INTENSE SITUATIONS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18563, 22 November 1923, Page 6

INTENSE SITUATIONS.

, ; T \ OEITECHILL MXMOSBS,

' * • KITCHENER UNREASONABLE

]?.BSBSNiTH>N OF FISHES. .

.„ i I DEAF TO ' ALL , APPEALS.:

;r; 0 by' -THE RT. HOK. ' WINSTON S. CHIXECHiLIi. / J .-..-..'a. • -.:*• » • v :- -

■ - • , >(C<g?yriglji)-' ' The War Council of »Jay 14,1915, was sulphurous. We were in presence of the fact that. gir Jan Hamilton's army had been definitely brought to a stand- ' -/still on 4 the Gailipoli Peninsula, was suspended 1 there in circumstances of peril, - was ' difficult to reinforce, and still more difficult to -withdraw. Die fleet had relapsed / into passivity. Lord ' « Fisher had insisted on the withdrawal of the Queen Elizabeth; German submarines were ' . about to enter the Mgm, where our enormous concen- ; ■ trations of ' shipping; -necessary to support the Dardanelles operations lay in a very unprotected state. At the -isamo. time the £ failure of the British : attacks in France on the Aubers- Ridge was unmistakable. ; The s&jH * crisis had reached its explosion point, and behind it • marched a political crisis of the first order. The weakness and failure of Russia were becoming every month more evident. Intense anxiety and extreme bad . temper, all suppressed under sombre .forma, characterised the discussion. _ 1 . > . Lord Kitchener -began in Va _ strain of solemn and formidable complaint. . he had been induced to participate in the Dardanelles • operations on tha assiiry ances :of the ; Nnvy that they would force * the ~ passage. • Now they had abandoned • the attempt. Most particularly had his judgment been affected by the unique qualities •' of the Queen Elizabeth. Now she <wfa to be with drawn; she was' to be ' withdrawn :at the very moment when he hfid committed his arm? to a great operation on the Gallipoli -Peninsula," r and when that ■ army was struggling for its life with its back to the sea." Lord Fisher at this point interjected that he had beep against the Dardanelles operation from • the beginning, and that the Prime Minister and , Lord Kitchener knew this 'tact well. This remarkable \i- interruption was received in silence.' The Secretary of . State far War then proceeded • to survey other theatres of the war in .an extremely ■ pessimistic - ; mood.. / , . * Churchill's Defence. "When he . , had finished, .the Council' turned to me—almost 'on me. -*I; thereupon spoke in the sense cf the series of arguments with which 'the reader should i now be familiar, '.If it had been-known three monthsYbefocs that an army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men : would be avail able in May, for litu attack on the Dardanelles, the' .attack by the Navy alone would novei have been undertaken. ! Though' matters had gone badly in.. many quarters and > great disappoint :■:> ments had r, been experienced, there wee; no reason f'tfc despondency -or alarm,; > still leas to make 4 things ; Out worse ' than they were, ?or to take unreasonable ac-! , tion. ** The operations at Dar-; danelles did not depend and had never . depended r upon the Queen .*' Elizabeth. They ■ had been planned before .it .was V known': that she would go. She Was now to be V withdrawn .because fof Hhe finger of ; submarines to so valuable a ship. She would be replaced by moni-•" ■ tors and {other specially designed - vessels ■ ; ; better suited in ; many ; respects to bom-■; barding -operations'".-.and".- lately im- : mune from submarine . attack- The 1 naval support tide Army would in no way be: affected. V - - - . I am -.not quoting the actual words in either case, but , their gist. ' The i sense is fully sustained by the 1 ; abbreviated J recordsj -. * These arguments appeared to • produce, a definite impression > upon the Council. W 6 separated without any decision. My arguments were, however, accepted ;> almost in their entirety by the Coalition Administration . which came into ! / existence a few ? weeks later. For events' were now to supervene in the British poli- : tical sphere which were destined fatally ■ to destroy the hopes; of a? successful issue; at the Dardanelles, and preclude all possi- • bility of a speedy termination of the war. , letter ito Prime Minister. ~ *

