DOGGER BANK ACTION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18562, 21 November 1923, Page 6

DOGGER BANK ACTION.

CEimCHILL MEMOIES.

"THE LION KHOCKEB 9UT." '' v." ' .■'... :

HOW VON HIPPER ESCAPED.

©EAOTY'S ORDER MISREAD

BY THE RT. HON WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

(Copyright). Mr. Churchill begins this chapter with a reference to Sir John Jellicoe s anxiety about the Grand Fleet and his request that the battle-cruisers should bo withdrawn from the Firth of Forth to Cromarty, which would have rendered tnem useless in the action of the Dogger Bank. He goes en to show Admiral von Ingenohl's reason for choosing 3™™*? -»» 1915 as the data of the naval attack. On the 23rd Lord Fisher, who, in spite of several divergencies of view, which will bo dealt with later, had been very staunch and good to me oyer the Jellicoe incident, was laid up with a cold. 1. therefore, visited him at Archway .House, which adjoins the Admiralty buildings.. Wo had a long and pleasant talk over our various problems. It was nearly noon whan I regained ray room in the Admiralty. I had hardly sat down when the door "opened quickly, and in marched Sir Arthur Wilson unannounced. He looked at me intently, and there was a glow in his eye. Behind him came Oliver, with charts and. compasses. " First Lord, these fellows are coming out again." "When?" A " To-night. We have just got time to get Beatty there." " Get. Beady to Sail."

- We sent successively at brief intervals the following telegrams:— Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwnitt,. Harwich. Negative plan Z. All your destroyers and light cruisers will be • wanted to-night. Negative sending destroyers to Sheerne.'is for escort. Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, Lion, Eosvth. Get- ready to sail at once with all battle-cruisers and light cruisers and sea-going destroyers. Further orders folAdmiralty • to Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet,. First, second, and fourth battle squadrons, cruisers, and light "cruisers should be ready to sail after dark this evening. . • This done, Sir Arthur explained briefly the conclusions which fie had formed from the intercepted German message which our cryptographers had translated, and from other intelligence of which he was a master. All the German fast vessels were potting to sea at dark, and a raid upon the' British coast was clearly to be expected. My companions then addressed themselves to fixing the rendezvous for the various British forces. The chart and the compass circles showed in a moment that only Beatty from the Forth and Tyrwitt from Harwich could intercept the Germans before they could strike and escape. , The Grand Fleet could not reach the scene till the next afternoon, nor could any .ships stationed at Cromarty. . There was, however, just time for Beatty and Tyrmit to join forces at daylight near the Dogger Bank r. - /: . Laying -the Trap. Wilson and Oliver had already drawn lon the chart, with whit afterwards proved -to be almost exact accuracy, the probable , line of the enemy's course. They stepped ; it out with the compasses hour by hoar, at what they guessed would be the German speed; till it reached our coasts. They then 'drew from the Forth and Harwich ■■:. the intercepting lines of Beatty and of ; Tyrwhitt. ' The intention was that the British forces should' meet and be united ■■■: at daybreak at some point about 10 miles, - or half-an-hour behind the enemy after he had passed westward, and consequently be between him and his home. We discussed whether we could run the risk of a more adventurous scoop—i.e., a rendezvous for ships still farther, to the . eastward. This would give more certainty, of being between the enemy and his home, but also more chance of missing him if ;< the weather became thick and remembering what had happened on December 16, :■■ this last possibility Framed' a very serious one. Thus the rendezvous was fixed for 7 o'clock the next morning, the 24th, in 55deg. ; Ifoniu North. : '3de^^ 12min. East ; Le., 130 miles from Heligoland and almost . in :a" line drawn from Heligoland to the Firth of Forth. ' ,

»- y The Enemy la Sight. i >/* The telegram of instructions visa' sent •id ;| the ' Commander-in-Chief with the ' . Grand Fleet at Scapa- to Admiral Bradford with ' the Third Battle Squadron, to ' Admiral Beatty •: with the battle-crtuflers at Rosyth, and to Commodore Tjnraliitt .' -with 'the light , cruisers and , destroyers at ; Harwich. - V,. Lord Fisher was quite ; content with-the decisions which were \ proposed, and action, was taken accordingly. .... , We were afoot the ; nest morninjr while ' it was still dark, and Fisher, Wilson, Oliver, and I were all in the War Room ' ; when daylight began to grow out of '. doors; The ;: ordinary ' night staff of the , various departments were still at their ;*? posts. 1 -'. Suddenly, with the soreness of , v destiny and the punctuality of a parade, ''. * a telegram ; intercepted from the Fleet 'was' laid before us. It was from the First Y... Light ; Cruiser; Squadron to the Lion •';■' (Beatty) and the Iron Duke (Jellicoe) :— '" (Sent 7.30 m. Received BJ. a.m.) Urgent, Enemy* •in sight. Lat. 54deg. "54mih. . N. ■ - Long. 3deg. ' 30min. : E. '-2 Steering east. Consisting ,of battlecruisers and cruisers, number unknown. .And 'two minutes —Urgent. Lit. J ;.ssdeg.: 24min. N., Long. 4deg. 15min.' E. 'Enemy in sight consisting of cruisers '■' and destroyers, "'battle-cruisers, light cruisers, steering between S.E., and S. So once again it had all come true], V v w The Battle in the Distance.

