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THE AFTERMATH.

CIIUECMLL'S MEMOIRS. [TRO.UBL.ES ,0E IRELAND, FREE STATE DIFFICULTIES. l * HIDEOUS AND INDESCRIBABLE." BV THE RIGHT HON. WINSTON CHTJRCHILL. (Copyrieht.-r-By arrangement with the Times, London.) No. XL Toward tho end of May f1922] a, new, ftnd to mo a most disconcerting, development took place. On May 19 Mr. Griffith had told tho Republicans in tho Bail that, in (heir violc/nt courses they did not represent 2 per cent, of the people of Ireland, and that " tho courso that' thoy were pursuing placed them on tho level of the ■worst traitors in Ireland—namely, thoso who by their actions were rendering the return of the English troops inevitable." The very next day, to tho astonishment of all, to the dismay of their friends, and to the joy of every enemy, a compact was signed between Do Valera and Michael Collins. Tho compact dealt with the approaching election. It comprised an agreement that the Republican anti-Treaty men—who Mr. Griffith had declared tho day before did not represent 2 per cent, of the Irish people—were to have 57 seats in the new Parliament as against 64 for the supporters of the Treaty. They were not to be opposed by the Provisional Government to a the extent of 57 seats. In other words the existing balance on the question of / accepting or rejecting the treaty was to bo preserved. Secondly, this compact prescribed that after this so-called election a Coalition Government should be formed consisting of five pro-treaty Ministers and four antitreaty Ministers, with the President of the Assembly and the Minister at the head of the Army additional. On this basis, the two Sinn Fein parties, pro- and antiTreaty, were to divide the representation and "challenge the candidates of every other opinion. Fear of Civil War. We invited the Free State leaders over to London. They came immediately; Griffith plainly in resolute dissent from •what had been done; Collins half defiant, half obviously embarrassed. It was all right, he said ; we did not know their difficulties. Theso wero hideous and indescribable. Nothing, said Collins, was stable under their feet. A contested election was physically /impossible. It would mean widespread civil war; no one would dare to vote; they had not the strength to keep even the semblance of order. Nevertheless Collins .declared himself unchanged in general intention to stand by the treaty. It looked as if the wounds of Ireland would not react to any treatment known to science, but would just dough away into mortification. These events produced their immediate reaction in the north. Protestant Ulster was convinced that Southern Ireland would now sink into chaos, and to .wall themselves off from this infection was the only thought. Incessant demands were made for troops and arms. Sir James Craig made an uncompromising statement about the boundary. While not by any means giving up hope, I thought it right to prepare Parliament for a slattern development, and on the motion for the Whitsuntide adjournment I laid the whole story before the House of Commons, repeating the most valid of I the explanations which Mr. Collins had offered. Afiront by Republicans. On that very day, however, a new incident which I duly reported to the House had occurred. The townships of Pettigo and Belleck had been seized and occupied by Irish Republican forces. Pettigo lay astride the border and Belleek was wholly in northern territory. This military affront brought into play the other side of the dual policy I was endeavouring to apply. It gave me the opportunity of assuring Ulster ■ that we were not merely sliding ■with apologies down the slope, but that, whatever else went to wreck, the integrity of their territory would be protected. Immediately after the debate, Michael Collins, who had listened to it, came to my room. I mentioned to him amicably that if any part of the Irish Republic Army, either pro-Treaty or anti-Treaty, invaded/ northern soil, we would throw them out. Ho took it quite coolly, and seemed much more interested in the debate. "I am glad to have seen it," he said, " and how it is all done over here. ■ not quarrel with your speech; we have got to make good or go nnder." We argued a little about Pettigo and Belleek and about Belfast atrocities. Before Collins left he said, " I shall not last long; my life is forfeit, hut I shall do my best. After lam gone it will be easier for others. You will find they will be able to do more than I can do." I never saw him again. Collins and Griffiths. Here I will record a few thoughts aTsont Ihis man, Michael Collins. He was an Irish patriot, true and fearless. His narrow upbringing and his whole early life had • filled him with hatred of England. His hands had touched the springs of terrible deeds. We had hunted him for his life, and he had slipped half a dozen times through steel claws. But now he had no hatred of England. Love of Ireland still possessed his soul, but to it was added a wider comprehension. He had come in contact during the Treaty negotiations with men he liked; with men who played the game according to tho agreed rules; he had plighted a new faith to act fairly by them. As Griffith seemed to rely especially upon Mr. Austen Chamberlain, so Michael Collins was deeply impressed by the personality of Lord Birkenhead. The transition of his sympathies can be followed in gradations through his speeches by anyone who cares to study them. Whereas he had had only one loyalty, ho now had two. He was faithful to both; he died for both. When in future times the Irish Free State is not only tho homo of culture and of virtue, not only prosperous and happy, but, an active, powerful and annealing forro in the British Commonwealth of Nations, regard will be paid by widening circles to his life and to his death, Tho Advent of Cosgravo. Arthur Griffith died of heart failure, so it, is established, on August 13, and Collins himself, moving audaciously about the country rallying and leading his supporters in every foray, was killed in an ambush on August 22. The presentiment of death had been strong upon him for some' days, arirl he only narrowly escaped several murderous traps. Ho sent me a valedictory message through a friend, for which lam grateful. " Tell Winston we could never have dono anything without him." The funeral of Collins was dignified by the solemn ritual of the Roman Catholic Church and by every manifestation of public' sorrow. Then silence. But his work was done. Successor to a sinister inheritance, reared among fierce conditions and moving through ferocious times, he supplied those qualities of action and personality without which the foundation of Irish nationhood would not have been reestablished. The void left by tho deaths of Griffith snd Collins was not, unfilled. A quiet, potent figure stood in the background, sharing, like Griffith, tho dangers of the rebel leaders without taking part in all that they had done. In Cosgrave the Irish people found a chief of higher quality than any who had yet appeared. 'To tho courage of Collins ho added tho matter-of-fact fidelity of Griffith and a Knowledge of practical administration and State policy all his own. At his side rose the youthful Kevin O'Higgins, a gure out of antiquity cast in bronze., / k* continued flaifeJi

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH19290412.2.11

Bibliographic details

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20228, 12 April 1929, Page 8

Word Count
1,239

THE AFTERMATH. New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20228, 12 April 1929, Page 8

THE AFTERMATH. New Zealand Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 20228, 12 April 1929, Page 8

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