After the Council I wrote, the follow- '•■' ing letter to ; the Prime Minister, which 1 think shows .exactly where -I :■ stood:— ;V?«rr./Churchill to the : -I*rima' : 'Mini«^;*V,; ''i-/'-/ : "- v /*---'-i' '- '/""' '■• May 14, 1915.. v< -.'-I must'ask you to -take not© of Fisher's statement to-day " that he im against the Dardanelles • and -had been . all ■ along," or . words to "that % effect. ;; The Fust Sea lord - if*" t agreed'? iii writing -v* to ■ every ;' executive .telegram on ( which the operations have been : conducted; and had they .bean - immediately : successful,. the credit would -hare; been ••■■hi*/ , ,But } pa« J OO : complaint; of - that -:*li «m attached to the old boy and it is a great l ! pleasure to nut to J work with; him, I think ; <he reciprocate these v feelings. "fcjj My A point ; ** that fa-; moment will probably arise in these operations when. the Admiral and general '■■ on the : spot will wish • and require . to run a. risk with the "Fleet ? for " as, great. '"' $ii cecwwe . effort. $If ,-1 agree with/ them -■l-i shall sanction ; s Hi:..; and I cannot undertake '..* to be paralysed, by the veto of a friend who, whatever the result, will certainly say, .V\ was H always ,;- again** i • the i Dardanelles." You will ; nee that ,in a .matter; of this kind someone hats to take the responsibility.:j • Til' 1 d 0 ft>-Provided' that my decision 18 tI • onB i ttfcat rules—and not otherwise. v j ',-'' •: iT x -xt "MomfprtaUe : ? not to ? know i what .Kitchener will or ,; won't do iin the matter _ of -reinforcements.- J --We are absolutely in his -Hand*, and I 'never '■ saw i him m a queerer. mood—or more unreasonable i K. will • punish ,th ? Admiralty ;by docking ~: iiomi'tor /of hie division, because iwe have withdrawn -the Queen -Ehj»be«j.' and Fisher will have -the; Queen Elisabeth home if he ie • to j; stay.' --■ Though '. all • thin ;:: with patience ' and. - determination we can make our way to one of world?™*' : ; events -in th * history of the , world.' -..,.. v, ... i.'- .-.•■ -.--'.. .Z ~ But I ; wish now to make ifxilear to you 'i?^-i.inan- who; says, "I disclaim responsibility for ~ failure," cannot be the fin."l ;, arbiter of the meaaures which -- may be found; to be vital to success. ;; ; v v \ -i ■r£ -iTue require* no answer, and I am Quite contented with the course of affairs

Plans. tor Beinforcemeuts. I spent /- the afternoon ,; completing -. my proposals f for -the naval* reinforcement of the Dardanelles and for the convoying of the two divisions with - which '".:•« I . understood and trusted Sir lan Hamilton was to be immediately reinforced. > Although there ? could be "vtiry Httle doubt-about the naval 'reinforcements, I did not want the demands to fall upon Lord Fisher with i& shock. I therefore went into his ; room in vtbe>; evening s to talk over the whole it position with him Our conversation was quite friendly. ' / He did not object to J any J; of the particular measures proposed, bat he did not like the steady , ; and increasing |dram';-on our resources, and the inflection /given to our campaign by the growing demands of the Dardanelles. I then "Said to him \ that it was really not fair for.him to obstruct the necessary «steps at - the.V Dardanelles, ■■ and ■ then, if thero was a ' failure, * to turn round and say, "I ■ told you so I ; was always against it." He \ looked at me in an odd way and said, "I think you are right—it isn't fair," //However, he accepted the minutes and we parted amicably. .-,-..: ■■-,:•■-;■".. •/;,:.-i'-;. v , :,;'M.\;'k: .-.; : v :-:u-; •,".•.:'■ .-Into this extraordinary period, when intense situations succeeded each other with w to ap,d^y ,S a, ?° ther evcnt was now - I bl^h'A.rl^ l^ i he method;;whichf ' to tK AdSPt 0 ! Sll i ce Lord ***** came ' worn at I^vv 1 «umed ; work in my !O «0ck that; ni K ht. * .sequence of resi « nod in con * ng the war, a B d P ff Wn to enter ' m#. settled Tore th«^* d / e S ard ed as alnow appearedonce<L* fo r before ;-;,- ■•: -Bte^tfio^meltinK-Lt^i^. 66 tbrown ;.,; midnight (? the ', Ifiliin V»» A i h } ih 'before officer ardently^evot«?*7 al . Atfcaehe > an «K«tbe; Allies, asked to ie^J 0 fe «*>«• of 5j companiei; Admiral nt : H * was *s- * » file of-p tp9W .* amu * Oh**, who hid

