THE NEW YELLOW PERIL.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIV, Issue 19663, 15 June 1927, Page 14

THE NEW YELLOW PERIL.

"TRAGIC PAST" IN CHINA. CRITICISM OF BRITAIN. FRENCH AND AMERICAN VIEWS. "SO COMPLETELY UN-BRITISH." BY PUTNAM WE ALE. (All Rights Reserved). XIV. HANKOW. April 9. "You have betrayed us!" exclaimed a group of Frenchmen irately to me in the Club Gaulois in Hankow, when we commenced discussing the tragic past. "By not defending your line—by opening the line to the enemy you have done us infinite harm and condemned us to the same humiliation as you yourself have suffered." This is what men of all nationalities are saying. Even Chinese now marvel at the astounding phenomenon of a passivity that is self-destructive. They cannot reconcile it with any known facts. There is something so completely un-British at what has occurred in Hankow that it seems to them an evil dream —a conclusion by no means derogatory if one thinks rightly on the subject. While this might have been contested prior to what happened last Sunday, it can hardly bo contested now. Tile Japanese by a few rifle-shots and a burst or two from a Lewis gun had the mob completely cowed. I walked all round the Japanese concession yesterday. It is in a stage of siege, with barbed wire and sandbags at every entrance, and a "Glacis" a hundred yards broad beyond posts strongly held by sailors and mer-chant-volunteers. Not a cat moves on the roads round about. It is an absolute reply to those who say that force is fatal. The Argument of Force. The Governmenfcuis cowed, Borodin is cowed, the canaille is cowed. They know that any attempt to rush the concession will be met not only by rifle and machinegun fire, but by ship's guns. Force is the only thing that counts. It is ten times more effective to-day than it was 25 years ago, because of the perfection of rapidfire weapons. The Japanese, with their cruiser and destroyer guns trained on shore, are as secure against the whole Cantonese army as Tokio is—and they know it. And they will not give way one inch. Similarly the French, if their concession is attacked, propose to stand firm, in fact they will do even more: they will destroy the native city of Hankow with high explosive and incendiary shells. And we could have had the active co-op'eration of these die-hards months ago had we only been more circumspect. While the cancellation of the AngloJapanese Alliance is recalled by everyone, hardly a soul remembers that five years ago there was substituted for that alliance au agreement between the four Powers, England, United States, France and Japan, who pledged themselves to consult with o'ne another and take common action whenever their interests on the Pacific were jeopardised. When matters in China became critical in 1925, something might very reasonably have been attempted. That the French, like the Japanese, are cold, if not indignant to-day, is a proof that the British memorandum of December 18 is a poor substitute for such agreement. Extent of French Interests. I will pass by that constant remark that France has virtually no interests in China —that it is difficult for a trading^power to see eye to eye with a power with such slender responsibilities. Measured in terms of trade and shipping and investments, France certainly does not possess a tithe of Britain's China interests. Nevertheless she has concessions at Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton and Hankow; she is mistress of a great Colonial Empire adjacent to China — tndo-China, and twice in the period. 1856-60, she was Britain's ally, making war and peace in common with her and helping to implant those very institutions which are now at stake. In 1925 she was certainly willing to co-operate. In the action she took at Shameen, when the attack was made on the joint FrancoBritish concessions, she showed better instinct than Britain, who, through a Con-sul-General as inadequate as his Hankow colleague—and in spite of his bellicose despatches —missed the opportunity of a lifetime to shell and subdue Canton as the French were willing to do. In Shanghai it was the French who saved the situation immediately after May 30; for it was the suggestion of the French Minister to Peking to Chang Tsolin which secured the despatch of a picked corps to the borders of the international settlement, thus nipping in the bud just such a subversive movement as was to come 18 months later in Hankow. This service was never acknowledged, and ultimately rancour against France was created because it was believed that the French suggested certain disciplinary measures against the Shanghai Municipal Council in order to round off what had been done with Chang Tso-lin, and to give him a proof of good faith. Unfortunate Misunderstanding. Even the Wanhsien affair contributed something to this unfortunate AngloFrench misunderstanding. For, on the day of the attack, the French gunboat in port was informed that the assault would be carried out next morning, and was asked to get up steam and help; but when quite unexpectedly the armed merchantman Chiawo camo round the bend from Ichang the same afternoon and attacked immediately, the French gunboat could not participate owing to cold boilers. To these local incidents must be added a major grievance which is still obscure. The French claim that at the end of 1925 military intervention in China was proposed by them, with the despatch of a division bv each i f the interested Powers, and that it was the British who demurred. They add that this is, the reason why the British memorandum of December ' 16, when handed- to Monsieur Brand, evoked the comment that, sinceBritain decided her China policy independently of other Powers, France would! do the same. Yet this should not be-; such divisions are perilous. The French in Hankow have had to suffer continued attacks from the Cantonese and the pickets, from the Labour Unions and tfyj officials. The Annamese police are frequently dragged from the streets and beaten; Chbaese troops always do what they please; the houses are plastered with propaganda and insults. French blood boils, but barjause the line has been opened they cainnot defend themselves without waging open warfare. The Opinion of Americans. And if this is the opinion of the French it is just as much the opinion of Americans, who have learned more about China during the past three months than in the previous 30 years. It is not merely such outrages as have come at Nanking which have changed their minds; it is the general story ol the unparalleled assault ordered by a Central Executi-\#e Committee which, in words uttered -"by Edmund Burke-100 years ago, is " a college of armed fanatics for the propagation of the principles, of assassination robbery, i rebellion, fraud, faction,, oppression and | impiotv." No doubt it is a defect of th/> American temperament to judge by superficials, and to be led by emotion. But ever since they have seen what defeatism produces they have been convinced flhat only a stalwart policy can redress tfhe balance. The lead is what they want, a lead from the Power with most at stake. It was

