SAMOAN CONSPIRACY.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20525, 28 March 1930, Page 10

SAMOAN CONSPIRACY.

•MAU'S GROWING DEFIANCE. 1928 NAVAL DEMONSTRATION. NATIVES "CALL THE BLUFF." CONSEQUENCES OF FATAL ERROR

BY THE HEnALD's SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

NO. 11. A review of tlie Mau movement at this time—January, 1928—suggests that St had been kept alive by propaganda, and the effect of a number of events which supplied motive power. There had been publication of Mau propaganda in the vernacular. Stimulus had been given by the deportation of three Europeans. There had been the extraordinary demonstration of defiance in x\pia by a large party from Savaii. There was European ferment over Mr. Nosworthy's virtual ultimatum and Ihe sitting of the Royal Commission, •which, in the opinion of European and 4 half-caste opponents of the Administration who were not necessarily wholehearted supporters of the Mau, was valueless, because in their opinion \ its order of re ference was too limited. Among the extremists there was, and still is, scorn for the/ whole inquiry, to the extent that by inference at least, the integrity of the late Chief Justice, Sir Charles Skerrett, and Judge C. E. MacCormick is assailed. There liad been few checks to the movement beyond the local banishment of one or two 'Mau chiefs and the imprisonment of a few others. / • Growing Defiance. As already mentioned, the police force •was qiiite inadequate. At this time there were only two European police officials, and their weakness in strength, combined with what appears to have been a policy of extreme patience, had had the effect of stimulating the Mau to take wider and wider liberties with the law. Submission Jo insult and toleration of hostile demonstrations were naturally interpreted as weakness, and all the time it must be remembered the natives were fed upon the belief that soon victory would be brought home by Mr. Nelson. It was believed that the League of Nations would step in, and other hopes were entertained of the power of outside influence. It was wrongly supposed at this time that the banishment of the chief European leaders,jwould deprive the Mau of its inspiration. Events have proved that the New Zealand organisation, which came into being upon the deportation of these men, has been more dangerous to the peace of Samoa and more damaging to the Administration than would have been a similar organisation operating in Apia itself. Naval Demonstration. Ira February, 1928, it seemed that- the Government Had' determined to support the Administration with sufficient display of force to bring an end to tlie Mau and open up a way whereby the fono of Faipule might again become jthe mouthpiece of the Samoan people, and provide a debating ground for all Samoan discontents. These were by no means clear. The Samoan mind was so completely under the influence of disgruntled Europeans that all native questions were tinged with a whollv " foreign" complexion. In "February two New Zealand cruisers arrived, and, to give an idea of the extent to which the Samoan mind is susceptible to false rumour, there was a belief that the cruisers had come to take away the Administrator, who, they were told, had been suspended. In the same month the police were given extended powers. Processions were forbidden, but <' it is ho be emphasised,, in view of the charge of militarism against the Administration, that the police were not yet authorised to carry firearms. February 23 saw a round-up of the Mau police, and several hundred were sent to internment on Mulunu'u Point. As is well known the movement had a farcical ending. The natives soon learned that the naval forces had been forbidden to shoot. There was much, coming and going among the prisoners, yho found means of getting to Apia > through the swamps and by canoes, but at meal times they were always present, usually . with several hundred of their friends, who lia'd no right to be present. Natives Call a Bluff. On March 9 the naval demonstration, . thanks to the limited powers imposed by the New Zealand Government, was definitely proved to be worse than useless. That day the police tried to arrest the late Tamasese in Apia's main street. Mau followers came to his assistance, and he escaped. The police followed him *to Vaimosa. They were supported by a party of marines. Tamasese was found in- his fale, surrounded by several hundred of his followers. The marines stood with fixed bayonets, while the handful of police endeavoured to push through the crowd to secure the chief, sitting placidly in the fale. . They were pushed off with fists and sticks. They were Unarmed. When it was quite obvious thaC the police could not-perform their duty they and the marine pafty withdrew. Thus the Mau called a bluff, thanks to the limitation of power imposed by the New Zealand Government. The Mau believed that the Administration was afraid. It was a fatal mistake, which more than, anything else has been the cause-of the succeeding two years of Mau defiance. It was not until the following November that Tamasese was arrested. The warships departed, the interned prisoners were released and the Administration was left in a much weaker position than it had ever been before, notwithstanding the fact that a force of 75 military police arrived the following April. So much for the charge of military aggression. ' j First Mau Setback. In May the Mau received its first setback. At Matautu a party of armed police delivered a warrant to one, Leota, who was /surrounded by 150 Mau. There was violent resistance. Rifle butts and batons . were used, and Leota was taken. No shots were fired. In June Mau threats to kill the police were circulated, intimidation being the . chief weapon of the Samoans, who have not ■' been conspicuous for individual valour. August found the Mau more definitely defiant. : For instance, Tamasese refused to accept a Court summons. This meant that the Mau had determined upon a policy of disregarding the authority of the Administration in every respect. Friends of the Mau might call it " non-co-operation" or " passive resistance;" actually, it was a revolt, which was anything' but passive, when there were sufficient numbers.to resist the police in the performance of their duty. In September there was an unlawful procession. In October the police were stoned at Magiagi. In November a rumour of Tamasese's arrest resulted in the concentration of Mau; men at Vaimosa. Tlie Mau was definitely out of hand. The situation might be likened to the revolt of the fourth form against a master for whom/ it had lost all respect, and the origin of the whole thing—the dragging in of the natives into European politics —might be likened, to the same fourth form* being invited by university graduates to help them in a protest against the professorial board. The Europeans and well knew that in their present stage of development natives could' 1 not understand their politics.