- •■ ■ ■ ■ m , i.,i ■« m 1 ' ■ ■ . ' •<- ,- twere to send .inter alia four armoured cruisers. to: reinforce the Italian Fleet-in] the Adriatic. These . cruisers were to reach > Taranto by daybreak *■ on I the 18th. The Naval Attache nrged that their arrival should be accelerated. : If they could arrive by the morning of the 16th definite naval ; -- co-operation between (Great -Britain and Italy would be can accomplished 'fact, 'and this fact might well be decisive. < As I j had * mvseif' negotiated the Naval Convention with Italy ■■• in Paris, I was ,; of course, fully » acquainted with every, detail. I'- ba<mprocurea th© First Sea Lord's agreement' to all its terms, including the despatch .of the four cruisers." v- -.These' tpnisers had been detailed. Fisher's green initial : directing } their j movement was i prominent on the second page of the file. No question of principle was involved by accelerating thoir departure by 48 hours. < It , did not come within the hmits of the working arrangements; which 'Fisher i; and 1 had made with each other, viz., to take no important step except in consultation. ] It never occurred to me for a moment that it could be' so viewed, nor did the Chief of the Staff suggest that we should !-wake up the; First Sea; Lord. ' H :He would \ begin his -letters.;at about 4 o'clock, in the morning, and; ho would get the file then.; i: therefore • approved the immediate ; des- : patch of these cruisers and wrote, as "J; had dono : in similar cases before, "First Sea Lord to see after action." -;.♦. ,f

Spark to the Train. Although in'later years when; s Lord Fisher, and I were" friends; again, we never discussed -this particular ■ episode, the evidence which I nave received from several quarters leaves me in no doubt that this was the spark that fired the train. The old admiral, -waking in the early morning, saw ; himself ■ confronted ; - again with the minutes proposing the reinforcements for the Dardanelles, .which he knew he could not resist. He saw himself becoming ever more deeply involved in an enterprise which he distrusted and disliked. He "saw that enterprise quivering 1 on; the verge of failure. He saw a civilian Minister, to whom indeed be was atI tached : by many bonds of friendship, becoming every day a hard' and stern taskmaster in all that was needed to sustain I the hated operation. He saw the furious j discontent of the; Conservative ;Party at j the shell shortage and the general conduct of the war. He saw a field-marshal ! in uniform at the head at tho War Office, while he, whose name was a watchword throughout the -, country, j was relegated to a secondary place, and in , that place was compelled by arguments : and. pressure he' baq\ never been able to resist, but had never ceased to resent, to b€icome responsible for operations to which he was i cordially opposed. And then on top of all this, a red ink minute about cruisers for Italy. "First Sea Lord .to'see after action." - f , - < .' .