There can be few purely" mental experiences ' more charged with cold ' excitement than to follow, almost from minute to minute, the phases of a great' naval action from t)s> silent rooms ot • the " Admiralty. Out on blue water in the fighting ships amid the stunning 'detonations, of the cannonade, fractions ! of * the event unfold themselves to the corporeal eye."- There is the sense of action at its highest there is the joy of battle } there is the intense self-effac-ing physical'or mental toil. , But in Whitehall only the clock ticks, and quiet men enter with quick steps laying slips of pencilled paper, before other men equally silent who draw lines and scribble calculations, and point with the finger cr make brief subdued comments. Telegram' succeeds telegram at a few minutes' interval as they are picked up and decoded, often in the wrong sequence, frequently of dubious import and out; of these a picture always flickering and changing rises in the mind, and imagination strikes out around it at every stage flashes of hope or fear. Ist Light Cruiser Squadron to Com-mander-in-Chief:'(Sent 8 a.m. Received 8.30 a.m.), —Enemy's ships have altered course to . N.E. Lion to Commander-in-Chief: (Sent 8.30 a.m. Received 8.37 a.m.). Enemy sighted consisting four battle-cruisers, > four light cruisers, destroyers number un- . known, bearing S. 61, E. 11 miles. My ; Position Lat. 54deg. 50min. N., Long. | -3deg. 37min. E. Course S. 40 E., & :,- j k lots. ■;..-.■ S^ manderinCllief to 3rd Battle aS_f {^ nt 9 A '' m - Reived 9.18 '■ ■ SEES; ' °««d» Heligoland. '4 C'ffi?™?!"! Thitfc to Commander-in-irL-ii a ' ra ' Received 9.27 astern 1 X?ft a »d 3rd Flotilla are «,€**&sS&eE$ W6 V T *o miles. Squadron: (Scnufe • to „ 3rd Battle '; *.n,.) rAct y n su p^ rt \ m ; Reived 9.28 Squadron. . Ml,or t Ist Batvlo Cruiser a. m^vTdT4^m ? ie i : **«* enemy battleVnlittlv *s*->-—Am engaging Ist Light CrVileTk? an , ga 16 »°°0 vards ':■:,.. (Sent 10.8 »* L/ 1 !*^ 8 • to E m Enemy detached 10 ' 18 a -^! cruiser , Am driven off BJlrm ° sfc "battle- • Ist Light Cruise-, I .Vi , .. ;. . .. • (Bent ,10.21 0 »^^^;:^?sh^|^^;;^B.)rT

"' lst Light Cruiser Squadron to Com-mander-in-Chief and •" Lion: : i (Sent 10.15 aim.' Received 10.63 a.m.) —Enemy's ': air!ships E.S.E. t-y'X'y-vy ■ / '---:..-r : : ' '•'■-:' We had not > heard ' the lion speak for nearly an hour and • a-half, during the whole of which period presumably she and the First Battle Cruiser Squadron- were in full battle. Evidently Sir John JeLlicoe also felt the weight of this oppressive silence. : v'■■.•.'• *y'■?'■■ *;.'.V/»> v' Commander-in-Chief to Lion : (Sent 11.9 a.m. Received by Admiralty 11.15 a.m.). —Are you in action =, > Another twenty-three minutes' silence, seaming much longer, ensued. Then, at last at 11.37 came in the following message, not from the Lion or the First Battle Cruiser Squadron ? but from the Senior Officer commanding the Second BattleCruiser Squadron to the Commander-in-Chief v. - > ' Heavy engagement with enemy battlecruisers. Lat. 54deg. 19min. N., Long. sdeg. smin. E. Someone said "Moore is reporting; evidently the Irion is knocked out." Across' mv mind there rose 'a purely irrelevant picture. I thought of the Memorial Services I had so often attended in Westminster Abbey; the crowd and uniforms, the coffin with, the Union Jack, the- searching music. Beattv! That vision at least was not. true; but, alas ! too-true, indeed, " The Lion knocked out." . At 10.52, while in the hottest action with the Seydlitz, the Moltke, and the Derfllinger, the Lion, which had already teceived.l4 hits, was suddenly struck in a spot vital to her speed and fatal, as it proved, to our complete victory.' Her port engine failed, she,listed 10 degrees, and her speed sank in a few. minutes to 15 knots. J At i his moment (10.54) when the Lion was falling out of the line, and the Tiger, the Princess Royal and New Zealand were drawing swiftly past her, the wash of a periscope on the starboard bow was reported from the Lion's foretop to Admiral Beatty, and seen by both the Admiral and his staff. German submarines were, as wo now know, actually near this area at this time. To avoid this new danger bv a quick manoeuvre, he ordered the whole squadron to turn 8 points to port together —i.e., across the rear of the enemy and at right angles to his own previous course. This movement was intended to be of the briefest duration, and four minutes later the Admiral modi-. fied it by the signal: "Course northeast. "-

