THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1924. NAVIES IN THE PACIFIC.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXI, Issue 18635, 29 April 1924, Page 6

THE New Zealand Herald AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 1924. NAVIES IN THE PACIFIC.

j The analysis of the United States j naval position, published by a i former expert of the Navy Department, gives definiteness to a growing American anxiety. The Ignited States naval authorities have protested against the rigid economies practised of late in American naval expenditure. They have pointed out that the Washington agreement, while limiting naval armaments, implied a positive obligation to maintain the standards set by it. One I expert has gone so far as to say i that " the United States, after lift- ! ing its voico to avert war, has been i content to destroy, the power which ; alone could make that voice carry." j There can be no doubt that since j the Washington Conference there j has been a very marked reduction j of America's naval strength. Full | credit must be given for the sincerity j and earnestness of America's purpose in calling the conference. President Harding's worife at its opening were striking: "speaking officially for the United States I can say ' A hundred millions of our people frankly want less armament and none want war.' " Mr. C. E. Hughes, as Secretary of State, followed with an authorised offer made under instructions "from the President. It proposed the elimination of all capital-ship programmes and a further reduction through the scrapping of some older ships. The scheme he propounded involved the United States scrapping 30 ships, with a total tonnage of 845,740; Britain should scrap 19 ships, with a tohnage of. 583,375, and stop the construction of four new Hoods then begun ; Japan should abandon her programme on ships not laid down and on ten ships then being built, the tonnage represented ' being 448,928. On the other hand, the capital ships to be retained by these three Powers were proposed asJ United States, 18 ships, with a total i tonnage of 500,000; Britain, 22 ships, j 604,450 tonnage.; and Japan, 10 | ships, 299,700 tonnage. The tonnage I basis for capital ship replacement, as proposed by Mr. Hughes, was— United States, 500,000; Britain, 500,000; Japan, 300,000: this was subsequently styled the —— standard. On the basis of that proposal, the conference evolved an epoch-making agreement, which has been put into effect by the United States as honourably as it r was instigated. ' The actual situation resulting from the agreement was affected by Japan's reluctance to scrap her latest battleship. The sacrifice of a ship of less efficiency but nearly equal tonnage was accepted instead : and in c nipensation the United States and Britain were allowed a modification of the original proposal as it affected them. This left the following situation resulting from the treaty : Ships to bk Scrapped, OLD SHIPS. No. Tonnage. United States ... 17 267,740 (Jreat Britain ... 24 500,000 Japan ... ... 10 163,312 SHIPS BUILDING. No. Tonnage. United States ... 13 , 552,800. Great Britain ... Nil. Japan ... ... 4 161,958 SHIPS RETAINED. (Allowing for replacements.) No. Tonnage. , United States ... 18 525,850 Great Britain ... 20 558,950 Japan ... ... 10 301,320 These figures show that the pro--1 posed s—s— ratio as to capital

ships was very closely realised when details were finally , agreed upon. That this agreement vitally affected the United States is evident when consideration is given to the position of its navy at the close of the war. That navy had then become stronger than at any previous period in its history. .Construction had been..confined chiefly to the destroyers and anti-submarine vessels needed for the war, but there was also in being the capital-ship programme of 1916.. Great war stocks had .been accumulated. The personnel had reached the considerable totals of 32,000 officers and 550,000 enlisted men. The United States had become a competitor with Britain for sea supremacy, and was considerably stronger than Japan, the only other naval Power of importance after the passing of the German fleet. • The obligations undertaken in conformity with the Washington agreement, however, have altered the situation. Had the recommendations of the Navy Department, framed to cover necessities outside the provision for scrapping capital ships, been given effect, the ratio would not have been disturbed ; but the department complains that these recommendations have never got beyond the table of Congress.

The position to-day, according to it summary circumstantially attested, is that the United States has its full international allowance of capital ships, but many of them are practically obsolete. It has one-third of its adequate number of cruisers, and is able to operate only one-third of its destroyers, the remainder being laid up away from the seaboard. It has but a fraction of its possible submarines and aircraft, and only two-thirds of its requisite personnel. In armament and range -of guns it is deficient. It lacks adequate Pacific bases, and in the matter of fuel supply has but a small fraction of what is necessary even- for peace manoeuvres. These detailed declarations of weakness have an interest beyond the United States. The comparison with the naval strengths of Britain and Japan has, indeed, a deep significance for all countries with a seaboard on the Pacific. The next Washington agreement about naval armaments, projected by President Coolidge, may solve some problems ; but in the meantime there is an added duty for Britain to secure her fleet's mobility, as Sir Frederick Field has suggested, by the provision of adequate bases and oilfuel supplies in this region.