GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LX, Issue 18556, 14 November 1923, Page 14

GALLIPOLI SECRETS.

CHBECHILL MEMOIRS. ■ ■-' *• '-*'■*■■ | "" ._'''* \ THE VISION OF VICTORY" "NO SUGGESTION OF DOUBT. (Copyright.) It was difficult to judge the prospects of a military landing at this juncture 2*o one knew what troops the Turks had on the snot. Vice-Admiral Carden had statedin his telegram of February 23 that the garrison of the Oallipoli Peninsula is about 40,000 men." This was also the working basis assumed by the War Office. We now know that the force actually in the Peninsula'at this date (the middle of March, 1915) was under 20,000, scattered along the coast in small parties without supports or reserves. It seems probable that if the 29th Division had been on the spot in fighting order it could have been landed, with whatever traps were sent from Egypt, at tins period withouf severe loss, and could have occupied very important and probably decisive positions. The concentrating of all troops allotted, including the French division, was effected as promised by the Admiralty punctually to the date named, namely, March 17. ino naval attack reached its culminating point on the 18th. JNo largo Turkish reinforcements had yet leached the Peninsula. But without the 29th Division the army could do nothing. This was ,Che vital kc> division, the sole regular division, whose movements and arrival governed everySing. Therefore four-fifths of the force assigned to this theatre were concentrated pSSIy as arranged, and the indis. SenS "remaining fifth without which thov could not act?, was three weeks behind them. Thus they were all rendered M By ß the middle of March we had there. for/ reached a turning point not only in the naval operations but m the whole enterprise. Hitherto no serious risks have been run, no losses have been sustained, and no important forces deeply engaged. The original Carden plan of gradual piecemeal reduction has been pursued. It ha« not failed, but it has lagged, and it is now so feebly pressed as almost to be at a standstill. Meanwhile, time 18 passing. Nearly a month has gone since we opened fire. What are the Turks doing? Clearly they must be reinforcing, fortifying, layfee new mines, erecting new torpedo tubes, mounting new puns under the organising energy of their German instructors. What have the Germans themselves been doing? It would probably take about a montu to send' submarines from the Elbe to the Aegean. Have they been sent? Are thev on their way? How far off are thev? They mav be very near. I his was a rapidlv growing anxiety. It was also a spur. " Surelv now the moment has been reached to review the position and policy. Choice of Alternatives. : Surely this is the very moment foreseen from the beginning when, "if matters did not go as we hoped, if the resistance of the forts proved too strong," we could, if we chose break off the operation. Observe we could, in fact, do it in a moment One gesture with the wand and , the whole armada assembled at the Dardanelles, or moving thither—battleships, cruisers, destroyers, brawlers, supply chips, transports—would melt and vanish away. Evening would close on a mighty navy engaged in a world arresting attack; and the sun might rise on empty ; Beaa and silent shores. Further, was not this the moment to consider alternatives? The prolonged bombardment of the Dardanelles had assured lv drawn continually increasing Turkish forces to the Gallipoli Peninsula • and the Asiatic shore. Guns, ammunition, supplies of every kind with which the ..Turks were so "ill-provided, had been scraped and dragged from every other point, or were on the move. Moreover, the Russians had, by a brilliant effort, largely restored the situation in the Caucasus. The British and French troops now on the sea might not be strong | enough to land and storm the plateaus j and ridges of Gallipoli. "3ut no one could doubt their ability to take and hold Alexandretta— cutting from the Turkish Empire one vast portion, severing the . communications of their army threatening "Egypt, and intercepting the stream of sorelv needed supplies and foodstuffs from the East. ' For such a descent, the Dardanelles . operations were the best of all preliminaries—a sincere feint. Lord Fisher's Support. On me these considerations made no impression. I knew them all and I rejected them all. I was unswervingly set upon the main enterprise. I believed that if we 'i tried hard enough wo could force the Dardanelles and that if we succeeded in this a truly decisive victory would have been gained. But where were the admirals, generals, and statesmen who did not see these clear-cut conclusions, who had doubtshad always had doubts —about the feasibility of the operation, - about the margin of the Grand < Fleet, about the utility of operations in the Eastern theatre! Here surely was the time for them. Here surelv was the time for Lord Fisher. He could say with perfect propriety and consistency, "We have given the Carden plan a good trial. I never liked it much. It has not come off; but if has been a very good demonstration; it has fooled the Turks; it has helped the Russians; it has cost U3 practically nothingnow let us break off altogether or turn to something else." Later on in April, when we were far more deeply committed, had Buffered palpable loss and rebuff, and could not withdraw without great injury to our war prestige, suggestions of this kind were indeed made. But what happened? So far from wishing to break off the operations, the First Sea Lord was never at any time so resolute in its support. He assented willingly and cordially to the new decision; which was now; taken to' change the gradual tentative limited liability advance into a hard, determined, and necessarily hazardous attack. He approved the momentous Admiralty telegrams which I now drafted after full discussion in our War Group, and, of course, with continuous reference to the Prime Minister. Ho even offered to go out and hoist his flag and take command at the Dardanelles himself, saying that the responsibility was so great that it could only be borne by the highest, authority. Subsequently, although it greatly 'Complicated his position, Lord Fisher himself informed the Dardanelles Commissioners of this fact in a very frank and chivalrous manner. Agreed to Press On. So far as the other responsible authorities cited in these pages were concerned, no sign of disagreement wa6 manifested. Sir Arthur Wilson, Sir Henry Jackson, Admiral Oliver, Commodore do Bartolome, all were united and agreed to press on and to press hard. The Ministers seemed equally decided. "War Office and Foreign Office were eager and hopeful. The Prime Minister did not even think it necessary to summon a council and put the point to them. I have never concealed my opinion. I rejoiced to find so much agreement and force gathering behind the ® nt * rr My only complaint has been "'♦£ *{?**■ high resolve was not carried ;«irougn by all parties *° a definite conclusion. :! and' httoeh o e emanation of this unity bad ffihS?°rJ io ° °* »en; Bthe "* nt al Scene. The imof the fflr&gTi ° the ****** and all mind? *5> J»Z l >eyon<, - nad Pressed "ad been duialS£ * £omomation which ** -till .figS 8 * & *? a on March 6 °« Bulgaria, of R,™ oattlt !J*» of Italy, attention v Dla ' c! ° r€ «» »C "P. /There wt;. fe° M 1 b,ood ■"*« nr, d dare. All th» I*ii """M" to do ion nectary *£&"*' »™* »hesgreat operatic by 2a^L a f d A l *™ ch a forthcoming. But a la* land "*»» **>" late! " ° w '. au ». month * too