EMPIRE'S OCEAN TRADE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXV, Issue 20137, 24 December 1928, Page 7

EMPIRE'S OCEAN TRADE.

NEW CRUISER PROGRAMME. ! ! " ABSOLUTE MINIMUM " POLICY. I VITAL INTEREST OF DOMINIONS. Ny SIR ARCHIBALD HURD. The. American President, Mr. Coolidgc, stated emphatically some time ago that the American Government does not intend to permit the strength and efficiency of the naval, military and air forms of the United States to bo weakened on the excuse that the Kellogg Treaty has outlawed war. The pact, as interpreted by tin Americans themselves, outlaws only aggressive war and it is contended that the American fighting forces arc being maintained only for defensive purposes, though their cost is two or three times as large as it was before tho opening of the Great War. The Governments of Franco and Italy, as well as of Japan, have lot '.t bo known that, they also do not intend to curtail their naval shipbuilding programmes by reason of the Kellogg Pact. Much ttie same attitude toward ttie agreement has been taken by Mr. W. C. Bridgemu.il, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, lie pointed out recently that the main object of the British Navy is to preserve peace and not, to wage aggressive warfare. The standard of British naval expenditure supports this contention. li' the critics of the British Navy, not by any means exclusively foreigners, would take its cost before the war, bearing in mind the change in the value of ami its cost now, they would find that the annual outlay on the tleet is about £30,000,000 less than it was in 1914. Nor should it be forgotten that a large part of the apparent increase in the expenditure upon the Navy arises from the better pay which is now made to officers and seamen in accordance with the higher standard of living, as well cs to the workmen in the dockyards, and the higher pensions have not been without their effect, on the votes. Britain's Naval Disarmament. One statement bv Mr. Bridgeman may be appropriately recalled in the light of many recent misrepresentations oi the attitude of the Empire generally toward the limitation of naval armaments. If anvono savs to you," he remarked, that we have not shown our goodwill in the matter of disarmament 1 ask you to point out that before the Geneva Conference our Navy had declined to something more than half the number of ships we had alloat at the outset of the war and very little more than halt the total tonnage. We have done our part, and more-than our part, m suggestions tor disarmament." What attitude will the British Governincut adopt when the Admiralty proposes iti the spring, as it will propose as a matter of Imperial duty, to continue the building of cruisers in accordance with the programme adopted three years ago? In order to set an example, to other Powers, three ships which it was intended to lay down in 1927-1028 have not been begun. That gesture was ignored in Europe as well as in the I'nited States and Japan. The coming Estimates —1929-1930 should provide for the laying down of one cruiser of the largest class, displacing 10,000 tons, two cruisers of about 8000 tons, ono aircraft carrier, nine destroyers, six submarines. and a net layer. The construction of these ships would complete the live years' programme, which was to cost £53.000.000. but owing to the dropping of three cruisers, will now involve an expenditure of just, over £50,000.000. What will happen '! Time and again the spokesmen of the Admiralty have insisted that the proposals originally accepted by the Cabinet, and since curtailed to the extent of three cruisers, represented the absolute minimum if the trade routes were to ho adequately protected, and the Battle Fleet was to be provided with the necessary scouting ships. Tha Outstanding Science Problem. The provision of cruisers for the defence of the trade routes is the outstanding problem of defence for all the peoples of the British Empire, because, in varying degree, they are all dependent upon sea Ira (He. Those who urge that no new cruisers should be built oveilook the fact that the highest naval opinion holds that it. is necessary for the safety of Imperial ha!. 1 '! that there should ho CO cruisers available under 20 years of age, with 10 older ships in reserve—-a total of 70. Actual experience has proved that after 20 vcars a cruiser does not remain efUcient for seagoing work and the cost of attempting, bv partial reconstruction, to maintain iis efliciency is prohibitive. After 20 vcars it, is more economical to scrap cruisers and replace them by new vessels. The present, position with reference to cruisers is little understood. '1 ho majority of the vessels which are now serving at sea were completed during tho Great War or in tho years immediately following upon tli-» signing of the Peace Treaty. In the five years 1935-40 35 of tlieso cruisers will reach the ago of 20 years and should be scrapped Most of them were driven hard during the war and will have exhausted their war usefulness bv 1940. The Admiralty, in their original programme, proposed to do no more than replace these ships at the rate of three a year, the assumption bciaig that four \cars would elapse between the drawing up of (lie designs and the commissioning of Ihi new vessels. Tho rate of c«nsl ruction has now been varied by the dropping of the three cruisers. This decision had no influence on American or .Japanese policy, nor on (ho programmes of France and Italy. The naval authorities of those countries declared that their building programmes were based upon their defensive r.?eds and were to be regarded as in no sense competitive. So (lie-British gesture failed lamentably. Replacing Old Cruisers. And thus it conies about that the British Fleet, even if no further economies were made, will have three cruisers less than (he naval authorities consider necessary as a bare provision for safety. Moreover, the Admiralty is confronted with (he necessity of replacing old destroyers and obsolete submarines, with the result that the templaiion to tho Cabinet, still further In reduce tho shipbuilding vot.'S during the next few years will be strong. even if Ministers are not exposed to contentious and. for the most part, ill-formed opinion, not only in the House of Commons, but, in the constituencies. The average elector in (ho British Isles has already forgot len that 10 years ago he and his family were being rationed for food. The iss.ie will vitally affect (ho fortunes of all the peoples of the British Empire. They are now partner nations in (lie Commonwealth. Tho Dominions can exert no mean influence on defensive policy. It was significant that when the Government was asked to suspend the cons!ruction of the Singapore base the consideration which weighed was that no such course could be taken without tho concurrence of (he Dominions, and in particular of Australia and New Zealand. This incident suggests that the overseas Governments of the Empire can. if (hey will, do much to prevent the cruiser strength for (he defence of tho (ratio routes boint; further reduced, thus en • '"Tigering tlie tree flow of Imperial trade. Thov were parties to the resolutions which were passed at the Imperial Conference. and at the Geneva Conference they were consulted before the firm declaration was made that 70 cruisers was (lie minimum number which should he provided if the British Empire and its ocean borne commerce were to he adequately defended.