GAS IN WARFARE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20518, 20 March 1930, Page 8

GAS IN WARFARE.

EMPLOYMENT. DEFENDED 'ti

*' LESS HUMAN SUFFERING'*

OPINIONS OF A CHEMIST, f J lie president of„ the -Society of CI emical Industry, Dr. Herbert Levinstein, read a paper on "Chemical Warfare " before thei London section of the society at the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, re. cently. He criticised the "illusory" character of treaty provisions against gas warfare, contended that the limitation of naval armaments increased the importance of the chemical arm, quoted & figures to establish that gases were less brutal and destructive of human life and property than shells, and pleaded for the prosecution of chemical warfare re- > search. •*' <

I)r. Levinstein said President Wilson was the main author or inspirer of Clause 171 in the Treaty of Ver«i£.ilies, which forbade chemical warfare; fresh from the drafting of this clause, he telegraphed to the Congress that; although the United States would gladly join in a national disarmament programme, it would nevertheless be obvious prudence to make certain of the successful maintenance of many strong and wellequipped chemical plants. If President! Wilson thought this obvious prudence for the United States, we were not warmongers or panic-mongers if we examined the problem for ourselves and pursued a liimilar course.

" Making War Cheaper." The restriction ofjpaval armament!!, tha limitation of the number and sine of ships, was almost purely an economy measure, but limiting the size or number; of battleships or ordnance did not necessarily make war less likely; on the contrary, by making it cheaper, in a sense it made it easier. In any case, <le creasing the relative importance of ships op guns or man power was bound to increase the importance of any other arm, particularly the chemical arm.

Chemical warfare had in a kiad of way been forbidden at Versailles, at Washington, and by the League of Nations.; ati Geneva, and, indeed, ever since the Hague Convention of July, 1899, said Dr., Levinstein. His object was not to show that the prohibition was illogical, but if it could be proved to ineffective, that was another matter, for to rely on ineffective prohibition might be as dangerous in the future as it was in the last' war.

The Germans claimed that they did noti break the letter Of the Hague Convention of 1899 when in April, 1915, they let loose a flood of chlorine over the British lines at the second baitle of Ypres and made a gap eight miles wide in our line. In the terms of the Convention the contracting Powers agreed to "abstain from the use of projectiles;, tha solo object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." The gasi in April, 1915, was discharged not from projectiles but from cylinders, an imjportant technical difference. Moist, if not all, of the gas shells employed afterwards had a high-explosive charge, and their object was not, therefore, "solely" tho liberating of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The loosing of that stream of chlorine on the Canadian and French Colonial troops created a. gap through which the Germans might have poured had their General Staff really believed at that time in the efficiency of tha chemical weapon.

The Surprise Attack. This {surprise attack showed tho extreme danger of allowing- ourselves- to neglect defence against chemical warfare, because we did not expect it owing to some inaccurate or indefinite form of words used in a treaty. In Article 171 of the Treaty of . Versailles, intended to prohibit chemical warfare, there was ,a proviso at least as vague as that, of 1893 forbidding in Germany tho manufacture and importation of toxic ga.ses and analogous liquids. What exactly did the Geneva Protocol of 1925,, which Great Britain bad promised to ratify, prohibit? It prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials or devices, but it did not prohibit the use of screening smokes. Wa of all people should be crazy to prohibit their use. Yet, in concentrated form, most of the smokes had deleterious effect 3 on the human organism. No one could clsiim, for instance, that chlorosulph'Sfiia acid smoke, the Zeebrugge screen, was ptaasant to breathe in high concentration. Those who used it in chemical works knew it to be a most unpleasant substance to handle. There was no screen smoke which was wholly non-deleterious, and if smoke screens were allowed and not defined or limited the rest of tha prohibition lost its virtue. Again., were tear gases to lie regarded as coming within the ban 1 Many people would argue that these were not poisonous, for in very low concentration they only affected the eyes. If tear gas were prohibited, that "would prohibit in war the use of a weapon permitted and used in peace. Tear gas was used in the United States for dealing with riots and similar disturbances and as a protection to banks and safe deposits against burglars and thieves. If it were permissible to use tear gas in peace time against one's own citizens, how could it bo wrong to use it in war against the enemy ? High Explosive ShcJls. High explosive shells, again, generally produced poiso*nous fumes which under certain conditions would poison men in the neighbourhood of the burst. The Geneva Protocol did not. prohibit the use of high explosive shells that released poisonous fumes, nor did it define in any • way what high explosives were permitted in war. The Protocol was certainly inaccurate in stating that the use of chemicals in war had beeh justly condemned by the general opinion of the world. The casualties of the last war showed that the military results desired could be obtained more easily and with lesi human suffering from gas than from liigl explosives, said Dr. Levinstein. Gal maimed or killed a much smaller proportion of those it put out of action than any other weapon used in the war. In proportion military results it caused far less human suffering, temporary or permanent. From January Ito September 30, 1918, the number of German ga3 casualties was, in round figures, 58.000; of those only 3 per cent. died. " From August 1 to 10, 1919, .the French had 14,578 gas casualties; of those 2.9 pe? cent. died. The total British casualties and deaths from gas from September 15, 1918. to tha end of the war, were 24,363 casualties, 540 deaths, percentage of deaths 2.2. Of tha American gas casualties less than 2 per cent, died, and very few were permanently; injured. Out of every 100 casualties from all forms of warfare other than gas more than 25 died, and of those that survived two to five were maimed, blinded or disfigured for life. It,, was estimated that mustard gas killed one man for every 40 put out of action, while shells killed one for every three. While not suggesting that gas warfare! was anything but dreadful, it was less wasteful of human life and property than older forms of warfare, and it was of such outstanding importance that, when tha time came, it would be used even if such, use were against-the spirit of the Protocol. 1 The persistent products such as mustard gas permitted great economy of force.: No place sprinkled with mustard g;»3 could be usefully held. Against high explosive shelling men could go underground, and when the shelling ceased they could come up; but they could not coma up and carry out any useful military; movement if the surface had become contaminated by mustard gas. By means of mustard gas an army could protect its flanks against attack, and an enemj' could be denied territory which large numbers of troops .would be required to defend*