DRAMA OF GALLIPOLI.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20465, 17 January 1930, Page 8

DRAMA OF GALLIPOLI.

MOBE SECRETS REVEALED. PRESSURE' 0N : DEFENDERS* / ' ENEMY'S PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WHEN THE ANZACS EVACUATED. ( , _ [SPECIAL (Copyright.) PARIS, Deo. 7. If proof were needed that the epic of Gallipoli must rank in history with other memories of fruitless valour it is provided by the latest/ papers of the French Secret Service transferred to the archives at the disposal of future historians. The main facts revealed may be exclusively summarised. 'At the moment when the Allied Governments decided that success on the Gallipoli Peninsula was impossible and that the losses should be cut by evacuation as quickly as possible the enemy had reached the conclusion that resistance to the Allies was nor longer possible, and at the very moment when the Anzacs were turning their backs on the scenes of their glorious exploits more than half the opposing forces had been withdrawn to new positions that meant yielding to the attackers all that they had been fighting for, and three-fourths - of the enemy guns were already in position far behind the original trenchjes. Enemy Unable to Strike. This is the substance of a revelation I «m able to make and it is not based on idle gossip but on documents that will be accepted,as unimpeachable authority for the 'conclusions of future historians trying to weigh the value of the, Gallipoli enterprise. The revelation helps to explain one of the mysteries of the Gallipoli enterprise, namely, the fact that though the enemy undoubtedly knew of the Allies'., decision before the evacuation had been carried out. he was unable to strike the blow that everyone expected by falling 'on the retiring forces in force to overwhelm them or even to rain gunfire on them. The plain truth ii that when the enemy learned <the truth, or rather when he accepted it, the distance between his main forces and artillery and the retiring troops made it impossible for the measures <■ to be taken. Von Sanders did his best to j atone for being caught napping and frantic efforts were made to rush up men and guns to the original positions in order to inflict a crowning disaster on the evacuating troops, but the withdrawal was carried out tod quickly to make those measures successful. Decoded German Messages. The documents that shed this now light on the drama of Gallipoli are selected papers of the French Secret Service that have been released for deposit with .the documents to be made available for the guidance of future historians of the world war. They coijsist mainly of decoded messages and reports passing between General Liman von Sanders, the German commander in chief on Gallipoli, and the German headquarters. At the very moment when the Allied withdrawal had been decided on von Sanders is found reporting to Berlin the deliberate judgment of the Turkish commanders that ib is no longer possible to withstand the pressure of the Allies and that in face of a new attack that they understand to be in preparation it has been decided to evacuate all positions to take up new ground that has'' been prepared for some time in anticipation of this necessity. The new positions are not indicated, but von Sanders *makes it clear that the withdrawal to them would involve surrender to the~Allies of key positions that would give them a crushing victory. He points out that the only hops of averting this disaster lies in stiffening the Turkish resistence with strong German contingents and guns. Failing such aid he declares that he will bo/ reluctantly obliged to acquiesce in the Turkish decision. He insists on the urgency of the matter, claiming, that a • day's delays may make all the difference between success and failure, as ho has the most definite information that the Allies have been reinforced and have already begun operations pointing to a new and more powerful attack in the next few hours.

What Von Sanders Did Not Know. ' What von Sanders did not know, or rather did not believe, was that the activity he referred to on the side of the Allies had to do with the evacuation and not with a new attack. Berlin replied that it Was impossible to divert further Gorman men or guns in view of the urgent calls on the western and eastern fronts and that the inevitable must be faced, von Sanders taking such measures as were in his power to delay the advance of the Allies and defer the gathering of the full fruits of their success. j Within a few hours of the receipt of this reply von Sanders had given the orders necessary and the main Turkish body withdrawn to the new positions, with their most powerful artillery, leaving only slender infantry forces and light guns in the original position to delay the anticipated attack of the Allies. Prior to this von Sanders had received through his secret service the definite information that evacuation of the peninsula had been decided on by the Allies, but he had already paid de'arly for giving credence to spies' imports that were evidently based on false information circulated by Allied agents in order to mislead the enemy. He therefore refused all credence 1o these reports until a few hours before the completion of the withdrawal. By that time it was too late, because with the best will in the world he could not get his men and guns within striking distance again in the time. In the last few 'hours-feeble moves were made bv the enemy on the spot, but there was little hope for their success. Anzacs and " the Landing." The papers also reveal that in the first stages of the war the enemy were well served by their secret service, which enabled them to know some days before of 1 he spot selected for the landing on Anzao Day. and von Sanders was thus able to prepare in advance gun positions that enabled the landing spots to be raked with gunfire, and trenches were dug and distances marked for the guidance of the infantry so that | heir fire might be more efficient. Tt. waS thus a case of men walking into a carefully prepared trap with lunges.so accurately marked off that the ' Turkish riflemen and machine-gunners had only to lie under cover and aim at targets marked off to the last inch. One of the most important, documents records the confession of von Sanders that his calculations r/ were upset by the amazing rpsource of the Anzacs, who achieved what he and his advisers had regarded as impossible by making headway in spite of the preparations made for their reception by the enemy.