"Re Means it this Time." , When I awoke the next morning, Saturday, I -received; no morning letter (" the early •worm ") from the First - Sea Lord. This was unusual, ■ for he nearly • always wrote to me his waking thoughts of the situation; 'I had to go over to the Foreign Office at* about 9 o'clock , wad was kept some time there. As I was • returning across the Horse Parade.,- Masterton Smith hurried up to me with an; anxious faw—" Fisher has resigned, and; I think he means it this time." v He gave me the; following note from 'the First Sea Lord :—■;:; : " /'. - : .... '-'\'C.- ■ First Lord.—After. further anxious reflection 1 have came to the regretted conclusion X am unable to remain < any longer as your colleague. V It is undesirable in the public interests ,: to ; go'".• into > details— ■, said "Never explain"—rbnt<,l - find it increasingly difficult to adjust nyeelf to the increasing is daily requirement* iof '■' the. Dardanelles your views—as you, truly said, yesterday, I am in the position of coninraally. vetoing your proposals. v ; .; This ■»* not fair to you, besides being ex- | tremely distasteful to me* '*. '.*...':' .i 'o-I-anv- off; to- Scotland at once so. as to i avoid all - Questionings. ••:' *-v; '■' ..•„ - .'V: .<-:.'-■.:.- • ":i~. .:':■/-V '-■ •'-■ ---O'-.r Tours'.- truly, L ■■ :: '- -;..* • ' FISHEB. '"el-did not,v however/ at first take a seri-! ous view. I remembered a similar letter •couched< in terms of the utmost formality earlier ,? in the year on the air '\ raids/ and he had threatened tor/ hinted resignation both in letters and in conversation -on all sorts of matters, big and small, during : the 'last four or five months. I was pretty sure thafi'aJgood' friendly talk would put matters right. However, » when I -got back .to the Admiralty I found tisat he had entirely disappeared. t; He was not 'in ; the ; building; • he' was not in 'his ■ house. ' None of : his 1 people knew where -he ' was; except that his was v going ■; to i Scotland % at; once. He had sent a communication to the other Sea Lords which ;; they were engaged in discussing at a meeting of their own. . Poini; Blank Refusal. >' , : - 1 e "■;/, I i went over ; to; the Prime Minister and [; reported the fticts. / Mr. Asquith immediately ; sent his i secretary 'with a written order commanding i : J Lord > Fisher •in the name of 'the \ King ; to..return to I his duty.; It was some hours before the First Sea Lord was re-d*s^ He refused, pointblank to re-enter: the Admiralty or to discharge any. function. ,: He reiterated his determination to proceed at once to • Scotland. ■'!"-He ') was, ; however, ' ; at % length; persuaded ito see the Prime Minister, £Ty was not present at the interview. After it was over Mr.' Asquith ) told *me he ~ thought ;he had shaken him in his intention, but that he'was very much upset. He ; advised me to write to him, adding, " If you can get him back, well and good>,but;if not it will be a very difficult situation." The correspondence which. follows. tells . ita own la'n. ' •".**,

Mr. Churchill to Lord Fisher. m , ; , .'". May 15. 1015. V The only : thing to think -of now is . what is • best * for ; the = country and ;. for ■: the brave men who ;"are v fighting. ■'•.■; Anything which docs injury to those interests will be : harshly judged ■-> by history on whose stage we now ■ are. ---"-;v-: ( A'': l: :i '•"*■.-.:-. v -s;-^-•■;'.•:■ •'•-.;

■V:-I do not understand what is the specific j ; cause which - has led you to resign. If : I aid I ; might cure it. ; When we parted last night ■I. thought we were in agreement. : The proposals I made to you :by ; minute were, : I thought, in general accord with your views; and in any case were for'dii*cussion between aus.'-S Our ' personal , friendship is and v I;- trust will remain ? unimpaired^ 1 . '■■■.-,- ~,.-.. ... t It 'is true *-* 6 moment is anxious and our ; difficulties grave ; ?-■;;-< But I -am r sure h that with loyalty and courage Vwe shall come through safely l and successfully. You ; could not "let it v be- said that you had thrown me ' over because- things were for the ; time being going badly- at the Dardanelles. In every way I have tried ;"<rto work in the.closest, sympathy with : you.;?' The men you wanted m the places you wanted them •—the, ships you ;; desired—every proposal you have • formallyh made;. for naval action. I have agreed' to.'-''•■-■'••.-S-.>--;- v->.; •.•.'•.■'•..-.:■• ,i-..-,,» mMy own responsibilities 5 are great and also i I-am. the one who gets the blame for anything that goes wrong. But I have scrupulously adhered to-our original agreement that we should do nothing important without consulting each other. v; - If you think this is not so surely you should tell me in-what respect. - .- .-:•:■-, ;i..-;-.--. ; In , order ;to bring you v back to the Ad- ; miralty I ' took my political ; life in imv hands— you know well. You then promised to stand by me and see me through. If you now go; at this ■■ had f moment and tharaby let. loose upon ;me the spite /and malice of those who are your enemies even more than "they are' mine, :it will be a .melancholy ending to our six months of successful. war; And administration. The discussions which will arise will strike a cruel blow at the fortunes of the army now struggling op- the GalKpoli .Peninsula and cannot fail to invest ' with an air of disaster a mighty enterprise which with patience can and will certainly be carried to success. ■-'': : :v- ;. s ;;;-•;■.'• : : ; : •'.';?' yf ; ;;vv.-!' ; ---':V

