble as it appears. Even our inner and higher pangs bring benefits. "We trace the rainbow in the rain" of our tears. Dumas asked Reboul: "What made you a poet?" The answer came: "Suffering." Darwin credited his poor health with the amount of work he accomplished. Tennyson's "In Memoriam" was the product of a great grief. Says Carl/le of Dante—"We will not complain of Dante's miseries; had all gone right <vith him Florence would have had another prosperous Lord Mayor, but the world would have lost the Divine Commedia." Our highest good comes down the vale of tears. Pain is then a potential minister of good, not essentially a monster of evil. The Incidence of Pain. • But the heart of the problem is the incidence of pain in human life, its apportioning among men. If moral evil and pain on the one hand-and right-living and pleasure on the other were clearly, closely and appropriate'ly linked in human experience, the puzzle would largely vanish. They are not so associated, save in a rough way. Thero is 110 fine adjustment, 110 mathematical certainty in the following of wrong-doing by pain and rightdoing by pleasure. The wrong-doer hopes to side-step judgment. He plays with fire, hoping to find himself a fire-walker, immune from harm. He has heard about " the mills of God," but he thinks that in his case they may slip a cog. Nemesis has a halting foot; the man of evil heart trusts to that lameness, hoping to show a cle.vi pair of heels. He seems to succeed. Beside this, suffering (which thus falls uncertainly on the wrong-doer) hits the innocent. The sane, the healthy, the thrifty, for example, have to carry the burden represented in the world s hospitals, asylums, poor-houses and gaols. Prattling innocence and trusting love are victimised by lust and hate and selfishness. There is no mathematically detailed relation between evil-doing and evil-expei 1encing. What If There Were No Problem? What if there were? This is equivalent to asking—What if there were no problem of suffering ? What if the kind of wor d were known for which some have openly longed—a world with absolutely just and eauitable and manifest apportionment of immediate penalty . for wrong-doing ? Would it be a world in which good char ac ter —the highest product of human lifecould be developed? . , Suppose there Avere obvious, mathematical certainty in the rewards of goodand the punishment of wickedness. There would be no morals. Right-doing would be a smart investment, not merely in " futures," but in stock giving immediate and certain profits. _ Right-doing would then bo followed for this certain reward, and wrong-doing would bo shunned because of its certain penalty; that is, right-doing would be politic and timeserving and worldly-wise—not rightdoing at all; and evil-doing would be stupid and suicidal and insane not evil doing at all. , , , , Such a world would havo no place for the growth of character. The essence of a hood deed is that it is done " in scorn of consequence." If it is done with a single eye to the main chance it loses its essential quality as a good deed. 1 herefore it is the very ill-adjustment of right and reward, of sin and suffering, that preserves to right and wrong their real distinction. Sweep that ill-adjustment away and this distinction is practically lost- that is to say, given a world without 'the problem of suffering, morality is impossible and character cannot be proBut this is, in effect, to admit that at heart the problem of pain is without a solution in this life. Certainly; its continued presence is essential to molality. Life's best for intelligent, ethica , spiritual beings is possible through this very failure of pain to be obviously and certainly and appropriately associated with moral wrong. Whatever bo said about the disaster that fills our thought and awakens our sympathy, to look to it for the buttressing of any foolish notions about its overwhelming of some and sparing of others would be wrong. Were such notions feasible, there would bo an end to everything that most matters in mortal and immortal life.