GENEVA CONFERENCE.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19797, 18 November 1927, Page 11

GENEVA CONFERENCE.

WHY CECIL RESIGNED. BLAME LAID ON CABINET. STATEMENT IN THE LORDS. By Telegraph—Press Association— Copyright. (Received November 17, 8.50 p.m.) A. and N.Z.-Sun. LONDON. Nov. 16. In the Houso of Lords, as the outcome of a reference to questions of foreign policy by Lord Parmoor, Viscount Cecil made a personal explanation regarding his resignation of the position of British delegate to the League of Nations. He said it was the culmination of a series, of events, such as the rejection by the late Labour Government of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which was followed by the rejection by the Conservative Government in 1924 of tho Geneva Protocol. Lord Cecil said he went to the Naval Arms Limitation Conference in Geneva conscious that his instructions would causo serious difficulties. Exactly what he anticipated had occurred. He repeatedly was put in the position of having to defend situations seemingly wholly indefensible, and thereby creating the impression that Britain was lukewarm on the subject of disarmament. He narrated several instances of what he described as " departmental obstruction." Indeed, ho said, the representatives of the Admiralty scarcely concealed their indifference, if not their hostility, to the whole proceedings. He did not intend to infer that that was the attitude of all the members of the Cabinet. Nevertheless, he was unable to convince the Cabinet of the importance of taking a stronger line with their technical advisers. Owing to the harmfulness of many incidents he had asked for a free hand personally to decide minor matters. This was declined. He trusted the Cabinet had now seen the result of too great deference to expert advice, and that it would give his successor, Lord Cushendun, greater support than it felt able to accord to himself. Disagreement with Mr. Churchill. When he returned from Geneva he was exhausted and discouraged. He felt that though the conference was not a complete failure the advance made was not commensurate with its objective. Above all. he felt that there was a fundamental difference between his view and that of the members of the Cabinet on the importance of an international effort to disarm. He referred to the declaration by the Chancellor of. the Exchequer, Mr. Winston Churchill, after the breakdown of the conference, when he said: "Britain ' cannot now, and I hope never will in ( the future, embody in a solemn international agreement words that would bind i us to the principle of a mathetical parity of naval strength." Although he did not agree with the remark, said Lord Cecil, he was certain Mr. Churchill was convinced that his warning was essential for the safety of Britain. He was equally sure that if such a policy were persisted in, it would bang, bolt and bar the door ajgainst any hope of an agreement with America on naval disarmaments. There was no doubt that the moment Mr. Churchill realised that the delegates to the conference were agreed on the question of parity, even although Lord Cecil had received express telegraphic sanction to agree, Mr. Churchill began to press on his colleagues in the Cabinet tho necessity for avoiding what Mr. Churchill regarded as a disastrous concession. Failure of Vital Negotiations. The culmination of many telegrams was • the recall of Lord Cecil, who proceeded i to trace at length tho subsequent negotiations. The Government, lie said, had 5 taken a course which he believed had ! caused the failure of vital negotiations. 1 If ho had remained in office he would s have had to take the responsibility for that failure as well as to defend it. That 1 was impossible. The Earl of Balfour said he regretted that Lord Cecil had thought it necessary to level serious charges against his late colleagues. He did not see how the course of events at Geneva justified the extreme course adopted by Lord Cecil, who, it appeared to Lord Balfour, had allowed inevitable differences to accumulate to a point at which his temper gave way. >. He did not believe that the two great peace-loving countries would fail to reach ■ a friendly agreement on the point at issue. • Britain did not object to America build--3 ing as many small craft as she thought - necessary, but Britain had duties to per--1 form to the Empire and to ihp people of • the Homeland. Let Britain say to America: "Do not s ask us to diminish our small craft beyond ■ the point we deem necessary for our e safety." Surely that line of policy was e not so . inherently unreasonable that America would even refuse to listen. 0 Lord Balfour said ho regarded the Geneva Conference as having been inter- • rupted. not ended. Compared with the great issues at stake, the differences that had arisen were small and petty.