Many of the anxieties of the: winter are past. The harbours i are protected, the great flow of new construction is arriving. We are far ; stronger ( home' than ,we have ever been, and the great reinforcement, is now 'at ■ hand..... ;> ';; .-■;::;:',;/-" - -' -/, ,' ;■;■.•■ ■- ■>" i; I hope you will come : to see me to-mor-row afternoon. . I have* a proposition/ to make to you, with- the assent of the Prime Minister, which may ? remove of th»» anxieties and difficulties which you feel about the. measure* % necessary to r, support the array at , the Dardanelles. , . * Though I 'sh all, stand; ■to my I post until relieved, it .will be a very great grief "to" me to part from ; you; and our rupture will be, profoundly injurious ;to every pubho interest. /' : ; '.;.-,:■• ■'•'■.- * :";: -T,

Dead Against Campaign; ; v Lord Fisher to' Mr. Churchill. ■■■■%*'■ dear Wilton,- - May 1(5. 1915. - My dear Winston.— ■_..■■ . . . ;; The Prime Minister put the case in : a nutshell when he stated to me yesterday afternoon .the actual ?■ that I find- been dead against . the Dardanelles -. operation from the f beginning! ' How could it be otherwise when ; previously as Firitt Sea S-l, had been responsible for isiie Def?™, e Con ,ittee Memorandum ' stating ■ th© sihl^ Bof8 of the »"-danelle« to ;, be imposK; iou must remember my extreme reJa«™+ n the '?" m e Minister's room in «S£fts£a° a i? c * pt hw decision-in regard to the. Dardanelles,- an <* ;v at the War Council B?i d t£T Bdlat ** ly 9ft«*»rda I stated in Scfcse? a th.t \t $«■ Chancellor of the »W views and t ififi V? nm *; Minister' knew Hjp^^'T.^A thft m *«»* to him to »oyanc e £&?&*£ to - ; your great : ; ani other day U, fe; *» ■'? you . tri "* said of beia« wtLni,to £*PW«t position i *WWM to your proposals. .'-,. l " -