noticeable on January 3 at Hankow that the Amorican Admiral Hough changed his anchorage and steamed up beside the British gunboats, so that if they had accepted the Cantonese challenge, America would have lent her help. It was also noticeable that on the last of the three eventful January days—January s—before the British flag was hauled down, and the British concession surrendered—armed Americans assembled in great numbers at the American Consulate, prepared to' go into the firing-line, and not \ believing that what was to happen could possibly occur. A study of policy conducted by the method of using local French and American judgments as criteria leads one infallibly to the view that not further conciliation, but the establishment in China of international military defence-areas, has become essential. The First Military Need. The first military area needed, if we are not to be driven into the sea, is here at Hankow. Everything is ripe for it. To-day, April 9, the" last of the gunboats, Consuls and men of the foreign communities of Chungking, Ichang, Shasi, Cnangsha and Yochow have arrived, and wo are back to where we were in iB6O, with Hankow the highest navigable point. Upper-river trade is as dead as a doornail. All British and American oil installations are sealed up, so oil vessels cannot move. Insurance and warehouses are out of business—it is physically impossible for the Chinese to trade. And all the intervening ports on the lower Yangtse—KiuHang, Wuhu, Nanking and Chingkiang —have likewise been evacuated} there remain nothing but isolated men, who are trickling in after amazing escapes. To-day's naval signals declare that men-of-war passing between Hankow and Wuhu, as well as merchant steamers, are picking up Spanish priests, who are evacuating their districts in junks, floatting down the Yangtse to safety. What a picture that conjures up; how little has changed since the days when the great Francis do Xavier reached these coasts in the sixteenth century,_ when England was still Tudor and Spain had not yet launched her Armada, floating here "in a junk, to die with the Cross in his emaciated hands. Fleeing Before the Storm. The years go by and these people change not. Mild and pleasant in l their peaceful moments, let their nervous mechanism be upset by a process of continuous poisoning, and they are as beasts of the fields. The foreigner, harried without distinction of race or creed, is fleeing before the coming storm. All the women have gone. The last Japanese ships from here took down 1300 Japanese women and children; yesterday a British river-boat carried the largest number of white passengers that have ever sailed on the Yangt.se, the cabins and decks being full of Russian prostitutes, Catholic sisters of mercy, and Swedish and Lutheran mission women, an amazing enough companionship, but preferable to the isolated graves they would find if left behind. "Where do we stand ?" ask Americans, wiping their anxious faces and reading the Consular order calling for evacuation. They have met to-day in their Chamber of Commerce to decide what America in Hankow is going to do. They have decided that they will not go, if their navy will help them; they have decided to stand firm. The navies have 22 vessels in port, and many more ships should soon come; the pendulum must commence soon to swing back. The military area should not be a plan, but a fact. For Hankow should not be abandoned. It is a' key-position which can lie dominated from the water, particularly if hydroplanes are brought up with aircraft carriers What the Navies Could Do. The guns of the navies can enforce the first condition. The total evacuation of the Hanko-v district by the Nationalist army to the south bank of the river, and the garrisoning of the wimple fenced-in area of the foreign concessions by military and naval contingents, and a controlled Chinese police. Harry Parkes did that in 1857 in Canton with 400 British and French sailors under the guns of the sailing ships. What was done 70 years ago can be done again. These Communists here are murderers, led by Russian criminals, and the only things they understand are bullets and cold s'eel. China has got to have another protocol put on her which will hold things quiet for another 25 years. The building up of an international military area in Hankow under martini law would so discipline the place that in a very short while disorders would vanish. By licensing and controlling all essential communications and pivotal points, such as railway stations, steamers, junks, post office and customs, and assuming direct jurisdiction, the foreigners would put the Nationalists out of business overnight. All their strikes and violence would vanish and the people become peaceful if the unions were made criminal organisations. Optimists and Pessimists"We are going to act with yon," American naval officers declare. " Don't blame us if we. don't look like hard boiled Imperialists. Wait for the Joint Note about Nanking." That is indeed what we are all waiting for. Divided into two camps—the optimists, who believe that there is a point beyond which no Government will allow its policy to be demeaned, and the pessimists, who are sure that no guns will go off, we sit and wait. The more subtle ones are afraid of the sanctions likely to be imposed if the Nationalists prove stubborn. Blockade, for instance, which is just what the Nationalists would relish. China, the selfcontained, has all the food she wants; there are sufficient stocks of imported materials to last six months; blockade would work no harm except to prevent Soviet munitions from arriving. What is wanted is something positive, something which will inflict a public humiliation on the Reds and discredit them, some proof to convince the Chinese peoplo that the white man is not down and out—and that "friendly America" is just as unfriendly to Nationalist China as she is to Moscow, the bloody mother. In any case there is no time to be lost. The palsy, on the foreign side, if it continues into summer, will see all the key pneitions lost and necessitate a great efflort to recover them. ; " Surrounded by Mad Dogs," ! To-day there is yet time to wipe but humiliation. To-morrow it may be too late. To make this point clear I add this precise copy of a message just sent by the Belgian consul to his Government: " Eugene Chen to-day requested me to confirm the protest he made to the Councillor of Legation against the negotiations for a new treaty with Peking. He considers the action of the Belgian Government hostile to the Nationalist Government and announces serious reprisals against Belgians—for instance, popular outbursts. Insisted that he stop every such attempt, citing the hospitality offered to Chinese in Belgium as well as the numerous services rendered by Belgians here. He showed himself unresponsive and menacing." We are surrounded by mad dogs. People knew what to do with them long beforo the- age of Pasteur.