A Critical Moment. Matters now, however, passed completely beyond his control. The Lion was falling far astern of her consorts. Her wireless had been shot away, her searchlights were smashed, and only two signal halyards were left. Thus at this crisis when the great vessels, friend and ;foe, wero shearing through the water at nearly thirty miles an hour, and, once deflected were altering their relationship dn space every second, the Lion, carrying in Admiral Beatty the whole spirit and direction of the battle, was crippled and almost dumb. Her last two signals were "Attack the rear of the enemy," and then as a parting induction "Keep close to the enemy. Repeat the signal the Admiral is now making." But the signal flags, blowing end on, were difficult to read, and none of the battle-cruisers' took in the final order. - It was at -this juncture and in thes» circumstances that Rear-Admiral Moore, whose flag was flying an the New Zealand, now third in the line, succeeded to the command.' He was an officer whose distinguished abilities had made him invaluable as Third Sea Lord during the greater part of my tenure at the Admiralty. He had earnestly desired a sea command adequate to his rank and services. His wish had been accorded, ;nd now almost /at once Fortune " presented herself to him in mocking and dubious r" He was not certain at' first that . had succeeded to the command. It was never l - formally , transferred. He did not know why Admiral Beatty had: suddenly turned so sharply to the north. . No hostile submarines had been reported .= to him. ' :~ Operation Goes to Pieces. ; - The signal "Attack the rear of the enemy " was hoisted on the Lion before the compass signal " Course north-east " had been hauled down.' Both signals were therefore read' by ail the battlecruisers as one, and this was interpreted by Rear-Admiral Moore as a direct order to attack the forlorn and isolated Blucher, which actually bore north-east from him at that moment. Neither Admiral Moore nor any of the battle-cruisers ever received the signal " Keep closer to the enemy.." He therefore Buffered the Tiger, his leading ship, to continue on her' course , under the same misconstruction of Admiral Beatty'a orders which she had independently sustained. He gave no order of any kind until; 11.52, taearly an hour after the Lion had fallen out of the line. The whole operation therefore went to pieces.: All four of the British battlecruisers ceased firing on - the retreating Germans and began to circle .round the wretched Blucher, which, already a terrible wreck, was being engaged by the light cruisers and the M" destroyers. At 10 minutes past 12 the Blucher, fighting with desperate courage to the last, rolled over and sank beneath the waves. Of her crew of nearly twelve hundred men, two hundred.and fifty were picked up by the British destroyers and light cruisers; ana more would have been saved but for the intervention of a German seaplane which dropped its bombs indiscriminately on the drowning Germans and ;> ! the British rescuers. '~ ■■;■■ '-. ; -- :

Out of the Jaws of Destruction. Meanwhile, Admiral von flipper, delivered by • a single • fateful shot from almost certain destruction, continued to make off at his best speed toward Heligoland, then 80 miles away, two oat of his three remaining ships burning fiercely, cumbered with wreckage, and crowded with dead and wounded. Thus for the second time, when already in the jaws of destruction, the German Battle Cruiser Squadron escaped. In the opinion of his professional superiors at the \ Admiralty Rear-Admiral Moore bad warrant for what he did or did not do. He had not , departed from a strict interpretation of the actual orders, taken in by his ships. These orders uncorrected by the receipt of the final signal, " Keep closer \to the enemy," seemed to suggest that some reason unknown to Rear-Admiral Moore had led the most daring of our ' naval , leaders to break off the action.

It is not easy to fix the precise moment, while the Lion was dropping astern, when the command actually passed to him. The greater his confidence in Admiral Beatty, the slower he would be to assume control and the more impressive the signals to change the course across the enemy's rear would appear. A quarter of an hour might well have been accounted for in this way; and a quarter of an hour was a long time. Ships just holding their own in pursuit or in station on other ships, with only a small margin of speed to spare, lose distance very quickly once the parallel course is departed from. It was certainly open to him, once he was sure that he was in command and that Admiral Beatty . was out of it, to resume the parallel course and reopen the action with von Hipper's disappearing vessels. But a long delay must have ensued before he could have come within range and his squadron would all the time have been drawing nearer to Heligoland and the German High Seas Fleet. The victory of the Dogger / Bank brought for the time being abruptly to an end the adverse movement against my administration of the Admiralty, which had begun to gather. Congratulations flowed in from every side, and wo enjoyed once again an adequate measure of prestige. The sinking of the Blutcher with the flight, after heavy injuries, of the other German ships was accepted as a solid and indisputable result. The German Emperor was confirmed in the gloomy impressions ho had sustained after the action of August 28, 1914. All enterprise in the German Admiralty was again | effectually quelled, and apart from submarine warfare a period of nearly fifteen halcyon calm rained over the North Sea and throughout Home Waters. The neutral world accepted the event as a decisive proof of British supremacy at '!?.*» A v nd L even at home, the Admiralty It.t.Li ° benefit in a sensible increase of confidence ; and good will. JTq be Continued Daily .J