■ until the series of-fresh naval arrangements ! for ■'the Dardanelles you ■• wit s tee yesterday■ ' morning ttjnvinced .me that the time . had ( arrived -*■ me %to I 'take.'* a'? final •; decision- > ;there being much more in those proposals ' than had occurred to me the -previous evenf ; in*,' when you 'Suggested some jof 1. them: '<•:. ■ ! ' you -?are. .bent' oh' forcing the ■ Dardanelles, . i : and inothing- will • turn ; you from it—nothing.j ; 11 know you <so well! :I" could ? give you 'no | j better j proof $of my i desire >to ;. stand: ■by , you : ; than my having remained by you in this i Dardanelles business J, up '};;■. to this, lastl • moment against the strongest ; conviction of ■ rmy'/'lfloias V stated in the Dardanelles De- ; fence Committee Memorandum. ~\ "., You will 'remain and *L tsludlc go—U as better «o. Your splendid S stand ;;un:;nry- ;*<»- i half :•!I. can never forget when yon -took your political life in yout hands; and I j really $ have^-.worked' vesj? hard-,- for you .in j return—my utmost—-but ";h««j6tfis?a"«iueatson ; \ beyond all'; personal obligations.:; I assure ! you ■it is only painful having i further con- ' versations. a I have told the Prime Minisi ter • I will not '\ remain. I have .absolutely i decided to stick iiff- that decision. Nothing i twill turn jne -from jl*.: You > say with much I feeling that it will be a very great grief i tp you to part from me—l; am certain you ! know in your heart no one has ever been i mora faithful to "you- than I 'have,; since I i joined * you : last s October, v ■ I'•■; have worked i ,-my. v»»v .hardest. '..... ■■'■■ - ' - ,_,-. ■ .-. ' . : .Yours» t ..-, " ■ ■ '--'-■ ■-: ■';; " ;> FISHER. v Gallipoli Army. Jeopardised. , .. ' .' May 16. 1915. ' My dear Fisher.— >*' ''-v- ■•,-',.,■ ■'■ -' ; I am ; touched by the kindness or your letter. > Our..friendship has been ; » .long one. "I;, remember how ?: in 1903 you tried to bring me toitbe Admiralty as First Lord. -When I eventually came in 1911 I proposed to;, the ' Prime Minister that ; you * should .return to your old position, and onlv the difficulties which -your enemies werS likely to make at that time prevented the accomplishment of-"-my first wish. As it was. I followed your guidance in the .important decisions which have given- ua\the 15-inch gun and Jellicoe Jo-day. -■■-.:'.'■-'-'•5?-V.-.- , Six months ago in the crisis or, this great war you 'came to my aid: since then we have worked together in the very closest intimacy. One difficulty - after another has been surmounted; vast schemes of new construction have been carried through; andtremendous reinforcements are now approaching the Fleet. Over 'the ; whole -range of war -policy and naval administration there is nothing that I know of on whioh we -are disagreed the series of events which have led us into the "Dardanelles." Even then we are speed upon the immediate steps, for I shall not press •any wish about reinforcement*; beyond the point to which you were willini to go—;, namely, the six earliest monitors. We are now fully agreed that the Fleet; is not to, attemptSo rush the Narrows, but is to support the Army in its gradual advance upon the forts by land. Orders in' this sense have been- given with which you were in complete accord. : ■ -, - It seems to me that the only course now is to hold on, to go stow", putting as many .ships as possible in Malta and the Canal, out of harm's way, and using the destroyers whioh are out there to hunt the submarines and convoy the Army Corps.which is how starting. If you came into the Admiralty to-morrow for the first time and looked at the problem as it now is, you would advise this as the only practical course. You must feel as I do and as ths> War Council decided, that, whoever may. be responsible for the original step, to withdraw now cannot be contemplated. The announcement of your resignation at this juncture will be accepted ..everywhere as proof that the military operations as well as the naval at the Dardanelles have failed. The position of the Army, which I has suffered a loss of 30,000 men in a joint \ operation, will be jeopardised. The admission of failure at the Dardanelles, for so your resignation would be- exdoited all over the world, -might prove the deciding factor in the oa«e of Italy, now trembling -on the brink. ; The ■ knowledge of ■{. these : facts forces mo. not for any own sake (for the fortunes of individuals do not matter now), to appeal to you not to make your resignation operative until at least Italy has de. clared herself, for ; which the latest date is the 26th., Meanwhile,' Sir Arthur Wilson could, if you desire it,; do your ; work. ; There ought.to be no reproaches between us, and you, my friend, must at this moment in your long career,; so act that no ,one can : say you were unmindful of the public interests and of the lives of the soldiers . and sailors. /,/■■;.:< "-:'. : :y: "...-/-. _ In any case, whatever you decide I claim, in the name of -friendship and in the name of duty, a person interview—if only for the purnose of settling what explanation is to be offered to Parliament. .•--.•>: ■/.--'■.. v -• . Lord Fisher to ■ Mr. Churchill. - * f. May, 16. 1915.--; :Dear Winston.— ; -•-»'?-•- ■ As usual, your letter is most persuasive, but I really have considered everything and l I have definitely ?* told V the Prime Minister that I leave to-morrow (Monday)»., Please don't wish to see me. I could •ay nothing" as I am determined not : to. I know I am doing right. *.; ~ <-. - Yours, v ; ._.,..-,• ■... FISHER." It was no use persisting further, and I turned to consider new combinations. 1 : (To be continued daily.) . ;